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Thesis Abstract
The National Dock Labour Scheme had protected British dockers and had provided a 
definition of "dock work'. Technical innovations in cargoes handling, especially 
containerisation, however, had altered how dock work was performed and had reduced 
the numbers of men needed. This had exacerbated problems in an industry notorious for 
its contentious industrial relations and had helped persuade the 1979-1997 Conservative 
government to deregulate the ports industry. The Scheme was abolished in 1989 and 
trade union derecognition followed.
This thesis plots work and employment change in the Port of London between abolition 
in 1989 and the first test of recognition under the 1999 Employment Relations Act 
(ERA) in 2002. It is based on responses to a survey devised for this investigation and on 
interviews and conversations with both employers and cargo handlers working in the 
Port.
Technical innovation had not only changed the nature of dock work but had also changed 
the area of competition. Abolition had allowed employers to remain competitive by 
introducing changes in work organisation - contractual functional and temporal 
flexibility, for example - and by segmenting the workforce. Men working in the Port 
experienced these changes as a decline in terms and conditions; this was especially true 
for the redundant dockers in the "new' temporary docks labour force, who had seen their 
employment change from secure to insecure. From about the mid-1990s, men working 
at various terminals had been able to regain some control over the labour process; this, 
however, had been outside union organisation. Although the main dock workers Branch 
had sustained organisation throughout the 1990s, it had suffered a decline in both 
numbers and power. Two Port employers had volunteered recognition under ERA. 
During the period covered by this research, however, this had seen only minor 
improvements in industrial relations.
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Chapter One 1
Chapter One: The Dock Labour Scheme, Deregulation and Change in
the Port of London
Between 1947 and 1989, the National Dock Labour Scheme (hereafter referred to as the 
Scheme) had underpinned employment in the British ports industry. In 1989, however, 
and as part of the 1979-97 Conservative government's deregulation and privatisation 
programme, the Scheme was abolished: this was followed in 1991 by ports privatisation. 
The restructuring that followed had a profound effect on the British ports industry. 
Employers were able to alter the ways both work and employment were organised: this 
was experienced by dockers as a reduction in working terms and conditions.
The main impetus behind abolition had been technical innovations in cargo handling. 
New technology had been the driving force behind globalisation, and had been 
developed in order to reduce costs and thus increase competition. Globalisation opened 
up new markets, and technology made transport faster and cheaper. This, in turn, 
stimulated world trade, approximately 98 percent of which is carried by sea (Chris 
Ellison, Executive Director of Maritime London to "Maritime London' Conference, 15* 
March 2002).
The major technical innovations in shipping had been unitisation and containerisation 
(discussed in more detail in Chapter Two). These had been developed to improve 
competition, allowing shipping lines to introduce new operating strategies and exploit 
new markets, helping them to "survive in the new global economy they have helped 
create" (Slack et al, 1996: 289). The full impact, however, had been felt by dockers. 
Carried in a box rather than loose, containerised cargoes needed fewer men to handle 
them; as a result, the number of port workers declined throughout the world.
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Taking the Port of London as a case study, this thesis discusses the long-term effects of 
change in a single port. It looks at how, in response to technical innovation, the 
employers were able to utilise abolition in order to implement changes in work and 
employment organisation, and at how those changes affected the men working in the 
Port. It also examines their impact on industrial relations and discuses how the 
Transport and General Workers Union (T&G) sustained union organisation within the 
Port during the 1990s, when the union had been derecognised by many Port employers.
The Port of London was chosen for this investigation for a number of reasons. These 
included London's prominence, its militant reputation, and the absence of recent 
research on the Port. A final consideration had been the researcher's proximity to, and 
because of prior research (see Howson, 1997) interest in the Port.
Historically the greatest port in Britain, London had had the largest workforce, and 
therefore the greatest problems associated with labour and labour relations, in an 
industry renowned for its militancy. London, prior to 1989, had been one of the most 
militant ports. These problems had, from the 19th century, made London a focus for 
research (see, for example, Booth, 1892, and Hill, 1976). Despite dock and wharf 
closures from the 1960s, London had continued to be one of Britain's leading ports. In 
1999, when this investigation began, it had been Britain's busiest port by tonnage. 
Although the closure of the Shell Haven oil refinery at the end of 1999 saw it slip to 
third place overall, London was still the largest general cargo port in Britain in 2001 (the 
last figures available - see Port of London Authority, 2002:2). However, there had been 
no in-depth research carried out specifically on London since 1995 (see Mankelow, 
1996); this investigation, therefore, wanted to examine the long-term effects of abolition
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in what was still a major port, and to discover what happened to a militant workforce
when it lost its Voice'.
1:1 The Research Questions
Technical innovation and abolition had raised questions in three main areas - the impact 
of technical innovation of the labour process, the effects of abolition on work 
organisation and the employment relationship, and industrial relations. In order to 
capture nuanced changes, the main questions were then sub-divided. Looking at change 
from the point of view of the employers in the Port of London and the men working for 
them, the first set of questions concerning the impact of technical innovation asked were:
  What impact had technological innovation had on the port labour process? 
Had this been changed by abolition? How had 'dock work' altered as a result?
  What impact did technical innovation have on employment and work organisation 
within the Port of London?
  Had this seen control of the labour process transferred from the men to the
employers? What form had any resistance taken? Had the men been able to regain 
any of that control and, if so, how?
The second set of questions, on the affects of abolition, asked:
  How had abolition altered the organisation of work and employment in the Port 
of London? What impact did this have on working conditions in the Port?
  To what extent had the employment relationship changed following abolition? How 
prevalent had workforce segmentation become in the Port of London?
In particular:
  Terms and conditions of full-time employees: how did they compare between 
workers at various sites within the Port and in comparison with the temporary 
labourers who worked alongside them?
  The job content of both full-time employees and temporary labourers: Were they 
different and, if so, in what ways and why?
  Skills comparison: between temporary cargo handlers and other manual temporary 
workers: Were they as low skilled, and did they only work on low-skilled tasks?
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The third set of questions looked at industrial relations and union organisation within the 
Port, and asked:
  How had abolition affected industrial relations in the Port of London? How 
had the main T&G Branch coped with these changes? What impact did the 
1999 Employment Relations Act (ERA) have on industrial relations?
  Had trade union organisation been sustained in the ports industry in London 
following derecognition? How had the Branch attracted new members during the 
1990s? How had Branch members' problems been solved?
  What steps, if any, had the T&G above Branch level taken in order to aid the 
(possibly) organised workforce in derecognised workplaces within the Port?
  How had the T&G at Branch level reacted to the advent of ERA? What impact 
would ERA have on wider employment relationships within the Port?
These questions were explored by examining the experiences of the employers and the 
men who worked in six companies in the Port of London - four direct employers and two 
labour-supply agencies (see Appendix 3: 4 for details). These firms ranged not only in 
size, from a small company employing 10 men directly, to large firms and divisions of 
companies employing between 100 and 500 people, but also by the type of cargoes 
handled, thus allowing a variety of experiences to be captured. In order to explore 
change from the point of view of the union, the research also looked in depth at the 
experiences of the members of the main T&G dockers Branch in London, based at 
Tilbury.
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter Two looks at the wider effects of 
containerisation on work and employment and gives a brief history of the Port of 
London; it also examines the ways in which it was restructured following abolition, and 
Chapter Three discuss how the research was carried out. The thesis then discusses the 
research findings. Chapter Four examines the employers' implementation of change 
and looks at how this affected working terms and conditions, whilst Chapter Five
Chapter One 5
discusses the men's subjective experience of those changes. Chapter Six looks at 
industrial relations in the Port during the 1990s, and also looks at the early effects of 
ERA. Finally, Chapter Seven compares the research findings with the current literature 
on the main areas covered by this investigation, and offers some conclusions.
However, in order to understand change, one must be familiar with what went before. In 
order to place this investigation in context, therefore, the following section examines the 
Scheme: why it was introduced, how it worked, and the factors behind its abolition. 
1:2 - The National Dock Labour Scheme 
The Scheme
The Scheme, which covered the major ports in Britain, was introduced under the Dock 
Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act 1946. It was effective from June 1947 and 
survived virtually intact until its abolition in 1989.
Based on World War Two regulations introduced by Ernest Bevin, the former T&G 
General Secretary and then Minister of Labour, the Scheme was introduced in order to 
regulate what was then one of the most notorious of casual industries in Britain. By 
ending employment irregularity, the Scheme was intended to give dockers regular 
employment and, therefore, financial security; thus alleviating the social and economic 
problems caused by casual employment in the docks (Phillips and Whiteside, 1985). 
This was achieved by not only controlling access to dock work - by the compulsory 
registration of both employers and dockers so that only registered men could work for 
registered employers - but also by paying dockers maintenance when work was 
unavailable.
Chapter One 6
The Scheme was based on consent, underpinned by statutory authority (Wilson, 1972). 
It was administered jointly by the employers and the unions through a National Dock 
Labour Board (NDLB) and 22 local Boards (LDLBs). Wilson (1972: 99) called the 
Scheme " ...the only radical attempt to institutionalise a high degree of genuine 
participation", whilst Hill (1976: 31) wrote that, because it gave so much shared control 
in areas that elsewhere would have been management functions, the Scheme was 
^unique' in British industry.
The Scheme provided a legal definition of "dock work'; who could do it, what they did, 
and where. The 'who' and 'what' was any person employed to perform any work 
connected with the loading, discharging, moving or storage of cargo, defined as goods 
belonging to a third party. Firms in Scheme ports that handled their own cargoes 
(aggregate wharves, for example, or companies such as Fords at Dagenham) were 
exempt from the Scheme. The 'where' was in or near a port, defined as any place where 
ships were loaded or discharged (see Jackson, 1973, 112). Except for the "self- 
handling' firms, the definition of 'docker' was, in essence, a definition of 'dock work', 
as only Registered Dock Workers (RDWs) could perform 'dock work' at any other area 
in a port.
The NDLB collected and collated data on the Scheme, ran training colleges in various 
ports, including London, which gave induction, specialist 1 , and health and safety 
training; it also ran port medical centres (see National Dock Labour Scheme, Annual 
Reports and Accounts). The LDLBs oversaw the day-to-day running of the Scheme in 
individual ports, such as the Port of London, or group of ports. These, until 
decasualisation in 1967, acted as 'holding' employers, allocating men to the various
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wharves and docks, or 'operational' employers. They also ensured that their local 
registers were in line with the amount of work available. This was achieved by 
overseeing recruitment and training, and by enforcing the terms of modernisation 
agreements; these, as will be discussed in Chapter Two, reformed working practices. 
This meant that those on the register would have access to more, and more regular, work 
and, therefore, higher incomes. Before decasualisation, if work was completely 
unavailable, or if an RDW did not work enough hours in a week to earn the guaranteed 
minimum wage, the LDLB made his wages up to that level. This was financed out of an 
employers' levy, and was paid as a percentage of their labour costs (see Phillips and 
Whiteside, 1985: 244).
For RDWs, therefore, the Scheme offered a regular income. To earn it during the casual
f\
era, they had to attend the 'call on' regularly and, if not taken on, accept any work that 
was allocated to them. For the employer, the Scheme ensured that a supply of trained 
men was constantly available. Before decasualisation, the employer did not pay for idle 
time: when the men were no longer needed, they were returned to the LDLB, and it had 
the onus of finding new jobs for them, or paying the guaranteed wage.
Following the recommendations of the Devlin Committee, the ports industry was 
decasualised between 1967 and 1970. The 'call' was abolished and men were 
permanently assigned to various employers, who had to pay them wages whether they 
worked or not. Decasualisation was introduced at about the same time as the effects of 
new cargo handling techniques on jobs was beginning to be felt (see below) and, far 
from bringing peace to the industry, it only served to exacerbate its problems (see 
below). Decasualisation, together with the Jones-Aldington Agreement (see below),
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meant that employers were unable to alter their workforce in response to business needs. 
Any employer who, in busy times, wished to hire extra men had to obtain permission 
from the LDLB; similarly, permission had to be sought for a reduction in an employer's 
complement of RDWs. In this case, however, the Board could, and often did, refuse to 
do so3 .
In order to reinforce the Scheme's provisions, the LDLBs disciplined RDWs for 
breaking Scheme rules. If found guilty of any breach, RDWs were suspended and had 
their benefits removed and, in London, were moved to a different sector within the port 
on their return to work. However, very few men were removed from the register for 
disciplinary offences, prompting Hill (1976: 30) to write that, except in exceptional 
circumstances, RDWs had what "effectively amounted to guaranteed employment..."
The Scheme, however, was only one form of labour regulation in the docks. Terms and 
conditions were negotiated nationally at the National Joint Council for the Port 
Transport Industry (NIC) and supplemented by local agreements, usually between the 
same people who were on the LDLBs, and implemented by the LDLBs. As a result, 
although separate from it, industrial relations in the docks become identified with, and 
inextricably entangled with, the Scheme. 
Abolition of the Scheme
The reasons behind abolition were three-fold: the effects of new handling technology, a 
militant union fighting to preserve jobs in the face of this, and a change in the political 
philosophy of the British government. The following sections look at these factors in 
more detail.
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i. Containerisation
All the time dock work had been labour-intensive and vast armies of men were needed 
to handle the ships, casual labour had remained the predominant form of employment in 
the docks. However, Containerisation and other new cargo handling techniques reduced 
the labour content of dock work. When on Sunday 2nd June 1968, the American Lancer 
berthed at Tilbury docks, the first purpose-build container ship to do so, she started a 
revolution in cargo handling. Rather than the 176 men taking four or five days to unload 
her and then load her again had she been carrying traditional cargo, it took just 15 men 
only 13 hours to turn her around using the new cargo handling techniques. What is 
more, this took place over a Bank Holiday weekend when, traditionally, dockers had not 
worked (Brown, 1978: 132).
The American Lancer had berthed one year after decasualisation under Devlin Phase 
One. One has to ask, was there a connection between these two events? Certainly 
Turnbull and Sapsford (2001: 250) wrote that decasualisation had been "intended to 
pave the way" for Containerisation. All the time traditional cargo handling had been 
performed by cheap, casual labour, port owners found this the most cost-effective 
method of working. However, RDWs wages, especially from the 1950s onwards, were 
higher than those in other sectors (by 1988, the average RDW's earnings were nearly 
£150.00 a week more than other manual workers - see Mankelow, 1994: 45). This, 
arguably, made employers sympathetic to permanent employment - the numbers of 
semi-permanent and permanently employed dockers, who would work as directed, had 
risen since the 1950s (Phillips and Whiteside, 1985: 255) - and to the idea of 
Containerisation because it reduced manpower needs and, therefore, costs.
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For the men, however, containerisation reduced the numbers needed to handle the same 
amount of cargo. In their history of the Port of Tacoma, Magden and Marinson wrote 
that: "a// the manpower needed was a man to drive the straddle carrier, two men to lash 
the container to the crane, one man to operate the crane, and two men to unlash the 
container once aboard the ship" (quoted in Green, 2000: 577). Continued advances in 
cargo handling technology, however, had further reduced manpower requirements. For 
example, men were no longer needed to lash the containers to the cranes by the early 
1990s, and some ports had become fully automatic (see Chapter Two for a description of 
modern port work).
These changes affected the employment prospects of not only stevedores (traditionally 
ship workers) but also other workers in the port. Lightermen were no longer needed to 
move cargo from ships moored mid-stream to the docks, for example, and as each 
container had its own manifest, tally clerks (who had been responsible for checking 
cargoes as they were loaded and discharged) were no longer needed. The main losers, 
however, were dockers, or shore workers. Although RDWs continued to load and 
discharge containers from the ship, their contents could be "stuffed' and 'stripped' 
(packed and unpacked) at container depots situated outside the ports and, therefore, 
outside the restrictions of any port labour scheme (see Turnbull, 1992: 304 and Lloyd's 
List, 2nd December 1999: 16).
New handling technology also changed dockers' skills and skills levels. Anders 
Bjorkland suggested that the best way to characterise technical change in the ports 
industry was "hook, crane, forklift, container (cited in Green, 2000: 575). However,
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only containerisation reduced the need for manpower and replaced the traditional docker 
with "men trained in operating sophisticated equipment..." (Green, 2000: 578).
As a result, employment in Scheme ports fell, both as a proportion of docks employment 
- from 80 percent in 1983 to 64 percent in 1990 (see Evans et al, 1993: 18) - and in 
absolute terms. The following Table shows changes in the numbers on the register in 
three port areas - London, Liverpool, and the South Coast (the ports of Southampton, 
Poole, and Weymouth) - between 1957 and 1988, the last figures available. 
Table 1:1 - Register Changes During the Year, 1957-1988 (year ending)
Year
1957
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1988
Total
74,471
73,144
63,615
44,588
31,884
23,110
11,892
9530
%*
change
-
- 1.8
-13.0
-30.0
-18.5
-12.0
-49.5
-20.0
London
29,912
29,250
25,309
16,573
9825
5793
2648
1759
%
change
-
- 2.1
-13.5
-44.0
-40.7
-43.0
-44.3
-44.6
Liver
Pool
15,974
15,837
13,589
10,797
7546
4820
1999
1506
%
change
-
- 0.8
-14.2
-20.5
-30.2
-36.1
-58.5
-24.7
South
Coast
2041
2083
2020
1728
2180
1798
872
785
%
change
-
+ 2.0
- 3.0
-14.4
+20.7
-17.5
-51.5
-10.0
*percentage change between each period
Source: from: National Dock Labour Board, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts 
1957 to 1988, Appendix One.
The percentage increase in the rate of decline in the total register quickened 
dramatically, especially between 1965-70 and 1980-5. In total, the national register fell 
by 85 percent, or just over 54,000 names, between 1965 and 1988. The rate of decline in 
individual ports, however, was more acute. Between 1965 and 1988, the Liverpool 
register declined by 89 percent, or nearly 12,000 names, whilst the percentage decline in 
London was just over 93 percent, representing 23,550 RDWs who left the industry in 23
years.
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However, and as the above Table shows, the experience of dockers working in South 
Coast ports was largely different. Although the register did decline, the rate was uneven, 
with increases during some periods. The year-on-year figures showed that, between 
1972 and 1974, a total of 800 names were added to the South Coast register. This, 
however, was the last increase and the numbers on the register declined from then on, 
but at a slower rate than in London or Liverpool. This was possibly a reflection of 
investment by Associated British Ports (ABP) and P&O Ports following privatisation 
(see Chapter Two), which made Southampton especially more attractive than the older 
ports of London or Liverpool. 
ii. Trade Union Militancy
Containerisation, then, became a major factor behind the confrontational industrial 
relations that characterised the ports industry in Britain from the late 1960s, as men used 
industrial action as a means of protecting jobs and defending their way of life. As 
mentioned above, the docks had been a union stronghold with a workforce that was 
among the most militant in Britain (see, for example, Turnbull and Sapsford, 1991: 237). 
Reasons for this included that the docks were a pre-entry closed shop: many of the older 
dockers participating in this research recalled that they had to be accepted by the union 
and get a union card before they could apply for port work (interview notes, various). 
Two rival unions represented RDWs in London between 1924 and 1982. These were the 
majority T&G and the minority (but more democratic) National Amalgamated 
Stevedores and Dockers (NAS&D) union which represented mainly stevedores. 
Although a party to the NIC, the NAS&D did not have a seat on it and, rather than co- 
ordinate with the T&G, would use T&G industrial action in order to pursue its own 
grievances (see, for example, PLA Minute Books).
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Because of this, anything could, and did lead to a stoppage4 . Even after decasualisation, 
dockers had used their collective muscle, fostered by intense loyalty and camaraderie, 
and the 'ring' around their jobs provided by the Scheme to wrest concessions from their 
employers on a cargo-by-cargo basis (see Hill, 1976: 197 and Phillips and Whiteside, 
1985: 250). Hatchway strikes remained a daily occurrence into the 1980s. Any 
industrial action had to be immediate, otherwise the ship - and the reason for the dispute 
- would have sailed; because of the delays this could cause, employers were not in a 
position to refuse dockers' demands (see Hill, 1976: 124; and interviews notes, various).
The delays caused by industrial action prompted many shipping companies to move their 
ships to other ports. These included European ports, such as Rotterdam or Antwerp, 
where cargoes for Britain were discharged and transhipped to Britain, or British ports, 
such as Felixstowe (which became the largest container port in Britain), which were 
outside the Scheme. As these ports had none of the manning or other restrictions 
imposed in Scheme ports, they were able to attract investment, especially from 
international ports and shipping companies, thus becoming more competitive. Similarly, 
in case it fell under the Scheme, new businesses, such as ferry or shipping companies 
handling third party cargoes, were reluctant to open on redundant Scheme port land (see 
Chapter Two). As a result, the Scheme became more and more confined to older, 
decaying ports whilst non-Scheme ports prospered. By 1989, non-Scheme ports were 
handling 30 percent by weight (or 50 percent by value) of all UK traffic (see Phillips and 
Whiteside, 1985: 268 and Blyton and Turnbull, 1998: 146).
The Jones-Aldington Agreement, signed following the 1972 national dock strike (itself 
partly due to the effects of containerisation on jobs - see Lindop, 1998), gave RDWs x a
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job for life' by guaranteeing no compulsory redundancies. If, therefore, a registered firm 
closed, the men working there had to be re-allocated to other firms within that port. This 
further increased the labour costs of the companies still in business, becoming a major 
factor in the closure of especially the small stevedoring firms that hired men to load and 
discharge ships. The Agreement had provided that if this was to occur, then the men 
would become the responsibility of the port authority, which became 'employer of last 
resort' (Jack Jones, interview notes, 16/6/00).
RDWs, then, had a guaranteed job and guaranteed wages. The growing labour surplus 
(because of the effects of containerisation on job numbers) meant that, the only way the 
employers could persuade men to leave the industry was through severance payments. 
A national voluntary severance scheme was introduced in 1973. However, London and 
Liverpool, where the problems of surplus labour were the most acute, also had special 
severance schemes, paid for by the government through the Ports (Financial Assistance) 
Act 1982. Severance, however, seemed to have exacerbated manning problems in the 
docks. This was because, as they could find work elsewhere, in London at least, 
severance tended to attract younger men5 , leaving a workforce of increasingly older, 
more infirm men who were less likely to be employable outside the docks. The Port of 
London Authority (PLA), for example, estimated that, in 1978, 1278 RDWs, or 31.4 
percent of its total workforce of 4078, could only perform limited duties (see Port of 
London Authority Minute Book, 6th March 1978).
By the late 1970s, the PLA was heavily in debt. There were a variety of reasons for this, 
including changes in trading patterns, the effects of strikes, severance payments and the 
wages of the less productive workers re-allocated to it. In a bid to save money, the PLA
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closed the West India docks in 1980, followed by the Royal Group in 1981, transferring 
its operations to Tilbury. However, the debt continued and, in 1982, the government 
wrote off PLA debts totalling £28 million (it also cancelled Mersey Docks and Harbour 
Company debts of £36 million: see Port of London Authority Minute Book, 15 th 
December 1982).
Scheme ports, then, were becoming less productive and more uncompetitive. As 
mentioned above, the LDLBs were controlled jointly by the employers and the unions so 
that, in theory6, both sides had an equal say on recruitment, discipline, and severance. 
However, Scheme port employers believed that the only way to enhance competitiveness 
was to regain total control of the dock labour force. This could only be achieved if the 
Scheme was abolished. Various attempts by the employers to negotiate amendments to 
the Scheme with the T&G resulted in threatened or actual strikes (see Turnbull, 
Woolfson and Kelly, 1992: 109). For the PLA, however, a strike in 1983 was ^the final 
straw\ Describing the Scheme as ^an anachronism'' which needed to be ^modified or 
completely abolished', it began to lobby the government for abolition (see Port of 
London Authority Minute Books, 4th July 1983 and 20th February 1984). 
I'M. Changes in Political Philosophy
The abolition of the Scheme was part of the 1979-97 Conservative government's 
deregulatory programme. Millward, Bryson and Forth (2000: 4) felt that the main aim 
of deregulation was to weaken the power of the unions; Brown and Wadhwani (1990: 
58) saw it as reducing the influence of national agreements, thereby reducing the unions' 
capacity to employ sanctions. This, in turn, would allow the dismantling of industrial 
relations systems that dated back to the 1960s or (as in port transport) beyond.
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Rather than regulated by statute, prior to the 1979 Conservative government's reforms, 
British industrial relations had been characterised by voluntarism. Even the 1968 Royal 
Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations (chaired by Lord Donovan) 
had recommended an enhancement of worker power by the extension of collective 
bargaining: this, however, remained voluntary (see Blyton and Turnbull, 1998: 22 and 
158). Blyton and Turnbull (1998: 201) felt that, because the Donovan reforms had 
undermined workers' respect for management, it had become: "not so much a case of 
workers gaining control as of management losing it". Industrial relations continued to 
deteriorate and Blyton and Turnbull suggested (1998: 144) that the failure of the 
Donovan reforms "paved the way for the Thatcherite strategy of the 1980s". It is clear 
that the Conservatives planned an anti-union, anti-organised labour strategy well before 
the 1979 election (see Economist, May 1978). The Social Contract between the 1974-9 
Labour government and the trade unions had given trade unions legislative protection by 
extending individual workers rights and trade union immunities (leading to an upward 
pressure on wages). By 1979, trade union membership in Britain stood at 55.3 percent 
of the labour force, the highest it was to reach (Beck and Woolfson, 2000: 41).
Coming to power just after 'the winter of discontent', the Conservative government took 
a step-by-step approach to weakening the power and strength of organised labour. Each 
Act significantly altered the balance of industrial power in Britain, making it more 
difficult for workers to take official action. The 1980 Employment Act, for example, 
restricted the closed shop, repealed trade union recognition procedures, and outlawed 
secondary picketing. Further Acts between 1982 and 1993 outlawed 'political' strikes, 
opened up union funds to sequestration, introduced secret (1984) and, in 1995, postal
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ballots before industrial action, and made pre-entry closed shops illegal (see Blyton and 
Turnbull, 1998: 177-9).
The Conservative government saw registration via the Scheme as the root cause of 
inefficiencies and industrial conflict on the docks (Saundry and Turnbull, 1996: 11). 
Phillips and Whiteside had written in 1985 that: "abolition would seem to offer only 
small and nominal benefits, more than outweighed by the disruption and conflict it 
would provoke" (Phillips and Whiteside, 1985: 268). By 1988, however, there were less 
than 10,000 RDWs nationally (see Table 1:1 above) and, as mentioned above, the 
growth of non-Scheme ports had seen Scheme ports become marginalised; as any 
disruption would, therefore, be minimal, it was possible that the Scheme might have 
been allowed to die of inertia7 .
However, the government's proven willingness to take on strong unions and its support
o
for employers that did likewise , and its desire to improve competitiveness in the ports 
industry, made it more amenable to the employer's lobbying for abolition. Mankelow 
(1996: 2) suggested that, coming exactly one hundred years after the 1889 London Dock 
Strike which heralded general unionism, abolition had had a significance for the 
government. It was aimed at crushing what was one of the last bastions of union 
militancy, thus undermining the trade union movement as a whole9 .
The government announced its intention to abolish the Scheme in April 1989 and the 
Dock Work Act, which abolished the Scheme, was passed in July 1989. Because of 
employer delaying tactics (see, for example, Turnbull, Woolfson and Kelly, 1992: 139), 
a strike in defence of the Scheme could not take place until one week after abolition.
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This left striking dockers without the Scheme's protection and vulnerable to any changes 
that the employers wished to implement. The employers issued mass redundancies, paid 
for in part by the government through the Dock Labour Compensation Scheme, which 
ran from July 1989 to June 1992. The initial payments were £35,000, falling in 
gradations throughout the life of the compensation scheme. By the time the scheme 
ended in 1992, approximately 7200 ex-RDWs nationally - including approximately 
1,000 from London - had either been made, or had applied for, redundancy (see 
Turnbull, 1994a: 69 and Mankelow, 1996: 11).
Abolition had other consequences for the British ports industry. Labour deregulation was 
followed by the privatisation of some ports and the sale of others, often to foreign 
interests (see Chapter Two). Smith and Morton (1993: 105) found that employers in 
many sectors, including trust ports, road passenger transport, and British Steel, had 
accompanied privatisation with industrial relations restructuring. These included the 
introduction of individual contracts and performance-related pay, the devolution of 
bargaining, and the hiring of contract labour. They also wrote that "a significant 
development" had been the sub-division of single sites into separate units, and cited 
Tilbury (which was split into six divisions following abolition) as an example (1993: 
106 and 110).
Gallic, Perm and Rose (1996: 5) pointed out that the Conservative anti-union legislation 
had given employers the means to replace voluntarism with new procedures if they 
chose to do so. The National Association of Port Employers, the employers' side of the 
NJC, was disbanded following abolition, allowing employers in many ports, including 
London, to derecognise the trade unions (see Chapter Six). As a consequence of both
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abolition and derecognition, and as Chapters Four and Five will discuss in more detail, 
the employers were able to impose a variety of changes, including contractual flexibility, 
work intensification, and the re-introduction of'casual' labour.
Another change was to rename RDWs - Mockers' became 'terminal operators'. One 
employer remembered this was "# knee-jerk reaction: the term ^docker' was seen as 
pejorative. We wanted to close the door on the past and start again and this was a way 
of doing /Y" ('Paperco' Managing Director, interview notes, 16/8/00). The men, 
however, saw this in a different light: "... ^Oh, like termites?' [ ] termites work hard, 
and that's what we were expected to do" ('Roy', interview notes 26/11/01). 
Conclusion
The Abolition of the National Dock Labour Scheme allowed profound changes to occur 
in the British ports industry. In order to understand their impact, this Chapter has looked 
at conditions under the Scheme and has discussed the reasons for its abolition.
The Scheme had been introduced to safeguard casual dock labourers. By registering both 
employers and dock workers, and defining what a docker could do and where, the 
Scheme gave access to more regular work and, therefore, higher wages. After 
decasualisation in 1967, when men were assigned permanently to one employer, the 
Scheme's raison d'etre was no longer valid. The Scheme, however, continued and the 
union side of the LDLBs were able to protect jobs and working practices that had 
become obsolete as a result of new handling technology, especially containerisation.
Had it not been for containerisation, it is possible that the Scheme might not have been 
abolished, or at least, not when it was. However, containerisation reduced the number of 
men needed and changed the nature of the work they performed and offered the
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opportunity for Scheme ports to become and remain competitive. Scheme port 
employers needed to have control of this new type of workforce and be able to exert 
pressure in order to increase management control. They therefore lobbied a receptive 
government with a deregulatory ethos for abolition, which was enacted in July 1989.
The Chapter also outlined the questions raised by abolition and technical innovation that 
this investigation wished to examine. In order to start answering those questions, the 
following Chapter discusses the wider ports industry and looks at the effects of 
deregulation on work and employment in the industry.
1 The National Dock Labour Scheme Annual Report and Accounts training Appendices 
are a useful source for plotting the introduction of new cargo handling technology to a 
port. For example, the first straddle carrier driving (see Chapter Two) training in 
London was in 1970, suggesting that was when it was introduced.
The 'call' was the traditional form of hiring casual dock labour. In London, in a 
practice unchanged since the 19th Century, huge gangs of men would go to one of the 
approximately 200 "call on' stands scattered throughout the Port. Men working on a job 
were 'called on' first. If, however, a firm needed extra men (because a ship needed to be 
loading or unloading, for example, or a work gang was short of men), there would be a 
free-for-all for work as men, attempting to catch the hiring foreman's attention, jostled 
each other. The 'call' continued in London until 1967 and many of the ex-RDWs 
participating in this investigation who started working in the docks at that time had vivid 
memories of friends fighting each other for a day's work (interview notes, various. See 
also Phillips and Whiteside, 1985).
3 Many employers taking part in this investigation, such as the Taperco' Managing 
Director, recalled repeatedly asking the London Dock Labour Board to sanction 
deductions in their RDW compliment, and constantly being refused (interview notes, 
16/8/00).
4 For example, retired RDWs participating in the investigation remembered, "there was 
always some excuse or something to strike about - silly reasons " or "if we wanted a day 
off, we had a strike" (interview notes, various).
5 The term "younger men' is relative. By 1988, the average age of an RDW was just 
over 47 years. One reason for this was that, because to the effects of containerisation on 
jobs, there had been a moratorium on recruitment since the early 1970s.
6 Many employers participating in this investigation recalled that, because of the impact 
any form of industrial action could have on productivity, they were reluctant to make an
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issue of any situation. They also remembered the unions as the dominant force on the 
London Dock Labour Board (interview notes, various.).
7 Many of those taking part in this investigation, both trade union activists and 
employers, believed that, until early 1989, abolition had not been a priority for the 
Thatcher government and that it would be allowed to fade away. Other participants (one 
employer and two union activists), however, believed that, given the government's 
deregulatory stance, abolition was inevitable.
8 Turnbull, Woolfson and Kelly (1992: 163) wrote that the defeat of the union had been 
planned since early 1989, and that both the employers and the government saw London 
as a ^key battleground'. In 1986, the government had praised Rupert Murdock for taking 
on the print unions when he sacked all the union printers at Wapping and replaced them 
with those willing to accept complete management authority.
Dockers in London also recognised the significance of abolition. Talking about the 
funeral procession of Jack Dash, the 1960s unofficial London leader who died during the 
1989 strike, "Andrew', a dismissed activist, recalled that it was "like... we were 
marching out of history [ ] like the funeral march of the end of our bloody era, a 
hundred years of dockers power - over" (interview notes, 23/1/01).
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Chapter Two: Technical Innovation, Deregulation and Effects on the
Port Transport Industry
The preceding Chapter looked at work and employment under the Scheme and examined 
the reasons behind its abolition. This Chapter continues to set this investigation into 
context by examining the ports industry in the 1990s; looking at why and how it 
changed, and at the impact technical innovation had on the ports labour process. By 
reviewing the literature on deregulation, segmentation, labour law and union 
marginalisation, the Chapter then examines the wider world of work that dockers were 
thrust into on abolition.
2:1 - The Port Transport Industry in the 1990s 
The British Ports Industry
Unlike ports in many other parts of the world, where both the port and its facilities were 
in common, often municipal, ownership, individual facilities within a British port were 
privately owned. The ports themselves were also owned and operated in one of three 
ways. The nationalised British Transport Docks Board was sold to form Associated 
British Ports (or ABP) in 1982, and other ports, such as the Port of Bristol, were 
municipally owned. Lastly, yet other ports, including the Port of London, were trust 
ports, or non-profit making public corporations established by individual Acts of 
Parliament. Ports nationalisation and regulation, especially the Scheme's definition of 
what cargo was and who could handle it (see Chapter One), had made Scheme ports 
especially less attractive to take over and acquisition.
However, the 1991 Ports Act 1 enabled ports that wished to do so to transfer from trust 
status to public limited companies. Only six ports - Tees and Hartlepool, the Forth Ports 
Authority, The PLA at Tilbury, and the Medway ports (1993), Dundee (1995) and 
Ipswich (1997) - had taken advantage of the Act by 1999. In keeping with the extension
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of popular shareholding, the government's preferred option was that the ports were sold 
to a management-employee-buy-out (or MEBO) (see Thomas, 1994: 143).
The aim of the 1991 Act had been to enhance ports' development prospects by giving 
them access to public funds. This would not only make the ports more accountable, but 
would also allow surplus port land to be redeveloped. This allowed some companies, 
such as ABP and P&O Ports (see Table 2:1 below) to diversify into property 
development as well as into distribution and shipping. It also allowed port owners to 
withdraw from cargo handling and for other, previously non-port operators such as 
temporary labour agencies, to enter the industry. Deregulation and privatisation also 
opened up the industry to different forms of ownership. By 1997, an estimated 70 
percent of British ports were in private hands (Saundry and Turnbull, 1999: 285). These 
included foreign port operators. In their appraisal of changes in port ownership and 
operating structure following abolition, Turnbull and Weston (1993b: 113) estimated 
that one in five of the 230 organisations they surveyed in 1990 were foreign owned. 
The Port of London
The Port of London stretches from Teddington Lock to a point off the Nore Lighthouse 
in the Thames Estuary. There were, until the 1960s, 10 dock systems (built piecemeal 
during the 19th and early 20th centuries) stretching from Tower Bridge to Tilbury, and a 
large number of private wharves and warehouses lined the river.
Between 1909 and 1993, the dock systems in the Port had been under the auspices of the 
PLA, a trust established under the Port of London Act, 1908, and responsible to the 
Board of Trade. Members of the Board of the PLA were elected by port users, such as 
ship owners and wharfingers (owners of the wharves) or nominated by the Board of
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Trade. Uniquely in a British Port, the PLA Board also had representatives of labour, 
appointed by the Board of Trade (see Howson, 1997). Although restructuring of the 
PLA following abolition saw the removal of the labour representatives, the structure of 
the PLA Board remained virtually intact (see Port of London Authority Annual Review 
2002 for a list of current Board members).
At the same time as dockers in London and in other Scheme ports across Britain were 
given permanent employment after 1967, economic factors, such as changes in trading 
patterns (which shifted cargoes away from London) and technical factors were leading to 
docks closure. However, the major factor in this decline was containerisation. London 
suffered 'the most comprehensive decline' of any European city port (Baird, 1996: 151) 
because of this. At 80 metres draft at low tide, the Thames around the Isle of Dogs and 
at Beckton was too shallow for even the smallest container ships (see Hill, 1976: 3 and 
Baird, 1996: 149). Consequently, the upstream docks became redundant and were 
gradually closed from the late 1960s, with the Royal Group, the last docks in London 
proper, closing in 1981. This left only Tilbury Docks, designated a Port within the Port 
of London in 1988, and a decreasing number of wharves in the upper Port open. Despite 
perceptions that the Port became mainly confined to Tilbury (compare Barton and 
Turnbull, 2002: 143 with Miscellaneous Appendix One, for example), as Appendix 2 
shows, ships carrying a variety of cargoes continued to call at riverside wharves as far 
upstream as Tower Hamlets and Greenwich.
Following the 1991 Ports Act (see above), the Port of Tilbury, then part of the London 
trust port, was sold to a MEBO, allowing the PLA to withdraw from cargo handling. 
Although cargo handlers working at Tilbury became shareholders, they did not have any
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influence in the running of the Port. The MEBO sold Tilbury to Forth Ports in 1995, the 
working shareholders became "...standard, straightforward employees of Forth Ports'" 
(TauT, interview notes, 22/2/01). Still a trust Authority, the PLA continues to own the 
tidal riverbed and the shore to the high water mark, and retains various statutory 
responsibilities (see PLA Annual Report and Accounts 2000: 6).
By 1999, both abolition and the Ports Act had facilitated new operational structures. 
This investigation, however, found these extremely complex and difficult to unravel (see 
also Chapter Three). For example, many companies, including the PLA at Tilbury, had 
decentralised part or all of their businesses, operating them as autonomous units. This 
fragmentation of the workforce had an impact on industrial relations. As discussed in 
Chapter Six, fragmentation at Tilbury reduced collective cohesion. This, for the 
employer, not only avoided a return to the industrial relations system prevalent under the 
Scheme, but also gave them enhanced control over the workforce. Other companies, 
such as "Generalco' and Denton's Wharf (which ceased trading in late 2000) had closed 
in mid-1989, only to reopen later that year under new names. In common with other 
new entrants, (see, for example, Cully et al, 1999: 241), these "new' companies did not 
recognise a union (ETGRE survey (see Chapter Three) and interview notes).
Taperco', which moved to the Port of Chatham at the end of 1999, was an interesting 
example of an autonomous unit. Although operating as such, a search of company 
details at Company's House, London revealed that its ultimate owner was the News 
Corporation, which also owned media group News International. Arguably, Taperco's 
specialisation in paper handling, together with Deptford's proximity to the Wapping 
print rooms, made it an ideal purchase (see also Chapter Four).
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The International Ports Industry
The state regulation of employment was common not only in Europe but also in the 
United States and Australasia. These had elements in common with the British Scheme 
discussed in Chapter One. For example, Mock work' was legally defined and was 
restricted to Mock workers' in Belgium, and in Australia Mock work' was restricted to 
members of the Waterside Workers Federation and was jointly regulated by the 
employers and the union. However, many of these schemes (in France, Australia and 
New Zealand, for example) were abolished between 1989 and 1992 (Turnbull, 1994: 66- 
7). In their report on a questionnaire dispatched by the International Transport 
Federation (ITF) in 1992-3, Turnbull and Wass (1995a, 16) found that 42 percent of ITF 
affiliates throughout the world had experienced privatisation and 53 percent deregulation 
of employment. In many countries - Argentina, for example - deregulation had been a 
precursor to privatisation (1995a: 16). Turnbull and Wass (1995a: 21) further found 
that, rather than participants in them, many unions saw themselves as "victims' of those 
reforms. On restructuring, dockers in Trinidad and Tobago, for example, or Fiji, had 
faced compulsory redundancy, and the terms and conditions of those remaining in the 
industry had deteriorated (1995a: 19-21).
The ITF survey also found that the policies and standards set by external funding bodies 
had been a major factor in port reform (Turnbull and Wass, 1995a: 15). In order to 
handle containerised cargoes (which rapidly become the predominant form) ports had to 
adapt their layouts and invest in new cargo handling equipment, such as quayside gantry 
cranes and straddle carriers (see Hayuth and Hilling, 1992: 40 and below). In the past, 
port development had usually been funded internally; however, the scale of investment 
needed forced many, especially developing, countries to apply for loans to international
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funding agencies, such as the World Bank (see Turnbull, 2000a: 5). Structural 
Adjustment Programmes introduced by those bodies meant that ".. .market forces are 
substituted for state control via programmes of privatisation, restructuring, 
liberalisation, commercialisation and deregulation" (see 1994: 15 and Grosdidier de 
Matons, 1986 for an appraisal of ports projects funded by the World Bank).
Not all ports were deregulated, however. Barton and Turnbull (1999: 27) found that 
registration of port workers and the existence of labour "pools' (where dockers were 
"shared' by a number of employers who hired them when needed) remained extensive in 
the European Union, including the premier ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam. They 
suggested this was because such arrangements were beneficial to the employers. 
Registration in Europe acted as a form of "reward' for technical competency and 
signified that the port worker was trained and qualified, thus acting as a form of control 
over the quantity and quality of the labour force.
Even where labour schemes had been abolished or substantially altered, Barton and 
Turnbull (2002: 30) found that unions in European ports especially had remained 
influential. Many docks unions also remained militant. Although there were fewer than 
10 recorded disputes in British ports during the 1990s (Turnbull 2000b: 368), there had 
been stoppages in ports throughout the world, including an estimated 135 on the US 
West Coast between July 1996 and July 1998 alone (2000b: 367). Turnbull wrote that 
these ^end of the millennium'' strikes had been precipitated by "labour market 
deregulation, product market liberalisation and commercialism/the privatisation of 
state-owned ports" (2000b: 368: see also Financial Times, 19th June 2002 for the factors 
behind the West Coast dock strike).
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2:2 - The Impact of Technical Innovation 
Containerisation and Globalisation
As mentioned in Chapter One, competition and technical innovation in transport had 
been the driving forces behind globalisation. Before the introduction of new cargo 
handling technology, goods were packaged individually, in a method known as 'break 
bulk'. Handling was a slow, laborious process and, as result, ports became congested. 
New forms of packaging cargo - shrink wrapped on pallets, for example, or pre- 
packaging timber - gradually speeded up cargo handling: the major innovation, 
however, was containerisation.
Although removal firms had used containers to move goods since the 1940s, it was not 
until the mid-1950s that Malcolm McLean, an American trucker, recognised their 
potential for transporting cargo, and started a revolution in the way goods were packaged 
and carried. Goods are placed on pallets; these are then packed inside a container. 
Modern containers are standardised boxes measuring eight feet wide by eight feet high 
and between 20 and 45 feet long: the exact tonnage carried, however, varies according to 
the cargo. Moving cargo by this method minimises handling at the port, as only one 
item - the container - needs to be loaded or discharged. This cuts congestion, thereby 
shortening ships' turnaround times and therefore increasing shipping company profits 
(see Whittaker, 1975: 1-3).
Once the advantage of containerisation had been recognised, there was a rapid 
transformation in cargo handling, especially in the developed world. This not only had 
an impact on ports and port work (see Chapter One and below) but also changed the 
nature of the world's shipping and ports industries. Ports throughout the world were
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restructured, and shipping companies and port ownership became internationalised (see, 
for example, Turnbull, 2000a: 5-8).
Because of the huge investment needed to convert or build new container ships, many 
shipping companies formed consortia. These included Overseas Containers Limited, 
formed in 1965, and Atlantic Container Line, formed in 1968. A dedicated container 
terminal, now operating as "Containerco', was built as a joint venture between these 
companies and the PLA in the Port of Tilbury, opening in 1976 (see Greeves, 1980: 112 
and 115, Stopford, 1988: 192).
Containerisation changed the area of competition - from shipping to transport. Stanford, 
in his book on maritime economics, wrote that shipping companies had considered their 
responsibilities for cargoes to end at the ship's rail. Containerisation, however, saw a 
widening of their commercial interests to encompass the whole journey from 
manufacturer to customer (1988: 193). In order to provide an integrated service and 
have complete control over it, many shipping companies became involved in logistics 
and port ownership. Similarly, the development of intermodal transport2 from the late 
1980s allowed shipping companies to diversify (see Hayuth and Hilling, 1992: 50 and 
below).
Capitalist Concentration
By the mid-1990s, these developments had resulted in five main multi-national 
companies (MNCs) dominating both world shipping and port ownership. These were 
the Hong Kong-based Hutchinson Port Holdings, the British P&O Group (see below), 
International Container Terminal Services (based in the Philippines), Stevedoring
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Services of America, and the Port of Singapore Authority (see Financial Times, 9l 
November 1999: 16).
Table 2:1 below illustrates the dominance and business diversity of the British based 
P&O Group. Originally a British steam ship company, the P&O Group includes P&O 
Ports, shipping company P&O Nedlloyd and P&O Ferries. In 2002, P&O Ports had 
handled 8.9 million twenty foot equivalent units (or TEUs, the measurement for 
container traffic), or five percent of the world's total container throughput (P&O Group 
Annual Report 2002: 2). Describing itself as "0 global stevedore', P&O Ports had 
operated at 90 ports in 17 countries in 2002. Operating on such a large scale gives the 
company "a hedge against regional economic factors" (Lloyd's Port Management, 
November-December 1999: 9), allowing it to move operations from port to port - or 
country to country - in the event of political or other upheavals. P&O Ports also used its 
connections with P&O-Nedlloyd - its biggest customer world-wide - as leverage to 
obtain preference at various ports throughout the world (LPM: 9). 
Table 2:1 - P&O Group: Turnover 2002: £2676 million, of which
Activity T/O Profit 
Ports 36% 59% 
Property 9% 33% 
Logistics 8% 9% 
Ferries 47% - 0% 
Bulk Shipping n/a - 4% 
UK/Republic of Ireland 38% - 8% 
Continental Europe 19% 12% 
USA and Canada 18% 29% 
Australia 16% 18% 
Far East 7% 35% 
* T/O - Turnover
Source: Slater, J. (May 2003) (devised by) Company Refs (Really Essential Financial 
Statistics) (London, HS Financial Publications), p. 634
The dominant shipping companies not only handled the majority of the world's cargoes 
but were also able to ' wield significant economic and political influence', and were "at
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the forefront of labour reforms imports around the world" (Turnbull, 2000a: 6). Their 
economic impact enabled them, on the one hand, to put pressure on governments to 
reduce port dues payable to the state and, on the other, to restrict or abolish dock labour 
schemes, reintroducing casual dock labour in many ports across the world (see 2000: 6 
and above). The internationalisation of port ownership also affected how labour 
relations were handled within these companies. For example, all negotiations with Hong 
Kong-based Hutchinson, which had a majority holding in Felixstowe, Harwich and 
Thamesport in Britain as well as operating ports in Asia and the Americas, were co- 
ordinated at the Hong Kong office (see Turnbull, 2000a: 6).
Technical innovation also affected the relationship between firms, especially post- 
abolition. Although writing of the clothing sector, Blyton and Turnbull's observations 
on the interdependence of large and small firms (1998: 255-7) were germane to the ports 
industry. The labour supply agencies relied on the ports for work; they, in turn, relied on 
the shipping companies for business. These, however, could move ships to another port 
if it was in their interest to do so, without thought for either the impact this could have 
on the port or fear of industrial action. 
The Impact of Technical Innovation on Dock Work
As discussed above, the main reason behind ports' deregulation and privatisation had 
been the impact of containerisation. This not only changed the nature of port 
organisation but also the numbers of men in the industry - employment in British ports 
and docks had fallen from 136,000 in 1968 to 25,000 in 1998 (see Labour Market 
Trends, July 2000: 311) - and the ways in which the men worked. Modern port work 
could be seen as an example of 'just-in-time' work organisation as cargoes are unloaded 
when they arrive, day or night. It can also be likened to a manufacturing production
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line; as Turnbull (1994:75) wrote, and the following (based on researcher observation) 
demonstrates, "the movement of cargo through the port is a sequential process. In other 
words, cargo moves through successive, but distinct stages and work locations".
There were, for example, three distinct stages involved in unloading a container: 
preparation, unloading, and moving. Preparation involved men climbing onto the 
containers and opening the twistlocks that hold them together during transhipment. This 
was a continuous process, as the men had to unlock every container in every pod (port of 
delivery), or stack of containers for the same port, which were distributed throughout the 
ship by weight and size. A quayside gantry crane then offloaded the containers.
The quayside gantry crane was the largest piece of plant on the docks. The gantry, 
which was between 140 and 180 feet above the dock, went over the deck of the ship and 
the crane operator was told, either by radio or a computer terminal in the cab, in which 
sequence to unload the containers. The cab was on a trolley, which had a spreader 
attached to it. When the cab was over the container to be moved, the spreader was 
lowered over it; this was then clamped onto the container and lifted it off the deck of the 
ship. The trolley then moved back along the gantry until it was over the quay, and, at 
Tilbury, the container was then lowered onto the quay. Depending on the size of the 
ship and the location of the pods, the whole operation took approximately three minutes, 
or a continuous operation of approximately 20 container movements an hour.
Although the latest generation of gantry cranes had lifts, most crane operators reached 
the cab by climbing a ladder attached to the outside of the crane. In order to monitor 
operations, the crane driver sat hunched over the controls with his feet apart, staring
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between his legs. Operating a quayside gantry crane needed great skill and 
concentration. It was also very stressful and highly monotonous - the operators were 
isolated high above the ground and had no stimulation. Although "Containerco' rotated 
this operation with other tasks every four hours, some cargo handlers mentioned that 
they could work on this task for up to six hours without a break (interview notes, 
various).
The containers were moved from the quay to the container park by a straddle carrier, the 
largest piece of moving plant on the docks: its wheels alone were approximately six feet 
tall. The straddle carrier was an "H'-shaped piece of plant with the cab, which could be 
positioned anywhere along it, on the 'crossbar'. The driver positioned the straddle 
carrier over the container, lifted it up and carried it to the container park and deposited it 
where he had been told, again either by radio or computer terminal. Straddle carrier 
operators also sat hunched over the controls, staring between their feet. However, they 
did appear to have more stimulus that gantry crane drivers, as interaction between 
themselves and other port workers was observed. For loading a container, the above 
operation was reversed.
Not all cargoes have been containerised, however. Bulk cargoes, such as sugar or 
wood, were discharged using a method that has remained basically unaltered since the 
1970s; the ships and the equipment used, however, had become larger. Loose cargoes, 
such as sugar or aggregate, were discharged by a quayside crane which was fitted with a 
grab, which resembled a bucket. The grab was lowered into the hold and scooped up the 
cargo; it was then swung out of the hold and into a hopper, a large funnel-shaped piece 
of equipment which also weighed it. The cargo then fell through the hopper onto a
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conveyor belt that went into the factory (sugar), or the yard or into a lorry for onward 
transportation (aggregate).
Timber ships were discharged by two gangs of four or five men, one gang to a hold. The 
packages were loaded with canvas slings around them, or were "pre-stropped'. The men 
working in the hold hooked the slings onto a hook fitted onto the quayside crane, and 
were then hoisted onto the quay. The men on the quay helped to lower the packages so 
that they formed stacks of three to four packages high, took off the slings, and 
straightened the stacks as more wood was discharged. The packages were then loaded 
onto a forklift a stack at a time and taken to the storage area.
There was no 'dock work' involved in handling unit loads. These were items, such as 
cars or containers on lorries, which arrived at roll-on, roll-off ferry terminals, such as 
Terryco' or the Dartford Terminal. The ships carrying the containers had been 
unloaded at Rotterdam or Antwerp and those for Britain taken to Vissengen or 
Zeebrugge, where they were placed on lorries and the lorry then driven ("rolled') onto 
the ferries and, on reaching the London ferry terminal, the lorries are driven off the ferry. 
They then either continued their journey, or the containers were taken off the lorry by a 
reach-stacker (similar to the stacker trucks found in DIY centres), and taken to the 
container park to await collection. This was a very fast operation. The Dartford 
Terminal boasted in 2000 that the turnaround time for a full ferry was approximately 
three and a half hours (see Port of London Authority, Handbook, 2000: 24).
The above, however, were not the final stage in the evolution of cargo handling. There 
were cargo terminals in both Rotterdam and the Far East that were almost completely
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automated, and cargo handlers at Thamesport on the Medway were little more than
machine minders (see Transport NTOs Forum - Skills Forsight: 4 and Turnbull, 2001:
367).
2:3 The World of Work in the 1990s
By 1989, and because of Conservative anti-union legislation, many of the provisions
underpinned by the Scheme, such as union recognition and the closed shop, had been
eroded to such an extent that RDWs had been left extremely vulnerable to workplace
change. Taking the ports industry as an example, this section examines the world of
work that dockers entered into following abolition and applies it to the Port of London.
It also examines how new to the ports industry some of these working practices were in
actuality.
Deregulation and Privatisation
As the above showed, deregulation and privatisation were not unique to Britain but were
part of a global phenomenon (see also Standing, 1997: 21). However, Standing (1997:
10-11) has pointed out that "there is no such thing as labour market deregulation" and
that regulation in some form has to exist; rather than deregulation, therefore, it would be
more correct to write of re-regulation, or regulation imposed by, and for, the employer.
To emphasis that, Saundry and Turnbull (1996: 6) wrote that, rather than the absence of
regulation, deregulation represents a change in the way product and labour markets are
regulated. Barton and Turnbull (1999: 14) saw this as a shift from external, or
institutional, regulation (such as the Scheme) to internal, or direct managerial,
regulation.
In the British context, the aim of deregulation and privatisation has been to remove 
controls, and therefore worker protection, from an industry, such as port transport.
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Saundry and Turnbull (1996: 11) wrote that this was encouraged by and, where 
necessary, legislated for, by the removal of barriers to a free market economy. This 
assumed that the government would withdraw from all forms of control and financial aid 
from the public sector. Examining the background to ports privatisation, Thomas (1994: 
139) wrote that this was a means of improving management in those sectors. By 
removing regulation, business would be able to seek investment from the capital market. 
This would make them more efficient, as government financing would be replaced by 
shareholders. As these had a claim on the company's profits, financial markets became 
more important (Crouch, 2003: 112). At the same time, many firms were no longer 
tolerating union or other external interference. These two factors resulted in both 
manufacturing and the public sector, the two 'cornerstones' of trade unionism in Britain, 
becoming marginalised (2003: 112).
Following the 1979 Conservative government's pledge to reduce the size of the public 
sector, public utilities (British Gas, for example) and regulated industries - such as the 
ports - were gradually transferred to the private sector and/or opened up to competition. 
Public sector employment fell from 43 percent of employees in 1984 to 32 percent in 
1998, whereas private sector employment rose from 26 percent to 46 percent between 
1980 and 1998 (see Millward, Bryson and Forth, 2000: 19). Referring to sub- 
contracting in the civil service, Crompton, Gallic and Purcell (1996: 17) found that "a 
job for life' had been replaced by 'a job for as long as you are not undercut at the next 
tender'. This was also true of the ports industry. Chapters Four and Five will show that, 
for many men working in the Port of London, the RDWs "job for life' has been replaced 
by insecure, temporary employment.
Chapter Two 37
Changes to Work and Employment
i: Functional Flexibility and Work Intensification
Rather than negotiating change, port employers used abolition and the subsequent 
redundancies as a means of severing cargo handlers' solidarity with both their job and 
the union (Turnbull and Wass, 1995b: 488). Abolition gave port employers the 
opportunity to radically alter cargo handling operations, and privatisation had restored 
their freedom to manage, giving them "the will and incentive" to do so (Turnbull, 1991: 
16). The main factors behind these changes were the minimisation of labour costs and 
the maximisation of labour utilisation in order to attract and retain customers and to 
remain competitive (see, for example, Turnbull and Weston, 1993c: 181). As Turnbull 
(1995: 525) found (and as will be discussed in the context of the Port of London in 
Chapter Four), the post-abolition ports industry was characterised by longer working 
hours - including compulsory overtime - shorter breaks, lower manning levels and 
unrestricted flexibility. This, as Turnbull also wrote, represented "a massive 
intensification of the labour process" (1994a: 69). 
Flexibility in the Port of London
The post-abolition contracts for men remaining in the industry had 'full flexibility of 
work' clauses (see Turnbull and Weston, 1993c: 181). Although seen as a post-abolition 
condition of employment, flexibility had been introduced as part of the 1970s 
modernisation agreements. However, rather than part of a collectively bargained 
agreement that was open to re-negotiation, this, post-abolition, became contractual.
The 1970 modernisation agreements were agreed between the unions and the Port of 
London employers at the time of, and in conjunction with, Devlin Phase Two. They 
were to facilitate the introduction of new cargo handling technology by giving RDWs
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higher wages for increased productivity. A Port of London Enclosed Dock Agreement 
clause stated that the aim of the Agreement was to ^facilitate the introduction and 
operation of improved working methods of cargo handling" (Enclosed Docks 
Productivity Agreement, 1970: 2). This included " complete mobility and flexibility as 
required by the employer' (Manning, Flexibility and Mobility clause in above: 8). 
Given the definition of Mock work' however, this type of flexibility was numerical 
rather than functional, as the men could be moved between similar jobs, rather than 
between types of jobs. Because abolition opened up dock work to other workers (see 
below), functional flexibility tended to be multi-tasked rather than multi-skilled (see 
Evans et al, 1993: 28 and 34).
Similarly, the introduction of shift work by many employers following abolition was the 
continuation of a trend that had began in the 1970s. The Productivity Agreement 
mentioned above introduced two shifts a day to the London docks; from 7am to 2pm and 
from 2pm to 9pm, with a 45 minute (paid) break on each shift (Shift Work clause in 
Enclosed Docks Productivity Agreement, 1970: 2). 
11: The Segmented Labour Force
Turnbull and Wass (1994: 488) wrote that port employers were able to use high 
unemployment in the early 1990s and the "stigma' of the dockers' reputation for 
militancy in order to alter the employment relationship (see also Chapter Five). Labour 
costs in relation to operating costs in the ports industry were high: Barton and Turnbull 
(2002: 138) found them to be around 60 to 70 percent. Employers needed to reduce 
costs but also needed to meet both fluctuating demands and to attract and keep 
customers. Labour arrangements, therefore, had to be sufficiently flexible to both match 
labour supply with demand and to reduce idle time and labour surplus to the minimum
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(2002: 138). However, and as Saundry and Turnbull (1996: 4, 16, 18), for example, 
wrote, to be efficient, container operations required a skilled, experienced and 
permanent, or 'core', labour force, whilst general cargo operations could be left to a 
'periphery' of temporary labourers. As Chapters Four and Five will show, however, this 
was an oversimplification and this division of tasks was not observed in the Port of 
London.
As many authors have pointed out, the "flexible firm' was an academic model and not a 
description of a (then) reality. However, it had become incorporated into management 
thinking and became what Pollert (1988: 309) termed "# ^success story' of an idea". 
Pollert has pointed out that non-standard working arrangements pre-dated Atkinson's 
model and were a historical (and gendered) feature of work (see Pollert, 1988: 297 and 
1991: xxvi) - casual labour had been the norm in the docks before 1967, for example 
(see Chapter One). Pollert had also pointed out that workforce flexibility was, as 
discussed above, often part of 1960s and 1970s productivity deals (1988: 282).
The re-emergence of casual labour, arguably, cannot be seen as a "new' form of port 
working. Deregulation had allowed " ...firms to promote greater flexibility in the labour 
market" (Millward, Bryson and Forth, 2000: 10). Brown (1997: 70-1) wrote that 
Conservative policy led to a freer, less-regulated, more competitive, and more flexible 
labour market. However, it also continued to provide traditional labour market needs, 
only in a different way. Labour market flexibility could only be achieved by 
reorganising traditional working practices but, in order to do so, employers needed a 
catalyst that was "strong enough to overcome the strength of those traditions'" (Hudson, 
2000: 81). This 'catalyst' in the 1980s and 1990s was usually redundancies, layoffs and
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downsizing (2000: 81), facilitated by the progressive weakening of employment 
protection and by union marginalisation. Many sectors, including buses and port 
transport, saw immediate productivity gains following deregulation (see Bannister 1997: 
35 and Chapter Four). However, as both Bannister (1997: 35) writing on bus 
deregulation, and Turnbull (1994a: 69), writing on port transport, discovered, this had 
been achieved through mass redundancies, lower wages, and an increase in temporary 
and other "non-standard' working arrangements.
Deregulation played *a significant role' in not only facilitating changes in the labour 
market but also in the introduction of "new' forms of non-standard working practices 
(Rubery, 1996: 29). This 'new' work was usually outside employment protection and 
not only included what MacDonald termed Tiddly jobs' and undeclared work (see 
MacDonald, 1994 and 1996), but also casual and temporary work.
In his research on sub-contracting in the steel industry, Fevre (1986: 310 wrote that 
segmentation was the disintegration of the internal labour market, allowing different 
approaches to be pursued with different types of workers. Atkinson's (1984) "flexible 
firm' model had identified these as a 'core' of permanent employees that were multi- 
skilled, functionally flexible and protected from demand fluctuation by a 'periphery' of 
non-standard (part-time or temporary workers, sub-contractors and the self-employed), 
low-skilled, disposable workers in "dead-end, insecure and low paid jobs" (Kalleberg, 
2001: 482). However, this description of the "periphery' can be inaccurate. Robinson 
(1999: 89) found that the "typical' temporary worker was a well-paid professional, 
working in the public sector, rather than the poorly paid casual (see also Kalleberg, 
2001:483).
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Pollert found that "...the ^flexible' firm always contains the alternative of buying in 
skills, or replacing them with deskilled, cheaper casual labour" (Pollert, 1988: 218). 
Similar to Fevre's (1986: 18 and 25) findings in the steel industry, temporary workers in 
the Port of London were usually redundant permanent employees, performing the same 
work but on reduced terms and conditions (see Chapter Five).
The main advantage of hiring temporary workers is the transfer of risk, initially to the 
agency and ultimately to the men (Saundry and Turnbull, 1996: 18). Rather than paying 
permanent men when there is no work, the employer can reduce his workforce to the 
minimum and hire workers on a short-term basis, usually at a lower rate, and return them 
to the agency when there is no more work. Because agency workers tend to receive a 
standard hourly rate, whatever hours they work, the cost of hiring can be reduced; 
however, the agency premium can increase those costs considerably in the short term 
(see also Labour Market Trends, September 1996: 406 and footnote 4 to Chapter Four). 
Other, hidden, costs include the performance unpredictability of temporary workers, a 
lack of commitment to the hiring firm, and low effort levels (see Purcell, Hogarth and 
Simm, 1999: 58).
As Gallic et al (1998: 153) pointed out, the inference of the "flexible firm' is that "core' 
employees are trained, whereas "periphery' workers are not. Employers, however, 
expect temporary workers to be trained and/or qualified. This, in the ports industry, has 
been achieved by hiring ex-RDWs who had been trained under the Scheme in line with 
new technology (see Chapter One) but who were made redundant in 1989 or after. 
Nationally, 20 percent of RDWs made redundant on abolition had returned to the 
industry as temporary labourers by 1994 (Turnbull and Wass, 1994: 5000). As will be
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discussed in Chapter Four, the post-abolition temporary workforce in the Port of London 
was largely comprised of these men.
There are many similarities between the steel industry, discussed by Fevre (1986) and 
the ports industry following abolition. The crucial difference, however, was the way in 
which the workers were hired. Fevre describes the "new' jobs in British Steel as 
subcontracting; in the ports industry in London, however, it was not the work that was 
sub-contracted, but the employers who contracted for workers to work under their 
supervision (see Chapter Four).
Blyton and Turnbull (1998: 47) wrote that the return to casualisation in the ports 
industry indicated that many port workers were not properly trained, thus leading to 
higher accident rates (see also Turnbull, 1995: 514). A reason for this was that, 
following abolition, training (provided by the NDLB) became the responsibility of the 
employer, and the training that was given concentrated on individual tasks rather than on 
the trade of cargo handler (Turnbull, 1991: 25). By training all its employees for any 
job, employers ensured that, rather than any worker being irreplaceable, they are 
interchangeable (1991: 25). This, however, appeared to lead to a skills shortage. BPIT, 
in its 2000 survey of the ports industry, found that there was a shortage of skilled plant 
operators (British Ports Industry Training, 2000: 20). Training in the Port of London 
will be discusssed in more depth in Chapter Four.
As will be discussed in greater depth in Chapters Five and Six, the deterioration in health 
and safety in the ports industry following abolition has caused concern, not only to the 
men working in the industry but also to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and to
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the government. Mankelow, for example, found that notifiable accidents in the docks 
rose following abolition - from an average of 4.0 per hundred cargo handlers at work 
between 1984 and 1989, to 6.1 per hundred cargo handlers between 1989 and 1994 
(1996: 17). As Miscellaneous Appendix Two shows, HSE statistics for between 1996/7 
and 1999/2000 show that the rate per 100,000 workers for 'others supporting water 
transport' (which predominantly consists of cargo handlers - HSC Safety Policy adviser, 
interview notes, 14/5/02) were consistently higher than industries such as agriculture, 
construction and mining which are often considered to be the most dangerous. These 
figures, however, are for all employees in a sector and, because they include clerical 
workers (who are less likely to have an accident) but exclude 'workers', they may 
conceal the true accident rate among operatives. As James and Walters (2000: 141 and 
143) pointed out, the 1977 Safety Representatives and Safety Committees Regulations 
were restricted to workplaces with union recognition. Between 1989, when the T&G 
was widely derecognised following abolition, and 1996, when the Health and Safety 
(Consultation with Employees) Regulations were introduced, therefore, union 
involvement in health and safety issues in the ports was minimal. 
Temporary Labour in the Port of London
The ports industry had been decasualised for 22 years (1967 to 1989) on abolition. 
However, the event of Scheme abolition was in many ways a return to the traditional 
form of port employment, and the re-emergence of labour supply practices common 
before 1967. It saw the re-emergence of small stevedoring companies, now termed 
labour-only suppliers, which supplied temporary labour to the industry and performed 
very much the same function as the pre-decasualisation LDLBs (see Chapter One). 
Other practices have included the establishment of 'pools' of redundant RDWs, on call 
as necessary, and the hiring of truly casual labour for short periods (see Chapters Four
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and Five): this, again, has a resonance with the casual era. Only the final form of 
recasualisation, the opening up of Mock work' to other port workers, such as office and 
maintenance personnel, to give greater workforce flexibility, thus saving on labour costs 
(Turnbull and Weston, 1993c: 183), could be said to be a new departure. 
/«: Labour Law
Labour law can be discussed here at two levels: domestically generated law, and the 
legislation which, as a result of Britain's membership of the EU has to be translated into 
domestic legislation.
The Conservatives had seen the law as the key to facilitating its labour market 
restructuring policies and restricting industrial action. The government had reduced 
standards for the conditions of employment enforceable by law (Labour Study Group, 
1985: 117). This made it easier for firms with employees on fixed-term contracts to 
oblige them to "contract out' of their legal entitlements to redundancy pay and protection 
from unfair dismissal (1985: 117). It also removed the legal protection from the most 
vulnerable and those less likely to be in a trade union, especially temporary and other 
'non-standard' workers. These workers had very few rights, and appeared to be less 
aware of those they had (see IDS Study 689, May 2000: 12 and Labour Research, June 
2002: 5).
Dickens and Hall, writing on the framework of labour law, found that British labour law, 
especially in comparison with that of other EU member states, had been fairly limited. 
Because there was little to deregulate, Conservative intervention had still left the British 
labour market one of the most lightly regulated (2003: 130). Moreover, because it 
conflicted with it, EU legislation had been able to limit, and even undermine,
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Conservative deregulation legislation (2003: 127). This latter legislation had included 
the 1977 Directive on acquired rights, transposed into British law as the Transfer of 
Undertakings (Employment Protection) Regulations (or TUPE) in 1981, together with 
Directives on equal pay and sex discrimination.
Following the signing of the Social Chapter of the Maastrict Treaty by the 1997 Labour 
government, EU Directives that limit labour market flexibility were introduced. These 
included the Working Time Directive (WTD), introduced as the Working Time 
Regulations in 1998, which limited working hours to an average of 48 hours a week. 
Although initially excluding transport workers, the implementation of the Horizontal 
Amendment Directive meant that they were covered after August 2003. Also introduced 
have been Part-time Workers (2000) and Fixed Term Workers (2002) Directives, both of 
which gave these workers "no less favourable treatment' than employees performing the 
same task at the same site. These, however, have had little impact in the ports industry, 
as the legislation currently does not cover agency temporary or casual workers (see, for 
example, Labour Research, October 2002: 5 and January 2003: 8).
However, because of the legal difference between "employees' and "workers', not all the 
labour force is covered by all employment legislation. The term "worker' is used in a 
broad sense to cover the entire workforce, irrespective of the form of contract they work 
under. For example, under Working Time Regulations, rights to paid holidays were 
introduced for workers including agency temporary workers. "Employees' have a 
contract of services (or employment) and have access to, for example, TUPE and other 
employment protection, sick pay and parental leave (see, for example, Dickens and Hall, 
2003: 131-2). On the other hand, until the introduction of the Part-time and the Fixed-
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Term Workers Directives, 'workers' rights had been minimal. Although having the right 
to the national minimum wage, 'workers' had no rights to, for example, employment 
benefits, or to worker protection rights (redundancy, for example, or unfair dismissal - 
see also Chapter Four). Because of these different rights and protections, Dickens and 
Hall (2003: 135-6) were able to write that the new legislation had not curbed an 
employer's ability to discipline workers by 'hire and fire' but, rather, had legitimised it. 
They further pointed out that the legislation had not increased job security, and that the 
new unfair dismissal procedures only offered limited protection.
EU Directives that will impact on the ports industry include the Information and 
Consultation Directive. This must cover all companies with 50 or more employees by 
2008 (see Dickens and Hall, 2003: 127-9 and Industrial Relations Briefing, Issue 108, 
21 st February 2002) so, although excluding many small employers and various agencies, 
all larger port companies will eventually be covered by the legislation. As will be 
discussed in Chapter Six, at least one company operating in the Port of London has 
established a company-wide forum in preparation for the Directive. However, the 
impact of the European Works Council Directive (in force in Britain from January 2000) 
on the ports industry was, at the time of writing, minimal. This was because very few 
European multinational port companies also operate in Britain (the Belgian Terryco' 
was an exception). 
Labour Government Legislation
Since coming to power in 1997, the New Labour government has made only minimal 
changes to Conservative deregulation legislation. Dickens and Hall (2003: 131) wrote 
that the difference between the Conservative and Labour governments was that the 
Conservatives promoted flexibility at the expense of security, whereas Labour wanted to
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retain a flexible market, but underpinned by minimum standards. The Labour 
government championed labour market flexibility and appeared to accept the 
fundamentals of the Conservative industrial relations agenda (see Taylor, 2001: 249 and 
247). With the exception of ERA (considered in Chapter Six) and the introduction of the 
national minimum wage, much of the Conservative deregulatory legislation remained in 
place.
iv: Trade Union Decline
Conservative anti-union legislation had not been the only factor in trade union decline. 
Other factors included a sectoral shift from manufacturing to services, technical 
innovation, and high unemployment. Smith and Morton (1991: 326) found that the 
introduction of computer technology had enhanced employer power over work 
organisation and pay-effort bargaining in newspaper publishing. This had previously 
been constrained by the NUJ, which lost power as a result. In port transport before 
abolition, however, the Scheme had shielded RDWs from these effects. Although 
containerisation had much the same effect on work organisation as new technology had 
in printing, it had taken the 1989 Dock Work Act (discussed in Chapter One) to 
constrain the T&G which, until then, had been able to negotiate enhanced terms and 
conditions in exchange for technical innovation.
The 'new industrial relations' that replaced collectivism at many workplaces included 
human resource management (HRM) and individualisation, both synonymous with 
flexibility and employer-imposed changes in working terms and conditions (see, for 
example, Blyton and Morris, 1992: 116, and Ramsey, Pollert and Rainbird, 1992: 75). 
This conflicted with the traditional industrial relations model as, rather than emphasising
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collective bargaining, HRM emphasised individualisation (Gallic, Penn and Rose, 1996: 
13) and attempted to divert loyalty from the union to the firm.
For whatever reason, aggregate union density fell from its 1979 high (see Chapter One) 
to a low of 26.5 percent in 2001 (before rising to 29.0 percent in 2002 - see Labour 
Market Trends, 1996 to 2003). Individual unions' membership declined; T&G 
membership, for example, fell from 2,086,281 in 1979 to 896, 550 in 1996, or by 57 
percent (Blyton and Turnbull, 1998: 119).
Within the T&G, membership of its Docks, Waterways and Fisheries Group (DWF), 
which represents port and other waterfront workers, fell from 22,632 in 1990 to 10,871 
in 1998, the last figures available, or by 48 percent (see T&G Record, April 1990: 2 and 
March 1998: 25). Reasons for this decline in membership included abolition 
redundancies, especially of trade union activists - nationally, 20 percent of those made 
redundant had held a union post at some time (Turnbull and Wass, 1994: 496). Other 
factors included derecognition - by 1995, over 60 percent of the 140 employers 
surveyed by Saundry and Turnbull (1999: 286) no longer recognised a union - and 
changes in the 'check off system, introduced under the 1993 Trade Union Reform and 
Employment Rights Act. This, as discussed in Chapter Six, had a major impact on union 
membership in the Port of London.
Discussing its ^demise', Turnbull and Weston (1993c: 186/7) wrote that, post-abolition, 
trade union organisation and influence in the ports industry had been "eroded to the 
point of eradication" Similarly, Turnbull, Woolfson and Kelly (1992: 223) wrote of the 
"rapid collapse" of trade union membership and influence in the docks. However, these
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were based on conditions immediately following abolition and, as both the 1995-1998 
Liverpool docks strike and Chapter Six show, these pronouncements need qualifying. 
Conclusion
In order to give as complete a context as possible to the research-based Chapters, this 
Chapter has looked at the ports industry, both nationally and internationally, and has 
considered the effects of containerisation on the wider ports industry. This, together 
with deregulation in many countries, led to changes in the way ports were owned and 
operated. The Chapter argues that there was a connection between business 
restructuring and technical change. This is relevant to this investigation as it changed 
the ports and shipping industries in Britain and elsewhere, blurring the boundaries 
between different types of companies on the one hand and affecting work, occupations, 
and industrial relations on the other. The globalisation of markets meant that the slow, 
laborious method of un/loading ships was unproductive and a new way of carrying cargo 
was needed. This came in the late 1950s when Malcolm McLean realised the 
significance of the container for this purpose. As a result, cargoes were carried in a 
more cost-effective way, and could be loaded and discharged quicker by fewer men. As 
the description of the modern ports labour process showed, this had an impact on dock 
work, changing its nature completely, reducing the work content and blurring the 
boundaries between different types of dock work
Containerisation also changed the nature of competition in the shipping industry. As a 
container could be packed or unpacked anywhere, and in order to provide an integrated 
service from manufacturer to customer, shippers began to offer logistics services and 
entered into cargo handling via port ownership. Five of these companies, including the 
British P&O Group, became multinational, dominating world shipping and port
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ownership. Deregulation of the British ports industry through abolition and privatisation 
had made British ports more attractive to foreign port owners, such as the multinational 
Hutchinson Port Services.
Based on the literature, and taking the ports industry as an example, the Chapter looked 
at the world of work that RDWs entered after abolition. It looked at deregulation and 
labour market segmentation and temporary labour and discussed how these had 
impacted on the ports industry and especially in the Port of London, and discovered that 
many of the "new' post-abolition working arrangements were, in fact, continuations of 
older working practices. Both shift work and flexibility, for example, had been 
introduced during the 1970s. The form of flexibility introduced then, however, had been 
numerical - shifting men from dock to dock whilst still performing essentially the same 
tasks - rather than the functional flexibility that the opening up of port work to other 
workers that abolition had allowed. Similarly, rather than being introduced after 1989, 
casual labour, albeit in a new form, had returned.
Chapters Three to Six expand on the areas outlined in this Chapter. Chapter Four 
examines the employers' new-found "right to manage' and considers what changes were 
introduced and how these were implemented. Chapter Five will then discuss how 
changes in the employment relationship and work organisation affected the men working 
in the Port of London, and Chapter Six will concentrate on industrial relations change. 
First, however, the following Chapter will discuss how this investigation into work and 
employment in the Port of London was undertaken.
1 Many of those participating in this research believed that ports privatisation was a 
reason for abolition. As the 'Agencyco' Director put it: "...you couldn 'tprivatise the
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ports but leave a law in place that said the only people who could work in there were 
registered dock workers" (interview notes, 18/10/01).
Intermodal transport is the through transportation of cargo by at least two forms of 
transport (ship and rail, for example) with a single bill of lading and liability.
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Appendix 2 - Tonnage Handled in the Port of London 2001
Table 2:1 - Commodities, Ownership and Tonnage Handled in the Port of 
London, 2001.
CommoditY A
Aggregate
Recycling/steel
Bulk Cargoes
Forest Products
General Cargo
Oil and Petroleum,
Mixed/Containers
Rollon-Roll-off- 
containers and trailers
Facilities
19
9
7
10
2
5
6
3
Owners
11
4
6
6
2
5
4
3
Tonnage -
Millions
8.6
2.6
n/a*
2.1
n/a*
18.6
481 teus*
972 teus*
ASome facilities handled more than one commodity. 
*Total unitised tonnage, expressed in twenty foot equivalent units
Source: Employment in the Thames Gateway: Riverside Employment Survey 2000/1 
and Port of London Authority, Annual Report and Accounts, 2002: 7.
The following Table shows tonnage by riparian (riverside) borough
Table 2: Tonnage Handled by Riparian Borough in the Port of London 2001 - 
million tonnes
Riparian Borough
Tower Hamlets
Greenwich
Barking and Dagenham
Bexley
Dartford
Thurrock
Gravesham
Tonnage Handled
0.1
1.3
2.8
1.0
3.5
34.7A
2.9
A Thurrock includes the Port of Tilbury, "Containerco' and Terryco'
Source: Port of London Authority Handbook, 2003: 15.
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Chapter Three: Investigating Work and Employment in the
Port of London
This Chapter looks at how this investigation into work and employment change in the
Port of London was carried out. It discusses the main research methodologies utilised
and the problems encountered during the research. Finally, the Chapter reflects upon the
research experience.
The Research Design and Methods
The research methods chosen for this investigation were:
  A fact finding survey of employers in the Port of London
  Semi-structured and open-ended interviews with:
  employers and organisation with an interest in the ports industry
  cargo handlers, both permanent employees and temporary labourers
  T&G officials, both working and retired, and union members
  Observation and participant research in my role as T&G 1/10 Branch minutes 
secretary
  Document research.
These methods were chosen because, as a woman over 50 years of age who cannot 
drive, I could not, for example, conduct ethnographical research as a cargo handler in 
what had become a heavily mechanised industry in what was still very much a man's 
world 1 . However, the above research instruments did allow me to examine the changes 
introduced in the Port from the point of view of the various actors involved. 
3:1 - Conducting the Research
The main research activity began in June 2000 and, although observations of Branch 
meetings and conversations with T&G 1/10 Branch members (see 3:lc below) continued 
into 2003, the field investigation was largely concluded by May 2002. Appendix 3:1 lists 
the research activity in chronological order.
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The research was designed to be a logical sequence, starting with a survey of employers 
in the Port of London. This would give background information for employer interviews 
(which would expand on the responses), and the information gained would, in turn, 
inform the interviews with the men and the union representatives. Archival research 
would provide background information and data not generally available. The research 
structure, however, was left open enough to allow flexibility: the periods when I was 
unable to conduct interviews were utilised for further background reading, for example, 
or for archival research (see 3:Id below).
Taking the four major research methods in turn, the following discusses the research
activity in more detail.
3:la -The Employers' Survey
The field research began with the Employment in the Thames Gateway: Riverside
Employment (ETGRE) survey, which was devised for this investigation. A survey was
chosen because the literature suggested that it was a cost-effective means of gathering
large amounts of data in a relatively simple way in a short period of time (see, for
example, Burns, 2000: 581 andRobson, 1993: 128-9).
Although suggested by a number of sources, the main stimulus for the survey questions 
had been the literature on deregulation and the ports industry after 1989 (see Chapter 
Two). By using a variety of question styles (such as multiple choice, classification, and 
grid), the survey would provide both background information for the research and data 
from individual employers on areas of company practice not readily available from other 
sources. These included permanent and temporary employment utilisation, information
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on recruitment and training, and on trade union recognition (see Appendix 3: 2 for a full 
survey questionnaire and a summary of the results).
In order to ensure uniformity, the questionnaire was generated using the SNAP computer 
programme. As the survey had been for gathering information rather than an analytical 
device, many of the responses (especially the open-ended questions that asked for 
precise figures) were not amenable to cross-tabulation. Rather than using the SNAP 
programmes, therefore, the survey data was processed and correlated manually. The 
responses were then coded, using the question number as a topic guide; these were later 
integrated into the interview coding system discussed below.
The questionnaire was five pages long and had 38 questions. The final two (open) 
questions invited respondents to make any further comments and asked if they would be 
prepared to talk to me again. It was hoped that this would encourage candid views on 
the one hand, and participation in the research on the other. 
Finding the Survey Respondents
The most important source for finding potential respondents was the PLA Handbook. 
This listed terminals and "cargo handlers' (or labour-supply agencies) in the Port. Oil, 
gas, and petroleum terminal employers, and Fords, Dagenham (which had not employed 
"dockers' as defined by the Scheme - see Chapter One) were eliminated from the list. 
This left 40 direct port employers who, between them, owned or operated 44 terminals 
and handled a variety of cargoes. These formed the initial sampling frame.
In order to both verify and extend this list, I consulted telephone directories - both the 
Yellow Pages and Thompson's Local - covering the wider Port area. A separate list of
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"cargo handlers' was also compiled for a separate survey. The survey results, however, 
showed that this list was imprecise as entries included companies, such as freight 
companies, that did not employ cargo handlers. As I did not include general 
employment agencies operating in the Port area in the investigation, the final list could 
not be taken as a definitive list of all the firms that employ or supply labour to the Port 
(see below).
The completed lists showed that, in late 2000, there were at least one hundred employers 
that could be included in the survey. Two labour supply agencies based in Sheerness on 
the Isle of Sheppey known to supply temporary cargo handlers to London terminals were 
also included.
Untangling which company owned which terminal or wharf (so that that the survey 
could be directed to the right person) became a major problem. As discussed in Chapter 
Two, abolition had facilitated organisational change within the Port. For example, some 
large companies had set up subsidiary companies, usually company-specific labour 
supply agencies, and there were many joint ventures, especially among the aggregate 
companies.
Conducting the Surveys
Because of the geographical dispersal of the potential respondents and the predicted 
better response rate (at between 50 and 60 percent compared with a postal survey of 
about 30 percent - see Saunders et al, 2000: 282), the survey was devised as an 
interviewer-administered telephone survey. Because this type of survey had become 
more popular with market research companies (such as MORI and ICM), many firms 
had become accustomed to this type of approach. Robson (1993: 129), for example, had
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seen telephone surveys as "fl variation of an interview". Because I could use the 
opportunity to probe further, I anticipated that the telephone responses would be more 
spontaneous and candid than any written comments would be (see also Bryman, 1992: 
46).
A pilot telephone survey of direct employers was conducted in December 2000 to test 
the questionnaire. In both this and the subsequent survey proper, I asked to speak to the 
labour office or personnel or HRM department; the respondents, however, were from 
various levels within any company, ranging from HRM officers, labour managers and 
even the Directors of two small companies. After giving the respondent details about 
myself and the research and an assurance of confidentiality, I read the questions in order, 
noting the responses on the questionnaire. Each successful telephone call lasted between 
ten and fifteen minutes, depending on the candour of the respondent.
However, the pilot survey, conducted in December 2000 and January 2001, was not as 
successful as anticipated - only five employers agreed to take part out of the 16 
eventually contacted, possibly because these were the busiest months in the Port year. 
The timing of the pilot telephone calls - early morning - was also found to be 
inconvenient; this was later changed to better effect. Despite this initial setback, and as 
the survey remained the best means of collecting the necessary data, I scheduled the 
survey proper for a quieter period.
The survey proper was conducted between February and April 2001, initially by 
telephone and later by post. I made 10 phone calls a day, three days a week to all those I 
had been unable to contact. When I had finished phoning the companies on the list, I
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started again from beginning. Because I successfully contacted one company the fourth 
time I phoned, I phoned each company at least six times. Although between 200 and 
250 telephone calls were made between February and early March, only approximately 
one in ten calls were answered, and only half of the companies (11 out of 22, or 
approximately 20 percent of those called) agreed to take part in the survey. Although 
this represented a 50 percent response rate of those eventually contacted, it was only just 
over 27 percent of all direct Port employers; the number of telephone calls had also 
reduced any cost-efficiency. With reluctance, therefore, the telephone survey was 
abandoned and replaced by a postal survey.
A simplified version of the questionnaire2 was dispatched between late March and mid 
April 2001. Post was addressed to a named individual, if known (or the Human 
Resources Manager if not) to all the companies I had been unable to contact by 
telephone. However, I had no means of knowing who actually completed the 
questionnaire. Out of the 36 questionnaires dispatched over two postings3 , 11 replies - 
or 33 percent - were received. Although this appears a worse response rate than the 
telephone survey, if the number of unanswered telephone calls are taken into 
consideration, it was actually a better rate.
The second survey was administered in October 2001. Because of the failure of the 
earlier telephone survey, this was a postal survey only. It was dispatched to named 
individual or the Human Resources Managers at 18 companies in the Port area that had 
been identified as 'cargo handlers' (see above). An initial pilot survey of six companies 
was followed, because of time constraints, by a single posting. The response rate to this 
survey was, overall, marginally better than the direct employers' postal survey. Of the
Chapter Three 59
27 survey questionnaires dispatched over two postings, 10 positive responses were 
received, representing about a 35 percent response rate4 .
Although Saunders et al (2000: 310) suggested that three postal questionnaires should be 
dispatched, it was decided that, as the response rate had been so low, a third posting 
would be unlikely to secure any further responses. Overall, one third of the employers 
surveyed (21 out of 63 questionnaires dispatched) responded to the postal surveys. The 
majority (14 out of 21) replied to the reminder rather than to the initial survey, 
confirming Saunders et a/'s finding that reminders can be more productive (2000: 308).
Altogether, the surveys had about a 32 percent response rate (32 responses from the 
approximate 100 employers in the Port). Although personally disappointing, the overall 
result did compare well with other surveys in the same area or sector. Druker, Edmonds 
and White's 2001 survey of employers in Kent, for example, had a useful response rate 
of 18 percent, and the BPIT 2000 survey of port employers had a 37 percent response 
rate (see Druker, Edmunds and White, 2002: 5 and British Port Industries Training: 
2000: 4).
The low response rate may simply have been a reflection of closures and other 
inaccuracies in the source material. However, it also suggested that employers in the 
Port of London preferred to keep confidential information private. The survey was 
successful in terms of the data collected. Many respondents (to both the telephone and 
the postal surveys) gave candid opinions and no other research instrument would have 
been able to cover the number of topics as quickly and reliably. However, because the
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data had been unavailable from any other source, it was impossible to test its accuracy. 
These, therefore, were very much a reflection of the research instrument utilised.
The survey data only reflected conditions in the companies that responded to it, and only 
at the time it was administered. It was, therefore, not representative of the Port of 
London as a whole. However, responses were received from many of the largest direct 
employers within the Port: interview data later suggested that, between them, these 
companies employed the majority of directly employed cargo operatives. Although any 
data would be minimum figures, this suggested that the survey results were a good 
representation of conditions throughout the Port. However, because of the source 
material, and the non-inclusion of general employment agencies, it was impossible to 
judge the percentage of agency and other employers covered by the survey or, indeed, to 
ascertain the total number of temporary labourers working in the Port. It was later 
discovered (through employer interview data and later editions of the PLA Handbook) 
that there were some 30 agencies operating in the Port area. The survey coverage, 
therefore, had been low, making it difficult to gauge how typical this group of 
employers' responses were.
The survey had provided figures but had not explained the background to them. The 
survey was, therefore, utilised in order to broaden the data to reflect real life 
experiences, and to inform the interviews and conversations with the employers in the 
Port, the men working for them, and with their union. 
3:lb Interviews and Conversations
The most widely utilised research methods during this investigation were semi- 
structured and open-ended interviews. These allowed the freedom to vary the order of
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the questions, to omit some, and to add others in order to pursue any topics of interest to 
the investigation raised by the participant. In the case of the five of the employers (see 
Table 3:1 below), I was also able to explore their survey responses in more depth. 
i: Employers' Interviews
Problems were again encountered in locating interviewees. Although six employers 
initially answered "yes' to the survey question: " would you be prepared to talk to me 
againT, two - a labour-supplier (pressure of business) and an aggregate wharf 
(management restructuring) - later declined to take part (one other later declined, saying 
he felt he had nothing further to contribute). Many other employers who were 
approached declined, or ignored, requests to participate in the research. The most 
common reason cited for non-participation was pressure of business. However, 
speculative letters requesting interviews suggested by, for example, the PLA librarian 
(see Appendix 3:1) were more successful.
The following Table shows that 11 people (seven employers and four "others' - see
below) were interviewed for this phase of the investigation.
Table 3:1 - Employer and Port Organisation Representatives Interviewed
Employers - Direct Employers - 4* 
Labour-suppliers - 3* 
Others - 4
* of which, three were as a direct result of the survey and four as a result of direct 
approaches: two of these companies also completed survey questionnaires.
The four direct employers interviewed were the Human Resources Manager of 
"Containerco' and the Marketing Director of "Portco', two of the largest employers in 
the Port of London, and the Managing Director of Taperco', at that time located in 
Deptford, and the labour manager of the Port of Felixstowe. The Directors of 
'Agencyco', a large labour-only supplier based at Sheerness, and "Labourco', a medium-
Chapter Three 62
sized labour-supply agency based at Northfleet, were also interviewed. A telephone 
interview was also held with the manager of the small "Riggingco', based in the Port of 
Tilbury.
The "others' interviewed were the Chief Executive of British Ports Industries Training 
(BPIT), a Health and Safety Advisor of the Port Safety Organisation (PSO), and a 
Marine and Aviation Safety Policy Advisor of the Health and Safety Commission 
(HSC). Andrew Mackinlay, MP for Thurrock, which includes the Port of Tilbury, was 
also interviewed. 
Conducting the Interviews
A letter giving a brief outline of the research and the participant's role in it and giving 
assurances of confidentiality and anonymity, were sent to all the prospective 
participants. Before the actual interview began, the participants where asked if they 
objected to the conversation being taped5 , and were informed that they could decline to 
answer any question, or to terminate the interview at any time. The interviews, which 
were mainly held in the participants' offices, lasted an average of one and a half hours.
As each participant and the areas their contributions covered were unique, separate 
interview guides (see Burns, 2000: 424) were drawn up for each participant (see 
Appendix 3:3). However, each participant was asked about their background in the 
ports industry - how long they had been involved in it, and their experience of it. This 
was followed by specific questions concerning their business or organisation. These 
included their experiences of the Scheme and the impact technical innovation had had on 
their business. Other questions explored work and employment structure and asked 
about how work was organised (how it was performed, shift work and overtime,
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training, etc.) about the utilisation of temporary labour, and about union recognition 
(discussed in Chapter Four).
Following the interview, transcripts of the interview tapes, and notes of the meeting that 
were not taped (see footnote 4), together with any observations and impressions were 
made. These were then coded onto index cards, using the topic of the quote as a guide 
(see Riley, 1990). Letters of thanks, re-iterating confidentiality, were then sent, together 
with a summary of the main points of the interview which the participants were invited 
to comment on and make alterations to if they so wished6 .
The interview data was comparable and complementary, both with the survey and with 
interviews with other participants. It was, however, extremely difficult to form 
judgements as to whether the information was the participants' own beliefs or if they 
were merely repeating company dogma - the HR manager of "Containerco' admitted 
that her testimony was "nothing but marketing spier (interview notes, 15/6/01). 
Attempts were made to overcome this by methodological triangulation. Silverman 
(2000: 98-9), for example, had seen triangulation as a means by which, by having "a 
cumulative view" of the data from different contexts and sources and examining where 
they intersected, a view of the 'truth' could be formed. In order to do this, one 
employer's account was checked against another's, and against company records, 
newspaper reports, union Branch minutes (see below), and with cargo handlers working 
at those terminals. 
ii: Cargo Handlers Interviews
Many of the active cargo handlers taking part in this research were also union activists 
(see below). However, in order to differentiate between what could loosely be termed
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"cargo handlers' and 'the union', this section will discusses the interviews and 
conversations held with the full-time cargo handlers, retired dockers, and temporary 
labourers participating in this investigation. 
Finding the Participants
Gaining access to the men proved to be the most difficult and intractable aspect of this 
research. However, as some of the participants had moved from terminal to terminal or 
from a terminal to a labour-supply agency, those participating were able to give detailed 
accounts of work organisation at various facilities.
I had hoped to arrange employee interviews on site. However, two employers cancelled 
workforce participation, arranged by the Felixstowe Deputy Convenor and the T&G's 
representative at "Generalco' 7 at the last moment because of "pressure of business'. 
Similarly, the Director of "Labourco' refused to allow me to use the on-site canteen to 
talk to the men (some of these men did participate, however). Therefore, and because of 
London's militant reputation (see Chapter One), I believed my best access to the men 
would be through the T&G. I approached the union for permission to talk to its 
members working as cargo handlers' in the Port of London. The main gatekeeper was 
the T&G's local full time officer (FTO). Unfortunately he went on extended sick leave 
before access could be arranged, and I had to devise other means of access.
These included asking friends with Mocker' connections for introductions, and giving 
leaflets outlining the research and asking for assistance to the 1/10 Branch secretary for 
distribution (one interview was secured as a result). I also placed the same leaflets in 
libraries in "dockers' areas, such as East Ham and Poplar, and in the Age Concern at 
Blackheath. However, with the one exception, none of these approaches were
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successful. As the following Table shows, through various contacts, 14 people, mostly 
retired dockers and dismissed activists, eventually took part in this aspect of the research 
(see also Appendix 3:1). It had been hoped that family members would participate in the 
investigation, giving an insight into how modern port work impacted on family life. 
However, the only means of access was through the cargo handlers and, although I was 
able to speak informally to some of the men's wives as I was conducting the interviews, 
only 'Angela', whose husband 'Alan' worked at Tortco', agreed to formally participate.
Table 3:2 - Cargo Handlers Participating in this Investigation:
- full-time employees: 4*
- retired dockers: 4
- temporary labourers: 9
- family member: 1 
* These include a telephone interview with a lighterman.
The above list was not exhaustive, however, as research-centred conversations with a 
further four working cargo handlers took place following Branch union meetings (see 
below).
The full-time employees and temporary labourers in the above Table, together with the 
Branch lay officials in Table 3:3 below, were employed by, or worked for, Tortco', 
Xabourco' or 'Agencyco', which had participated in the investigation, and 'Generalco', 
which had not. Not only were these interviews valuable in their own right, they also 
highlighted the contrasting views of the men and the employers on, for example, health 
and safety and training in the Port. 
Conducting the Interviews
Letters, similar to the employers, were dispatched to the dismissed activists and retired 
dockers. After enquiring into their ports industry history, the questions probed the 
participants' experiences and perceptions of change. They were asked, for example, 
about the effects of technical innovation on their work, and about the continuing effects
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of abolition on work and work organisation. All were also asked for details of their 
terms and conditions and about union membership and participation. The temporary 
labourers were asked to give accounts of their experience of the transition from full-time 
secure to temporary, insecure employment. Finally, 'Angela' was asked about the 
impact of her husband's work on family life. The data gained from these interviews are 
discussed in Chapter Five.
The interviews were mainly held at the participants' homes and, again, the average time 
for each interview was about one and a half hours. Those that had been taped (see 
below) were transcribed and coded, and letters of thanks and interview summaries were 
dispatched were possible (no amendments were notified).
Circumstances occasionally made it impossible to tape the interviews. For example, the 
meeting with the men working at "Generalco' and with the temporary labourers I met the 
following week (see Appendix 3:1) took place in a public house situated near the site in 
Northfleet, Kent. I was, therefore, unable to follow the same protocols with these 
interviews. The noisy public house made it impossible for me to tape the conversations 
and, as details of these participants' full names and addresses were unforthcoming, 
neither was I able to send letters of thanks or conversation summaries. Although open- 
ended interviews, I had drawn up interview guides and, by asking the same basic 
questions of all participants, I was able to utilise one interview to verify data gathered 
from other participants. The notes from these conversations were later written up and 
coded.
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i/i: Union Members and Officials 
Finding the Participants
This, again, was extremely problematical. Both the AEEU, which represents 
maintenance men and engineers working in the Port of London, and the three T&G 
branches in the Port (see Appendix 6:1) were approached and asked to participate; 
however, only the 1/10 Branch, based at Tilbury, agreed to do so. Various full-time 
officials - lay and paid, past and present - were also approached, but nearly all declined. 
The Region One Chairman, who had worked as a docker at Tilbury, declined for 
personal reasons and, although Jack Jones, T&G General Secretary at the time of 
decasualisation agreed to participate, Ron Todd, General Secretary at the time of 
abolition, declined for health reasons. The FTO was formally interviewed and, as a 1/10 
Branch member, also took part in many informal post-meeting discussions (see below). 
However, neither the Transport Trade Group secretary, nor any other serving T&G
o
officials with docks responsibilities , agreed to participate in this investigation.
As the following Table shows, 11 trade union members participated in this aspect of the 
research.
Table 3:3 - Union Members and Officials Participating in the Investigation 
Union members - Branch - shop stewards: 2
- dismissed activists: 3 
Paid Union Officials - active: 2 A
- retired: 2
AThese included the Convenor for the Port of Felixstowe, jointly interviewed with the 
Felixstowe labour manager.
Again, this list was not exclusive as conversations were also held with other Branch 
members and dismissed activists following Branch meetings and, as mentioned above, 
participating cargo handlers were also asked questions about union participation.
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With the exception of two of the Tortco' shop stewards, and although I was able to talk 
to them following Branch meetings, I was unable to formally interview any working 
Branch members who were active in Branch life. Many reasons, including the long 
hours both full-time and temporary labourers worked (see Chapters Four and Five), were 
put forward for why this might have been. Another reason suggested was that, as these 
approaches took place before ERA became law and when being identified as a member 
of a trade union could lead to victimisation, cargo handlers were nervous about being 
seen to take part in the investigation (personal conversations, various). Therefore, I 
turned to Branch activists dismissed on abolition, all of whom had been shop stewards 
and many of whom had remained involved in the Branch and in wider union affairs. I 
was also able to interview the National Docks Officer at the time of abolition (now 
retired).
Conducting the Interviews
These participants were mainly asked questions concerning trade union marginalisation 
and the impact of derecognition on trade union organisation in the Port. Jack Jones was 
asked about decasualisation and the Jones-Aldington Agreement (see Chapter One) and 
the dismissed activists and the retired officers were specifically asked about industrial 
relations prior to 1989. The current FTO and the shop stewards were asked questions 
about union organisation - disputes resolution, density, recruitment, etc - in the Port 
during the 1990s. They were also asked about their hopes for union recovery under 
ERA and about the effects of recognition on industrial relations in the Port (discussed in 
Chapter Six).
Although three interviews - with 'Andrew', "Larry' and "Benny' - lasted for over three 
hours, the average interview lasted one and a half hours and took place in the
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participants' homes. Again, the interviews were taped, transcribed and coded. In order 
to distinguish between the various information gathering strategies, taped formal 
interviews and verbatim notes taken at the time of unrecorded interview were designated 
'interview notes' and other notes taken during unrecorded interviews and the open- 
ended interviews were designated "field notes'. In order to add further clarity, notes 
taken following Branch meetings (see below) were designated "Branch field notes' and 
appear as such in Chapters Four to Six 
3:lc - Participant Research and Observation
Two types of observation were utilised for this investigation: participant observation of 
1/10 Branch meetings, and work process observation.
Buchanan, Boddy and McCalman (1988: 55 and 61) wrote that a close relationship 
between the researcher and the participants can produce rich information and that 
researchers should exploit any opportunity they are offered. Such an opportunity 
presented itself with regards to the T&G 1/10 Branch.
Occasionally invited to meet the shop stewards following Branch meetings, I had talked 
with Branch members, some of whom had declined to take part in the research, and had 
established a good relationship with them. I found that they talked openly to me about 
their experiences at these informal gatherings. On one such occasion, the Branch 
Chairman mentioned that he was finding it difficult to both take the minutes and conduct 
the meetings and, tongue in cheek and not expecting to be taken seriously, I said that I 
would do it - and my 'offer' was accepted! I did, however, see this as an opportunity to 
access information otherwise unobtainable and also as a means of monitoring Branch 
activities. As Branch minutes secretary from February 2002, I was able to hear, in a
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unique arena, discussions of the problems faced by the men represented by the Branch. 
This is discussed in more detail in Chapter Six.
However, my role raised a conflict of interest. I had been asked - and agreed - to 
become a Branch member and my union subscriptions were paid out of Branch funds (in 
appreciation for taking the minutes) and, as a Branch member, I took an active part in 
Branch meetings. The Branch had stipulated that I could not use the minutes I took at 
meetings for my research whilst the issues remained unresolved; I was, however, 
permitted to use notes from any conversations on these issues that took place outside the 
meetings9 . So I joined Branch members after the meetings and took part in discussions 
about the issues raised at the meeting. This allowed me to utilise many unrecorded 
conversations and discussions (the notes of which were written up as additions to the 
minutes on the journey home) in order to inform the background to this research, both in 
terms of Branch activity during the 1990s and more recently. This research activity, 
although it increased the risk of bias - the employers could not be consulted about the 
events as that would mean disclosing confidential information - give me access to a 
unique source of data. 
Work Process Observation
I was also able to observe the work process. I was able to see how a task, such as ship 
discharging, was performed, and how this fitted into the complete work process. I had 
approached a number of employers for permission to observe the work process; 
however, and for safety reasons, this was refused. Observations, therefore, were 
conducted from outside the facilities and took place on field trips to Tilbury and 
Chatham, following interviews at Felixstowe and Sheerness, and on walks along the 
Thames Footpath between Greenwich and Gravesend, where many of the smaller
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facilities were located. The observations were systematic in that I watched repeated 
cycles of each task, timed them, and made notes of how the task was performed, and of 
any interaction between the men. Where possible, observations were carried out at more 
that one site - I watched the tasks involved in loading and unloading containers at three 
terminals, for example. However, as I was unable to see inside the cabs of the various 
plant, or to observe how they were operated, I had to rely on the men or books on port 
ergonomics for this information. A description of the modern ports labour process, 
based on these observations, was included in Chapter Two. 
3:Id - Document Research
Secondary reading and document researches were carried out in a number of institutions. 
These included Greenwich University library, the British Library of Political and 
Economic Science at the London School of Economics, the Museum in Docklands, T&G 
head office, and at my local library in Croydon.
Information on companies in the Port was obtained from Annual Reports, either printed 
or on the Internet, or from reference material. The PLA minute books from 1970 to 
1993 were read for details of employment change before 1989, and the PLA Handbooks 
gave details of the various facilities in the Port and, as a series, showed change in the 
number, location, and business activities of terminals in the Port. Newspapers, 
especially The Port of London, published by the PLA, Lloyd's List and the Financial 
Times were also researched for the context for change and for changes in the maritime 
industry in general and in the Port of London in particular.
Three sources of union documentation were also utilised during this research. I was 
granted permission to visit the T&G deposit at the Modern Records Centre, University
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of Warwick, were I read T&G General Executive Council minutes and DWF National 
Committee minutes and the T&G Record up to 1990. The T&G allowed me to visit its 
"Docks' archives, held at its Research Department in Theobalds Road, London. There I 
was given access to the T&G Ports Survey, DWF National Committee minutes up until 
March 2002, and various documents on the ports industry generated by the research 
department. Finally, I visited the TUC archive, housed at the London Metropolitan 
University library, where I read, for example, the TUC Focus series, AEEU magazines 
and Annual Reports, and the T&G Record after 1990.
I was, however, unable to gain access to other T&G documents, such as the T&G 
Region One Committee and the Region One Docks and Waterways Committee minutes, 
which would have been useful to this investigation. Although Branch members were on 
the above Committees and were prepared to vouch for me, the Region One secretary was 
unable to grant the necessary permission. However, the Chairman and Branch secretary 
of the T&G 1/10 Branch very kindly loaned me two volumes of the Branch minute 
books, covering the period December 1991 to October 2001.
Although an excellent source for plotting change, the usefulness of the Branch minutes 
were limited as they were not verbatim reports of the meetings, but rather notes of the 
main events covered at them. Similarly, reports and minutes from other Committees, 
such as those mentioned above, were only minuted as 'tabled'. Although the main 
source of details of, for example, imposed terms and conditions, or the utilisation of 
temporary labour, some of the data was verifiable through other sources, such as The 
Port of London or Tideway, (a T&G Region One newspaper published between 1989 
and 1994), and through interviews.
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3:2 - Reflections on the Research Experience
This section looks back on the research experience, reflects on the conduct of the 
investigation and discusses the problems encountered and the lessons learned during it. 
The Problems Encountered
I was aware that problems would be encountered during the research. One such was 
bias, both the participant's and mine (see below). My status as an academic was known 
to affect participants' views of researchers' motives. Participants may have believed, 
for instance, that I had preconceived answers that only needed confirming and so may 
have reported what they thought I wanted to hear rather than "the facts'. Similarly, the 
employers wanted to show their organisation in the best possible light, whereas the cargo 
handlers wanted to emphasise their problems. Their various accounts form the basis of 
Chapters Five and Six.
Taking this into account, and in order to ensure that as much data as possible was 
verified, two peoples' accounts of the same event were compared, and accounts were 
triangulated. This was also to overcome the fact that recall memory can be selective 
(see Searle, 2000: 420), and people tend to remember only those events that have a 
special significance for them.
A major problem throughout this research was participation. Although many people 
expressed interest in the investigation, trying to persuade them to take part in it often 
became an exercise in frustration management. Many of those approached declined to 
take part (see above) and, as a glance at Appendix 3:1 will show, other problems, such 
as change of personnel or illness, also delayed meetings and interviews with some 
participants in the research. This limited participation has in turn limited both the
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validity and generalisability of the research outcomes. Had more, or different, people 
taken part, the findings discussed in Chapters Four to Six may have been different.
The employers' survey was, at the same time, a disappointment and a success. Although 
the telephone survey had produced some interesting and high quality data, it had been 
very time-consuming. However, the data eventually collected from the surveys were 
extremely valuable, for three reasons. The telephone survey especially revealed some 
very candid opinions, it led to three interviews which might otherwise have been 
unforthcomimg and, finally, the data collected included aspects of the employment 
relationship which would have been otherwise unavailable.
The timing of the survey in the research design, however, and the questions included, 
could have been amended. The research emphasis changed over time and, had the 
survey been administered later in the lifetime of the investigation, it could have included 
questions on trade union recognition depth, for example, or health and safety procedures 
and risk assessments, or supervision. The historical questions, which were only asked 
regarding temporary labourers, could also have been usefully asked of full-time 
employees.
My role as Branch minutes secretary taught me the value of participant observation and 
research. This was one of the most rewarding of the research design decisions, as I was 
able to meet and talk to cargo handlers I would not otherwise been able to. This 
association has also bought personal rewards and has continued beyond the lifetime of 
this investigation.
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In order to be successful, research should be unbiased, valid, able to be generalised, and 
reliable. Observer bias occurs when only an account of a situation that would strengthen 
the researcher's case is given (Robson, 1993: 68). In order to present the 'truth', the 
accounts of all the parties to this investigation were included in the following chapters. 
Similarly, research is only valid if an account of all the information received is included, 
with any that are contradictory to the general findings included (see Silverman, 2000: 
176-7). This was addressed by pointing out where the research findings deviated from 
both the literature on the topic and from the known situation in other ports. 
Contradictory participant reports were also included (see especially Chapter Six).
Arguably, because of its nature, case study research may not be generalizable. 
However, Saunders et al (2000: 259) feel that case studies can have a broader 
significance if the research is related to existing theory (see Chapter Two), or if its 
findings are tested in another setting (2000: 259).
Reliability can be achieved by the consistent use of, for example, the transcription 
coding discussed above, (see Silverman, 2000: 188). Another means of ensuring 
reliability would be if two observers placed the same event in the same category, or if, 
under the same conditions, two researchers using the same research methods came to the 
same conclusions. However, a major difficulty with qualitative research is that people 
and situations change over time, thus making exact replication impossible (see, for 
example, Burns, 2000: 417-8). It is, therefore, important that a precise account of how 
the research was carried out is given (see 2000: 418). A product of the time it was 
carried out, then, it is highly unlikely that this investigation could be replicated exactly. 
It is, for example, uncertain if access to the 1/10 Branch and/or its members could be
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arranged. Also, the situation in the Port changed during the three years taken for this 
investigation. Wharves closed and others opened and Taperco' relocated to Chatham. 
Personnel also changed. The "Containerco' human resource manager was replaced 
during 2002, for example, and both BPIT and PSO closed towards the end of 2002. 
Other events, such as P&O's proposed development of Shell Haven as a container port, 
the continuing growth in the utilisation of 'casual labour', and the effects of ERA on 
industrial relations mean that, even if the same research methods were utilised, any 
future investigation into working relationships in the Port of London would almost 
certainly come to different conclusions. 
Conclusion
This Chapter has given an account of the research methods - an employers' survey, 
interviews and conversation, participant research and work process observation - that 
were utilised in order to carry out this investigation.
The Chapter looked in detail at my experience of conducting the survey and outlined the 
difficulties encountered in administering the telephone survey, and the reasons why this 
had to be abandoned for a postal survey. It then recounted the interview techniques 
utilised, and discussed how that data was treated. It discussed the difficulties 
encountered in finding investigation participants, and also gave an account of 
opportunities, such as how I became T&G Branch minutes secretary, which I was able to 
take advantage of, and the participant research conducted as a result. Finally, the 
Chapter reflected on my research experiences.
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Chapters Four to Six discuss the research findings and relate, using the participants' own 
words as far as possible, their changing experiences of work and employment in the Port 
of London.
1 Two women were known to work occasionally as cargo handlers in the Port of London. 
Both were approached but declined to take part in this investigation.
The postal version of the questionnaire was reduced to 29 questions. The survey 
preamble (which became part of the covering letter) and variables, which had been 
included on the telephone survey to ease computer entry, were also omitted.
Only six replies were received from the 21 questionnaires dispatched in the first 
posting on 26* March 2001. The second posting of 15 questionnaires, dispatched on 
14th April 2001, again only received six replies.
Of the seven questionnaires dispatched for the pilot posting on 1 st October 2001, five 
were returned: these, however, included one negative response and two returned as no 
longer at that address. Eleven questionnaires were dispatched on 22nd October 2001, of 
which eight were completed and returned. The data was separated for calculation, and 
non-cargo handler's responses were added to those of direct employers'.
5 Two interviews, with the HSC Safety Policy Advisor and Andrew Mackinlay, were not 
taped. The former interview took place in a very noisy open-plan office and the latter in 
a House of Commons restaurant.
6 Two participants - the Port of Felixstowe labour manager and the HSC Safety Advisor 
- made amendments and the transcripts were altered accordingly.
7 The T&G had shop stewards at workplaces it was recognised and as "Generalco' had 
derecognised on abolition, an employee acted as a representative of the Branch members 
there.
8Although declining to participate, as the Region One Chairman regularly attended 
Branch meetings, I was able to have many conversations with him. The T&G has no 
full-time officers with specific responsibility for the DWF.
9 These have included, for example, the protracted 2002 pay negotiations, discussed in 
Chapter Seven, and health and safety issues that have become the subject of an Inquest.
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Appendix 3:1 - Timetable of Research Activities and Method of Introduction
Date Participant/Event How Became Involved 
in the Research
13th January 2000 1 st visit to PLA archive, 
museum in Docklands. A 
total of 14 visits between
>th rd
8th June 2000
13'" Jan and 3  May 2000
Interview with the retired 
T&G National Docks 
Secretary
15th June 2000
Speculative letter 
requesting an interview 
(SLRI) sent 5th June 
2000
Initial contact 
T&G's local 
official (FTO), 
gatekeeper
with the
full-time
the main
Speculative telephone 
call. Because he had to 
go into hospital, I was 
unable to interview him 
until December 2000 - 
see below.
16m June 2000 Interview with Jack Jones, 
former General Secretary of 
the T&G
SLRI sent 15in May 
2000.
24th to 27th July 
2000
Visit to T&G archive, 
Modern Records Centre, 
University of Warwick___
9tn August 2000 Interview with 'Ted', 
retired docker
An old acquaintance; 
arranged during a 
chance meeting 7th 
August 2000_____
16in August 2000 Managing Director 
'Paperco' interviewed
Suggested by the PLA* 
librarian. SLRI sent 
21 st July 2000______
12in October 2000 Marketing Director of Port 
of Tilbury interviewed
Suggested by the PLA 
librarian. SLRI sent
>tb18in September 2000
9ID November 2000 Interview with 'Benny', an 
ex-T&G Chairman
Suggested by the PLA 
librarian. SLRI sent 
18th September 2000
5th December 2000 Interview with the FTO. 
Further conversations 
following Branch meetings 
during 2002________
December 2000 Employers' telephone 
survey pilot began
23rd January 2001 Interview with 'Andrew', a 
dismissed activist
Suggested by an 
academic supervisor. 
Telephone call 
requesting an interview 
mid 2000. He was, 
however, unable to see 
me before this date.
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February 2001 Employers 9 telephone 
survey proper began
10'" February 2001 Interview with "Colin', 
dismissed activist
a Suggested by an 
academic supervisor.
SLRI sent 
November 2000
20 th
18'n February 2001 Initial meeting with 
1/10 Branch secretary
the
[ml
Arranged by RIO, 
Further conversations 
following Branch 
meetings during 2002
22naFebruary 2001 Interview with "Paul', a 
Tortco' employee and 
union activist. Further 
conversations following 
Branch meetings during 
2002
29in February 2001 Interview with "Alan', a 
"Portco' employee and 
union activist. Further 
conversations following 
Branch meetings during 
2002
March-April Employers' postal survey 
began_____
19in March 2001 Industrial Relations 
manager/Port Convenor, 
Port of Felixstowe, 
interviewed
The FTO had sent a 
letter of introduction on 
my behalf. The Deputy 
Convenor phoned me 
on 6th February 2001 to 
arrange a visit_____
2na April 2001 Chief Executive 
interviewed
BPIT Suggested by a training 
officer I met on a 
training course. SLRI
>ndsent 22nu February 2001
16in May 2001 Read T&G Docks, 
Waterways and Fisheries 
Group documents at T&G 
Head Office. Further visit 
23rd October 2001.
The FTO had suggested 
I contact the T&G 
Research Department. 
Due to changes in 
personnel at the 
Research Department, I 
was unable to arrange a 
visit until 9th May 2001
20'n May 2001 Attendance at 1/10 Branch 
meeting, followed by 
informal discussion with 
some Branch members
23rd May 2001 Director of "Labourco', a
labour-supply 
interviewed
agency,
As the result of the 
survey.
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13tft June 2001 Interview with 'Larry', a 
retired docker and union 
activist
Suggested by an 
academic supervisor. 
SLRI sent 20th May 
2001
14in June 2001 Health and Safety Advisor, 
PSO interviewed
SLRI sent 
February 2001
22nd
15in June 2001 'Containerco'
Resource
interviewed
Human 
Manager,
As a result of the 
survey.
23ra July 2001 Interview with ' Angela', 
'Alan's' wife
Arranged by 'Alan'
25in July 2001 Interview with 'George', a 
dismissed activist and ex- 
Branch secretary
Suggested by 'Paul'.
SLRI sent 12 
2001
th June
25in August 2001 Interview with 'Jack', a 
retired docker
Suggested by a 
colleague. Telephone 
call requesting an 
interview 27th July 2001
October 2001 Pilot and survey to 'other' 
employers began
18'n October 2001 Director of 'Agencyco', a 
labour-only supplier, 
interviewed
As a result of the survey
15in November 2001 Telephone interview with 
'Riggingco', a small labour- 
supply agency_________
As a result of the survey
November 2001 Telephone conversation 
with 'Paul', a lighterman
Speculative letter sent 
after hearing him speak 
at the T&G Biennual 
Delegate Conference in 
July 2001________
23  November 2001 Conversations with 
'Generalco' full-time 
employees and temporary 
labourers
Arranged by their 
union representative
26th November 2001 Conversations with other 
temporary labourers
Arranged by the 
temporary labourers I
had met 
November
on 26 th
13th December 2001 Andrew Mackinlay, MP for 
Thurrock, interviewed
Suggested by an 
acquaintance. SLRI 
sent 19th October 2001
February 2002 Became Branch 1/10 
minutes secretary. Ongoing
See text
14th May 2002 Safety Policy Officer, Health 
and Safety Commission 
interviewed
Suggested by the 
Branch secretary. 
SLRI sent 5th April 
2002
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12tn December 2002 Visit to TUC archive, 
London Metropolitan 
University, Further visit 24tb 
February 2003
*PLA - Port of London Authority
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Appendix 3:2: Employment in the Thames Gateway: Riverside Employment: 
Survey Responses
Table One: Employer Statistics: 
Employers: 48
Terminals and wharves: 52
Not asked to participate: 8 (oil or gas terminals, Fords.)
Survey population: 40 employers (48 terminals)
Trade and survey response
Trade Number of No responding Percentage
wharves to survey
Aggregate/cement 19 11 57.8%
Liquid bulk 7 3 42.8%
Recycling/steel 8 1 12.5%
Mixed* 8 4 50.0%
Forest Products* 6 4 66.6%
Plant/machinery 2 0 nil
* Some terminals handle more than one cargo
Agencies 30 7 23.3%
Location of wharves:
Barking: 8
Greenwich/Charlton: 6
Northfleet: 4
Gravesend: 4
Dagenham: 4
Grays/Thurrock: 4 (including Tilbury)
East London: 4
Erith/Belvedere: 3
Dartford: 1
Purfleet: 1
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Table Two: Survey Responses Question by Question 
Employment in the Thames Gateway - Riverside Employment 
Number of questions: 38 (35 to be completed by respondent) 
Questionnaire responses: 31 
Key: Direct employers (agencies)
Ql-3: Name and address of firm, source of information (completed by 
researcher)
Q4: Main Business activity:
: Port terminal - 9 (nil)
: Cargo Handler - 5 (nil)
: Marine Services - 1 (3)
: Labour-only supplier - 1 (6)
: Other: Aggregate importer and distributor: 4
: Timber importer - 1
: Cold Store management -1
: Lighterage (2)
: Shipping Services (1)
: Cargo Supervisor (1)
: Cargo Lashing (1)
: Barge Operator (1) 
Some employers gave more than one answer
Q5-7: Is your current location the main base of your business/a subsidiary?
: Main base: 14 (8) 
: Subsidiary: 8 (1)
Q8: How many employees, approximately, are there at your work location?
Direct employer: 2055 
Agencies: 510
Q9: Of those, approximately how many are cargo operatives?
Direct employers: 672 
Agencies: 465
Q10: How many cargo operatives are:
direct agencies
Full-time 684 161
Part-time nil 12
Casual: n/a* 276 
* unspecified numbers
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Qll: How many hours, on average, do part-time cargo handlers work: 
Direct employers: no part-time workers (see above), 
Agencies: four answered: "8-56 hours',
'30-50 hours',
'nothing to 7 days'
"presently under 30 hours)
Q12: Looking at ALL groups of workers, do you ever make use of the following
(direct employer responses only) 
Agency workers: 9 
Labour-only supplier: 5 
Contractors staff: 14 
Casual workers: 2
Q13: How many hours per week/weeks per year do casual labourers work?
Only 2 answered: 47 weeks per year
"as needed'
Q14: Looking at CARGO OPERATIVE labour only, do you ever use any of the
following (employer responses) - terminals only
Agency workers: 7
Labour-only suppliers: 1
Contractors: 9
Casual workers: 2
Short-term contracts: 2
Do not employ: 6 
Some respondents gave more than one answer
Q15: Under which of the following circumstances would you hire/asked to 
supply cargo operative labour
Category
Reason Agency ContA L-O A Cas A 
To cover for busy periods: 7(1) 10(2) 3(5) 3(2) 
To cover for sickness/absence: 5 (1) 6 (1) 1 (3) 1 (0) 
During periods of staff adjustment: 2 (0) 4 (0) 2 (1) 0 (1) 
Seasonal adjustment: 0(1) 1(1) 0(4) 0(1)
A Contractors/labour-only suppliers/casuals
Some respondents gave more than one answer
Q16: How many of the above groups are working for you/are on hire at the
moment? (Direct employers only)
Agency Workers: 62
Labour-only Suppliers: 24
Contractors: 140
Casuals: 19*
Don't Employ: 4 
* two employers also reported having casuals on site at the time of survey: no details
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Q 16: How many of the above are on hire at the moment?
Agency: 0 
Labour-only Suppliers: 318 
Contractors: 0 
Casuals: 1
Q17: What was that figure*
2 years ago (1998): 226 (375-425) 
5 years ago (1995): 230 (512)
10 years ago (1990): 64 ( 34)
* Of those answering, most gave figures for 1998 and 1995; very few kept records for 
1990
Q18: Why has the total changed?
Permanent employment: 5 (1) 
Increase in business: 2 (1) 
Less work: 2 (3) 
Took over another business: 1 (1) 
Contracting out of non-core activities: 1 (0) 
Competition from other agencies: 0 (1) 
New to Britain after 1995 1 (0)
Q19: In which areas do the groups in Q 16 work: 
Office: 2(1) 
Site: 17( 5)
Other: 2 specified: 'jetty and weigh house'
" warehouse'
Q20: Is this the same as permanent employees? 
Yes: 15 (5) 
No: 2 (0)
Q21: Has the range of responsibility for the following cargo operatives changed 
(positive answers only)*
Permanent workers: 5 (4) 
Contractors/agency workers: 4 (2) 
Casuals/temps: 0 (3) 
About the same: 3 (0) 
Don't Know 2 (0)
Q 22- 3: Are you currently recruiting staff/cargo operative (positive answers only)
Yes: 1 (2)
Cargo operative: 3 (3)
Most respondents were not recruiting
Appendix 3:2 86
Q24: Which are the main way/s in which you recruit cargo operative labour?
Adverts in the local press: 11 (1) 
Word of mouth: 10(7) 
JobCentre: 8 (3) 
Agencies: 5(0) 
Through a contractor only: 2(0) 
Some respondents gave more than one answer
Q25: Would you consider offering a permanent position to any of the following? 
Positive answers only (Direct employers only)
Agency: 10
Labour-only supplier: 7
Contractor: 7
Casuals: 5
AOne employer said yes to two categories of workers; all others either answered yes or 
no.
* Of those taking part in the telephone survey who enlarged on this, 2 employers 
mentioned that they had given permanent employment to agency/contractor labourers, 
and 5 said they would do so "if they were good enough'.
Q26 Do cargo operatives in your business currently undergo formal training for 
that business?
Yes: 17 (8) 
No: 4 (1)
Q27: If yes, are they trained by:
You - a training officer: 10 (4) 
You - a consultant: 2 (0) 
Outsider - original employer: 5 (1) 
By working: 0 (1)
Q28: What kinds of training do they receive? (Of those specifying) 
Induction training: 8 (5) 
Skills update training: 5 (4) 
New procedure training: 4 (4) 
New legislation training: 5 (2)
Q29-30: Does your company participate in the NVQ programme
For cargo operatives: 3 (0) 
Office workers: 6 (1) 
Electricians: 1 (0) 
Do not participate: 10 (6)
Q31: Have any of the following steps been taken over the last 2 years?
Introduction of group/collective pay incentives: 5 (1) 
Introduction of individual performance assessment: 4 (0) 
Replacement of some full-time employees by part-timers: 1 (1) 
Replacement of full-time employees by agency/contract staff: 3 (1) 
Replacement of some full-time staff by casual/temp workers: 1 (2) 
An increase in shift work: 4 (1)
Appendix 3:2 87
Q32: Does your company recognise a trade union: 
Yes: 10(1) 
No: 11(6)
Q33: If yes, which trade union does it recognise? (of those specifying):
T&G: 5 (1)
AEEU: 5(0)
GPMU: 1 (0)
MSF: 1 (0) 
Two companies recognised more than one union
Q34: If no to the above, did your company ever recognise a trade union?
Yes: 5(2) 
No: 4(3)
Q35: Under what circumstances was the union derecognised? (of those specifying) 
Abolition of the National Dock Labour Scheme: 4 (0) 
Number of trade unionists at workplace fell: 2 (0)
Q36: Do you think trade union recognition at your workplace is likely to become an 
issue in the future?
Of those recognising a union:
Number of employees YES NO D/K*
Under 10 employees Nil Nil Nil
10-20 employees nil 2 (0) nil
21-50 employees nil 5(0) nil
51-120 employees nil nil nil
121-200 employees nil 2(1) nil
Over 200 employees 1 (0) 1 (0) nil
Of those not recognising a union:
Number of employees Yes No D/K*
Under 10 employers: 1 (0) nil 1 (2)
11-20 employees: nil 3(1) nil
21-50 employees 1(1) 2(0) 1(0)
51-120 employees nil nil nil
121-200employees nil nil nil
Over 200 employees 1 nil nil 
*Don't know 
Of those answering "yes' that specified:
'hourly employers expected to seek recognition'
"expecting T&G to seek recognition'
T&G pressing for recognition in areas not yet recognised'
Q37: Would you be prepared to talk to me again?
Q38: Please use the following space to add any other comments
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Appendix 3:3: Examples of interview guides (names altered to protect confidentiality)
Interview Schedule: "Paul', Tortco' employee and union activist, Thursday 22nd 
February 2001
*> When did you start working on the docks?
*t* How has the job changed since then?
*J* Were you an active member of the union under the Scheme?
* What happened in 1989?
<* What was the outcome: for you, the union, the industry?
*J* Work now
<* "Mechanics' of work routine: how many in a gang, how is the work split up, how 
is work performed?
*t* Shift work: "rolling' by week/month, contracted for a specific shift/at employer's 
whim?
* * What affect does shift work have on family life (i.e., coping with unsociable 
hours, etc.)
* Wages?
<  WTD: affects on you/port work?
*«* Tell me about health and safety/risk assessments, etc.
<* Tell me about training: who is trained, who does it, induction only or other?
*»* Coping with the stress of an isolating job
*> Coping strategies, i.e., making the day go faster, and theft (careful how phrase 
that!)
*»* Union now
<  ERA: impact for Branch, for wider trade union movement
*** Tell me about the recognition agreement
*> Tell me about the Branch: area it covers, permanent employees or contingent as
well, union density. 
<* Tell me about union organisation: shop stewards in and outside Tilbury, (if so,
contact details), committees, etc.
*> How are new members recruited? Do they approach you, or do you seek new 
members? Is there a problem recruiting new entrants?
*> Casuals
*t* Casuals: do you know how they are hired/ why? Is it different to agency
workers?
»> Tell me about the "pool'
<* Agency workers: hired per job? Regular workers? 
<* Tell me about working with casual/agency men? 
<* How effective has the "passport' been?
*** Is the Branch/T&G actively trying to recruit these workers? If so, is it 
successful? Why/not? If not, why not?
<  Why is the situation as it is? What's the answer?
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Interview Schedule: Human Resources Manager, 'Containerco', 15th June 2001 
*!* CG is one of the few women in the industry at all, never mind a senior position
How long have you worked in the port transport industry? 
Always at "Containerco'? If not, differences there and 'Containerco' 
Any problems encountered working in a male-dominated industry? 
Do you ever work on the berth? If so, tell me about your experiences 
*** How has the job here changed since you started - is it still changing?
** Tell me about 'Containerco'
*> Ownership, autonomous management or centralised (if "a bit of both' which bits
are which?) 
<  How is work organised (i.e., shifts and overtime)
*!* Work routine: How are containers handled? How many men to un/load a ship?
How long does it take? What other tasks are involved? 
Survey
*!* Employed about 140 men: how many now?
*> Gradually replacing perms with contingent labourers as they leave - strategic
decision, or short-term solution? 
<* How (and why) do you hire contingent labourers?
*t* How effective has the 'passport' been in improving quality of contingent
labourers?
C* How do you recruit cargo operatives? 
£* Tell me about training
'Containerco' recognises the AEEU: why not the T&G? Do you expect it to seek
recognition under ERA? What will your reaction be? 
fr What is the level of recognition with the AEEU?
*!* Tell me about the expansion: will you need more men?
<* How will the development of Shell Haven affect' Containerco'?
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Appendix 3:4 - The Case Study Companies
The following is a brief account of the case study companies. Their choice was based on 
two considerations. These were: the full and candid responses given by these companies 
to the Employment in the Thames Gateway: Riverside Employment survey, devised and 
administered for this investigation, and the quality of interview and other data on these 
companies. 
i) ^Agencyco'
' Agencyco' was a labour supply agency based in Sheerness on the Isle of Sheppey. In 
contrast to any other labour supply agency sending men to work in the Port of London, 
" Agencyco' was owned by the men who worked for it. Made redundant from the Port of 
Sheerness in 1993, the men recognised that they had skills that port employers needed, 
so pooled their redundancy money and established the agency, becoming equal 
shareholders in it. There were approximately 140 shareholders in 2001, hired to work at 
any port terminal between Dover and Tilbury. The shareholders elected the company 
directors, who were responsible to them. "Agencyco' also hired extra workers for 
(predictable) busy periods. Unlike the shareholders, who were guaranteed work, these 
men were dismissed when no longer needed. 'Agencyco' profits were ploughed back 
into the company with any surplus going into a benefits fund, open to both shareholders 
and temporary employees fAgencyco' Director, interview notes, 18/10/01). 
ii) ^Containerco'
Based at Northfleet Hope (see frontispiece map), "Containerco' was a tenant of the Port 
of Tilbury. Originally a joint venture between the PLA and a consortium of shipping 
companies (see Chapter Two), it started operating in 1976. It was purchased by P&O 
Ports after privatisation in 1991 and became a joint venture with ABP, with each 
company having 50 percent of the shares. The company paid rent to the PLA/Forth Port
Appendix 3:4 91
but, when this agreement expired in 1999, rather than renewing it, Forth Ports became 
the third owner, with a 33 percent share (P&O retained a 34 percent share and ABP a 33 
percent share). "Containerco' is both ISO 9002 accredited, and was the first container 
terminal in the world to be granted this accreditation (PLA Handbook: 2000: 74). The 
terminal was expanded during 2000-1 and a second berth was in the process of 
construction. "Containerco' had about 100 permanent employees in 2000; it also utilised 
temporary dock labour, hired from a variety of labour-only suppliers (see Chapter Five). 
iii) * Ferry co'
Terryco' was a roll-on, roll-off (ro-ro) ferry terminal, based at Purfleet (see map). A 
general cargo wharf during the Scheme years, it closed in 1991 and was purchased by 
Cobelfret, an ex-customer, re-opening in 1992. Cobelfret, a Belgian ferry company, 
converted the wharf into a ro-ro terminal and, with a workforce of 55 people, starting 
two sailings a day to Zeebrugge. By 2003, Terryco' was operating 24 hours a day, 
seven days a week, and was handling 1500 containers on lorries per annum from its five 
daily sailings to Zeebrugge or Rotterdam (Port of London, January-February 2003: 4-5). 
Its workforce had risen to approximately 260 by 2003. These worked under a variety of 
employment contracts. It also utilised temporary workers, especially drivers, hired from 
general employment agencies (see Chapter Five). 
iv) 'Generalco'
'Generalco' was a general cargo wharf handling mainly newsprint, steel and assorted 
metals. The wharf had been a separate limited company during the 1990s but the Roth 
family, its original owners, bought back the shares in 2001. They set up a parent 
company that owned both "Generalco' and a fleet of five ships that were on a regular run 
between 'Generalco' and Dunkirk and Ghent (Port of London, March-April 2003: 4-5). 
It employed approximately 10 men full-time, thus manning to the troughs of business.
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The company also relied heavily on temporary labour, hired from labour-only suppliers, 
for meeting peak demands (see Chapter Five). 
v) ^Labourco'
Originally a barge operator based at Rotherhithe, London and now based in Northfleet 
(see map), "Labourco' took on labour supply work during the 1990s. The barge 
company's main customer, Kimberley Clark, made its workforce redundant but wanted 
to re-employ them on a casual basis through an agency, and the barge company offered 
itself for that role. Continuing to operate as a barge company, "Labourco' trained its 
workforce so that they could also work as temporary cargo handlers when no barge work 
was available. Gradually, the company took on others dockers made redundant during 
the 1990s and expanded its business to supply temporary labourers to other facilities. It 
had 40 men on its books in 2001 and, although supplying labour throughout the Port of 
London, its main customers appeared to be the Port of Tilbury, 'Generalco', and Tate 
and Lyle ("Labourco' Director, interview notes, 23/5/01). 
vi) ^Portco'
Tortco' was the largest of the six divisions created out of the decentralisation of the Port 
of Tilbury following abolition (see also Chapter Two). It employed about 300 of the 750 
permanent employees working for Forth Ports, the owners of Tilbury, in 2001. Tortco' 
also hired both temporary labourers through various labour-only supply agencies and 
casual labourers (see Chapter Four). Although handling every type of cargo, Tortco' 
mainly handled forest products (wood, newsprint and pulp), containers and cars. 
Tortco' was also ISO 9002 accredited.
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Chapter Four: Employer Implementation of Change
Based on ETGRE survey responses and interview data, this Chapter examines the changes 
implemented by employers in the Port of London. By looking at change in two areas - the 
employment relationship and work organisation - the Chapter discusses the rationale for 
change: why and how it was introduced.
Employers needed to introduce changes in both these areas for three main reasons. These 
were: competitive considerations, the need to control a much reduced work force, and a 
need to transfer the men's allegiance from the Scheme/the union to the firm (discussed in 
Chapter Six). The following section looks at the imperatives for change, and discusses how 
they were implemented.
For employers, abolition marked "a new beginning" where "anything was possible"
(interview notes, Taperco' Managing Director, 18/10/00 and Tortco' Marketing Manager,
12/10/00). Abolition gave employers back the 'right to manage': the right to decide what
was to be done, when and by whom (see Storey, 1983: 99). Rather than abiding by common
nationally agreed terms and conditions, employers were able to impose those terms and
conditions they believed would enhance their firm's productivity 1 and, because of union
derecognition (see Chapters One and Six), they were able to do so without reference to, or
interference from, the unions.
4:1 - Changes in the Employment Relationship
Brown et al (1998: 69) wrote that many industries, including port transport, had had "...
competitive circumstances under which firms did not need to make particularly high
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efficiency demands on their employees". As a result, management had allowed working 
practices, payment systems, and employee control over work to develop (1998: 69). This 
may have been true before technical innovation in the ports industry but, as discussed in 
Chapters One and Two, containerisation needed a different type of work organisation 
which, because of the Scheme, port employers had been unable to implement fully. 
Deregulation, however, had made this possible. Although run down because they had been 
unable to attract investment (see Chapter One), ex-Scheme ports were in prime locations, 
with better access to infrastructure links than many of their non-Scheme rivals. 'Ferryco' 
and Tilbury in the Port of London were near to or had easy access to the motorway network, 
whereas non-Scheme Felixstowe, for example, did not. It was hoped that these factors, 
together with new working arrangements, especially any that reduced labour costs and 
increased productivity, would attract traffic back to ex-Scheme ports. 
Cost Reduction
The reduction of port costs was the most important consideration behind the introduction of 
new work organisation. This was achieved by, for example, reducing the workforce and/or 
increasing productivity by introducing new working practices (see 4:2 below), and the 
introduction of new technology. Many employers also (re)introduced 'casual' labour; that 
is, hired workers from a growing number of labour-only supply and other agencies (see 
below).
Reductions in the workforce were common: as well as the abolition redundancies mentioned 
in Chapter One, there were at least a further 1000 redundancies, of both ex-RDWS and 
replacement employees, throughout the Port during the 1990s (1/10 Branch Minute Books).
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Firms such as 'Generalco' and Imperial Wharf, for example, had closed just before 
abolition, only to re-open later in 1989 with substantially reduced workforces (see Port of 
London, August 1989: 5 and September 1989: 5 and Chapter Six). 'Paperco' was another 
example. It reduced its workforce from 90 to 45 workers; unlike the above-mentioned 
companies, however, these men were not employed by 'Paperco' but by Deptford Cargo 
Handling Ltd, a company especially created by Taperco' to recruit and train workers. This 
allowed Taperco' to withdraw from cargo handling ('Paperco' Managing Director, 
interview notes, 18/10/00). 'Containerco' also withdrew from cargo handling in 1993, 
setting up a subsidiary company (P&S Hiltons) to employ its labour; however, these 
labourers were trained by 'Containerco'.
Cost reduction was also achieved by opening up Mock work' to other employees and 
training them to perform the tasks; at Tilbury, for example, both engineers and clerical staff 
were trained in cargo handling (Port of London, June 1992: 4). This not only reduced the 
need for labour but also ended demarcation. No port job, with the possible exception of 
quayside gantry crane driver, remained the prerogative of one class of employee and, 
because all port workers, whether employees or temporary labourers, could perform these 
tasks (see below), no worker was irreplaceable. This also eroded the boundary between 
various categories of work - cargo handlers at Tilbury, for example, were also expected to 
perform clerical functions and simple maintenance (see below). However, as their main 
function remained cargo handling, employees participating in this investigation are referred 
to as 'cargo handlers' in this and following Chapters.
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Costs were also saved by the introduction of new technology. Technical change had 
reduced both loading and discharging costs, and the costs of monitoring workers (see Brown 
et at, 1998: 14). It was extremely difficult to determine whether abolition had facilitated the 
spread of technological innovation in the Port of London or whether it was the result of 
continuing technological advances. However, post-abolition investment appeared to have 
allowed the spread and intensification of new cargo handling techniques. The Port 
Automated Cargo Environment (PACE) computer management system, introduced in 1994, 
was the successor of earlier, less sophisticated stock control systems. PACE was also a 
work control mechanism in that, via a computer terminal in the cab, it informed both 
quayside gantry crane and straddle carrier drivers the order in which to discharge or load 
containers, and where to place or find them in the container park. 
Wages
A final means of saving costs was to reduce wages and benefits. As discussed in Chapter 
One, union control over recruitment and discipline had enhanced dockers' bargaining 
power. Before decasualisation, RDWs had earned piecework rates on top of their daily 
wages. Codified in the "Green Book', there had been a plethora of rates, depending on the 
cargo and the tonnage. Although piecework rates nearly doubled between 1945 and 1966, 
time rates had risen faster and, as a result, piecework had become less lucrative after 1962 
(see Mellish, 1972: 11-12 - the figures are for South West India dock only).
After 1967, the PLA paid RDWs a differential, according to grade. In 1978, a ship's ganger 
or a crane driver (Grade One), for example, received a differential of £9.80 a week on top of 
the basic weekly wage of £70.20. A ship hand (Grade 3), on the other hand, received only
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£3.10 a week, whereas RDWs on light auxiliary work (Grade 6) did not receive differential 
payments (PLA Minute Book, 6th March 1978). This, together with bonuses and extra 
payments, such as 'dirty money' for handling unusual cargoes, had resulted in RDWs being 
among the highest paid occupational groups (see also Chapter Two). By 1988, the gross 
national average dockers' wage, negotiated by the NIC, had been just over £18,000 per 
annum (see Mankelow, 1994: 41). By abolition, however, dockers at Tilbury were earning 
less than this (see 1994: 204: Mankelow gave no details of the disparity). Following 
abolition, however, rather than collectively bargained, wages and earnings became a matter 
for individual employers. Southwood found that, nationally, wage cuts of one third to one 
half were ^widespread"1 (Southwood, 1992: 72). Many firms in London had reduced wage 
rates on abolition and continued to do so throughout the 1990s2 . "Extra' payments such as 
the above ceased and, at Tilbury, meal breaks were not longer paid ("Paul', interview notes, 
22/2/01). Cargo handlers were paid a standard rate, no matter what conditions they worked 
under (see, for example, "Paperco' Managing Director, interview notes, 18/10/00).
By 1999 (the last figures available) the gross national average wage for "stevedores and 
dockers' had risen by just over £3000, to £21,184.80 (New Earnings Survey, 1999: see also 
Miscellaneous Appendix Three). Although gross wages at Felixstowe in 2001 ranged from 
£17,000 to £21,000, or about the national average, (Felixstowe Industrial Relations Manager 
interview notes, 19/3/01), wages in London were below that level (see below). Generally, 
however, cargo handlers' wages remained high in comparison with other workers in the 
services sector. Although the overall rate of increase was lower, wages for Standard 
Industrial Classification code 632: "other supporting transport activities', which included
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cargo handlers, rose from £16,572.40 in 1990 to £20,378.80 in 2000, the last figures 
available. In comparison, the average service sector wage rose from £11, 273.60 in 1990 to 
£16,749.20 in 2000 (New Earnings Survey, 1991 to 2001). However, as Miscellaneous 
Appendix 3 shows, this may be accounted for by the amount of overtime worked by 'other 
supporting transport activities' workers.
Direct employers in London were reluctant to talk about wages, except in general terms. 
The "Containerco' HR Manager stated that its wages were "good for this area, the money 
is good..." (interview notes, 15/6/01). However, she went on to say that, in order to 
supplement their earnings, many 'Containerco' employees were known to do other jobs (car 
mechanics, for example) on their long weekends off. The BPIT Managing Director, a 
former port manager, also opined that "wages are good - usually better than a comparable 
job in the locality" (interview notes, 2/4/01). However, a Tortco' shop steward who had 
been involved in the 2002 pay negotiations (see Chapter Six), stated that
"...the argument by the employer is, it's the going rate for the area, so if someone is 
earning £13,000 a year at Tescos, he 'II get paid £13,000 a year at Tilbury. They 
might get paid a bit more than, say, the factory down the road, but not a lot... " 
(interview notes, 22/2/01).
Because there was no independent data for pre-abolition wages in London, it was difficult to 
judge the amount wages in London did fall. What wages data for the 1990s was available 
came from agreements and impositions recorded in the 1/10 Branch minute books and from 
interviews and conversations with cargo handlers. These indicated that ex-RDWs still 
working in the Port had experienced a fall in earnings. 'Richie' a permanent employee at 
'Generalco', for example, estimated that wages there had fallen by £4000 per annum during
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the 1990s (interview notes, 23/11/01). Similarly, an ex-RDWs pension trustees report to the 
1/10 Branch indicated that wages for ex-RDWs working at Tilbury had been higher in 1990 
than they were in 2002 (1/10 Minute book, 21 st September 2003). Wages had fallen to their 
lowest level in 1995, and had risen thereafter. As a result, those recruited into Tilbury after 
about 1995 had only experienced positive wages increases ("Paul', interview notes, 
22/2/01).
There were a plethora of wages rates at Terryco', which paid according to activity (1/10 
Branch minute book, 21st July 2002). Wages at Tilbury, on the other hand, were 
differentiated by department and by the men's experience and skills levels. As part of a 
settlement imposed in 1999, employees at the low-skilled Tilbury Freight Station were paid 
£11,000 to £13,000 gross a year in 2000/1. In contrast, the gross wages for men working at 
Tortco' (where the work was more diverse and the men more skilled) varied between 
£13,000 and £17,000 per annum; individualisation had also enhanced the wages of some 
men (no details available).
Tortco' employees were divided into three Grades to reflect their skills and experiences. 
Grade Three was for new entrants, who earned £13,000 per annum. They remained on this 
Grade for three months, during which time they received basic training, and were then 
transferred to Grade Two, an intermediate Grade. Wages on this Grade varied according to 
skills formation and rose from £13,000 to £17,000 a year, depending on the skills acquired. 
Grade One was for highly skilled, experienced men who could prove they could handle 
every piece of plant. These men's wages in 2001 were, on average, £17,860 per year (paid
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at £8.59 per hour), before overtime and other allowances (Branch Secretary, interview 
notes, 20/5/01).
If cost reduction had been aimed at attracting customers, it appeared to have been successful 
as the amount of traffic handled in the Port did increase in 1990 (see Miscellaneous 
Appendix One). As mentioned above, the employers had reduced direct employment to a 
minimum. This allowed them to staff to troughs of business. To staff to the peaks, men 
were hired from the growing number of labour-only supply agencies. This saved the 
employer both fixed employment costs (such as National Insurance) and variable costs 
(such as recruitment, training, pensions, and statutory sick and holiday pay), which were 
met by the contractor. These were ultimately passed on to the workers through lower pay 
and more intense work (see Chapter Two). 
The *New' Workforce
The Department of Employment wrote that abolition would not only restore ex-Scheme 
ports' competitiveness but would also establish a direct relationship between individuals 
and the employers (see Saundry and Turnbull, 1996: 13). This, however, was to be with 
different workers than under the Scheme, including non-dockers performing port work, 
post-abolition permanent recruits (Turnbull and Weston, 1993: 116), and temporary 
workers.
Workforce Segmentation
Firms operating in a competitive market, such as port transport, need to be able to adapt to 
both demand uncertainty and demand variability. In order to do so, firms need a workforce 
that, rather than constant, is variable (see Beatson, 1995: 6 and 8). As discussed in Chapter
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Two, a means of achieving this is to segment the workforce into a "core' of full-time, 
permanent employees and a 'periphery' of 'non-standard' workers, such as fixed-term and 
agency temporary workers, and casual workers.
The number of temporary workers in Britain doubled - from four percent in 1980 to eight 
percent in 1997 (Heery and Salmon, 2000: 14). Although the majority of temporary 
workers are women (see, for example, Casey, 1988: 19), male participation in the temporary 
labour market has increased. Whereas female participation rose from 7.2 percent to 7.5 
percent between 1984 and 1994, male participation rose from 3.8 percent to 5.5 percent 
during the same period (Beatson, 1995: 10). One reason for this increase was that males 
found it more difficult to find full-time employment (see 1995: 17 and Chapter Five): 
Cousins (1999: 101), for example, found that temporary work accounted for half of all new 
male jobs in 1995.
Casey (1988: 3) identified 11 categories of temporary workers. Of those, labour-only sub- 
contractors, who supply semi-skilled and skilled workers, casual workers, and agency 
workers were identified as working in the Port of London (see below). Many authors found 
that temporary jobs initially grew in sectors where they were already well established (see, 
for example, Pollert, 1988: 287). As discussed in Chapters One and Two, casual labour had 
been well-established in the ports industry before 1967, and its re-emergence after 1989 
could be said to fit this trend - it could, in fact, be argued that permanent employment (1967 
to 1989) had been the abnormal period in the industry.
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Many authors have identified temporary workers as having low or general skills. Casey 
(1988: 14), for example, wrote that, because they needed little training, temporary 
participation was higher where job levels were lower. Similarly, Nolan, Saundry and 
Sawyer (1997: 170) also found that, in the ports industry, skilled jobs such as crane driving 
were not often contracted out. As will be returned to below and in Chapter Five, this was 
not the case in the Port of London.
If temporary workers were needed on a regular basis, many employers found that it was 
more cost effective to have a list of "regular casuals' (Burchell, Deakin and Honey, 1999: 
7), who are given preference of hiring (see also Casey, Metcalf and Millward, 1997: 102). 
A survey conducted by the Institute of Employment Studies, Sussex University in mid-1995 
found that, of the 979 respondents, 17 percent - or 57 - had a "bank' of temporary workers 
they could contact at short notice (see Labour Market Trends, 1996: 407). Such "pools', 
which were a feature of port work pre-1967 (in that RDWs formed a "pool' which all 
employers in a port could access), re-emerged in the ports industry following abolition. The 
new labour-supply agencies, which "allocated' men to the various facility employers, could 
be said to act as an employers' labour "pool' on which, as mentioned throughout this thesis, 
they had come to rely on for labour (see "Agencyco', interview notes, 18/10/01, and Davies 
2000:612).
There were no official statistics for the numbers working in the ports industry, either as 
permanent employees or as temporary workers (Select Committee 18th June 2003: Qs 388 
and 591). However, data extrapolated by BPIT from its survey returns showed that the
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number of permanent cargo handlers nationally had fallen: from 5135 in 1998 to 2645 in 
2000 (BPIT, 1998: 8 and 2000: 11). There was also evidence to indicate that temporary 
labour had increased.
Labour Force Survey data showed that the number of temporary workers in the Transport 
and Communications sector had increased - from three per cent in 1992 to five percent in 
1996, when temporary workers accounted for eight percent of all employment in the sector 
(Labour Market Trends, September 1997: 352). Many participants' testimony appeared to 
confirm this. For example, the Marketing Director of Tortco' mentioned that there was "a 
flourishing business"1 in labour-supply agencies (interview notes, 12/10/00), and a HSC 
Marine and Aviation Safety Policy Advisor believed that, in future, the industry would be 
^heavily reliant' on temporary labour (interview notes, 18/5/02). The 'Agencyco' Director 
opined that: "The ports themselves don't hold the labour force anymore - it's the 
contractors that hold the labour force" (interview notes, 18/10/01). This was because, as 
the BPIT Chief Executive explained: "the most efficient ports now have a small core of 
highly trained people and they will buy in whatever [else] they need' (interview notes, 
2/4/01).
The evidence for London is ambiguous, however. Although interview data suggested that 
agency labour had increased, this was not supported by ETGRE evidence. This showed that 
there were 672 directly employed cargo handlers, but only 465 working for agencies (Q9). 
However, as only 7 of the estimated 30 agencies in the Port area took part in the survey (see
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Chapter Three), this was a minimum figure. Although there were more agency labourers in 
1998 (375-425) than in 2000, this was fewer than the 512 reported for 1995 (Q17).
However, most employers reported that agency work had become a highly competitive 
market in the Port. As well as the 30 labour-supply agencies, there were also a large 
number of general employment agencies, such as Star or Drake (both based in Grays, Essex) 
which were known to supply, especially drivers, to various facilities in the Port. The 
following section looks at how temporary labour was utilised in the Port of London. 
The Segmented Labour Force in London
In an attempt to distance the post-abolition ports industry from its past "casual' reputation, 
employers referred to temporary labourers as "non-permanent employees': "the term 
^casual' is contentious and it harks back to 1947 and beyond" (BPIT Chief Executive, 
interview notes, 2/4/01). The ports industry, however, cannot be equated with the "flexible 
firm' (see Chapter Two). A better description of full-time employees in the ports industry 
would be "primary workers'. This is because, for many facilities in the Port of London, the 
temporary workforce - often the same people constantly re-hired - had become an 
unofficial part of the establishment. Similarly, the US term "contingent labourer' best 
described the temporary and other non-standard workers in the ports industry. There are 
two reasons for this. Not only were their livelihoods dependent on work being available, 
but their employment was also contingent on labour law.
As discussed in Chapter Two, labour law differentiates between "employees' and "workers'. 
Whereas "employees' have statutory rights and are entitled to employment protection (such
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as the right not to be unfairly dismissed); other "workers' have few rights in law and are also 
denied employment protection. As a result, although the agency's changes may be high, the 
hiring employer escapes both financial obligations (see above) and their responsibilities 
under employment legislation (see Chapter Two and Druker and Stanworth, 2001: 75 and 
77).
Casey (1988: 5) wrote that a way of identifying temporary workers was by the amount of 
job security. This, among other considerations, is dependent on the length of service. Any 
benefits are only for continuous service and very few temporary workers work at one firm 
long enough to qualify. Even if, as with the "Labourco' men placed at "Generalco' (see 
Chapter Five), they are constantly re-hired, rather than having continuous service, each 
placement counts as a separate contract.
Although Fevre (1986: 26) wrote that "the difference between casual and temporary 
workers can only be one of degree", casual labours are taken on by the day, whereas 
temporary workers are hired for longer periods (see also Casey, 1988: 96). They are 
excluded from "mutuality of obligation', or the onus placed on an employer to find his 
employee work and on the employee to accept it (see, for example, Burchell, Deakin, and 
Honey, 1999: 6). These workers have the right to choose whether to work or not. 
Employers reported that temporary workers in London frequently exercised that right. The 
implications of this are discussed below.
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The employment status of contingent labourers depended on whether they were hired 
through an employment business (which supplies workers under contracts of service) or 
through an employment agency, which supplies workers who are not its employees, and 
whose employment status is, therefore, ^blurred' (Druker and Stanworth, 2001: 75). 
Approximately 90 percent of the contingent labourers working within the Port of London 
were placed by industry-specific employment agencies, such as 'Agencyco' or Tabourco', 
or by general agencies, both of which contracted to place the men with a third party 
(interview notes, various). However, as most employers referred to all types of agencies as 
'contractors' (ETGRE survey Qs 12-16), it was unknown what proportion of contingent 
labourers were hired from each category of agency. The industry-specific agency 
workforce, together with "pool' casuals, predominantly comprised of ex-RDWs made 
redundant in 1989 or during the 1990s. The hirer, then, knew he was contracting for highly 
trained men, able to perform much the same tasks as permanent employees, from these 
agencies. Only Tortco', and only for some jobs, utilised contingent labour for low-skilled 
tasks: all other employers assigned contingent labourers to the same tasks as permanent 
employees (interview notes, various).
However, it would be incorrect to view contingent cargo handlers as homogeneous. Because 
of the various forms of temporary employment in the Port, these labourers were extremely 
difficult to categorise precisely, and all had different contractual relationships with the 
employers. Based on ETGRE survey responses and interview notes, the following Table 
attempts to differentiate the various forms of contingent labourers hired by the various case 
study workplaces.
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Table 5: 1 - Employment in the Port of London - by workplace
Firm
'Containerco'
* Ferry co'
'Generalco'
'Portco'
Employee
Full-time (1)
Full-time/ 
Part-time
Full-time/ 
'Pool' workers
Full-time/ 
Tool' workers (3)
Temporary
Labour-supply(a)
Yes
Yes
Yes (2)
Yes
Workers
Agency (b)
No
Yes
No
Yes (4)
Other
No
No
No
Yes
(5)
Source: ETGRE survey notes and interview and field notes.
a) Industry-specific employment agencies, such as 'Agencyco' and 'Labourco'
b) General employment agencies, which supply temporary workers to a variety of 
industries
1) Although the total (140) remained the same, the number of full-time employees at 
'Containerco' fell, with the men being replaced by agency workers as they left.
2) The labour-supply contingent workers outnumbered permanent employees3 at 
'Generalco'
3) The Tortco' 'pool' (of about 20 labourers) became defunct in 2002
4) This category had included workers, such as farm labourers, bakers and postal workers, 
who were on an agency's books and has worked at Tortco' to supplement their income 
(no figures available).
5) This category had included drivers from a local truck stop who were given a few hours 
driving work in an emergency (no figures available).
As the above Table shows, there were five employment categories in the Port. These were 
permanent employees with contracts of employment, labour-supply agency workers, 
workers hired from general employment agencies, and casual workers. The fifth category 
were 'pool' workers, or directly employed temporary workers. Two employers - Tortco' 
and 'Generalco' - had 'pools' when this investigation began. The Port of Tilbury Grain 
Terminal also had a 'pool' of what were termed 'sessional' labourers after 1995 (see
Lavalette and Kennedy, 1996: 29-30 and footnote 3 to Chapter Five). In 1999, workers in
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the 'Generalco' 'pool' won an important industrial tribunal case relating to their 
employment status and, although possibly coincidental, 'pools' in London appeared to 
became defunct after that date
Rather than take redundancy when 'Generalco' reduced its workforce in 1995, some men 
had opted to work in a 'pool'. The company had denied mutuality of obligation and had 
classified the men as independent contractors, which they accepted. However, as they 
worked exclusively for 'Generalco', and too frequently to be termed 'casuals', the men, 
with the aid of the T&G, took their employer to an industrial tribunal. This found that a 
relationship existed and that the men were, in fact employees. As a result, the men were 
given contracts of employment (see Port of London, March 1999: 2).
The following section looks at the employer's utilisation of contingent labour from both the 
demand and supply sides. 
Demand Side
There are many reasons for the utilisation of temporary workers. Cappelli (1995: 569), for 
example, has pointed out that it is easier for employers to rely on an agency to supply the 
skills they need, especially if only for the short term, than to incur the recruitment and 
training expenses for permanent employees. Further more, as noted above, the agencies 
expect the men on their books to be trained and to be responsible for their own skills 
formation (see also below).
The major incentive, however, was to save on labour costs. As one employer explained:
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"It's the labour supplier that enables you to get down to that 1200 [employees] 
because that enables you to meet seventy or eighty percent of the normal demand 
and when you have a peak [...] you're able to use labour suppliers to fill in that 
demand (Tortco' Marketing Manager, interview notes, 12/10/99).
The following Table shows the main reasons direct employers gave for contracting for
contingent labour, and the reasons agencies were asked to supply men.
Table 5: 2 - Reasons for Hiring/Supplying Contingent Labour in the Port of London
Reason
To cover for busy periods
To cover for sickness/absence
To cover for seasonal adjustments
To cover for staff adjustments
Direct
Employers
20
12
1
8
Agencv
7
6
6
1
Source: ETGRE survey, Question 15. Some employers gave more than one response.
As can be seen, employers predominantly hired/supplied contingent labour to provide cover 
for busy periods. Although some vessels were on a regular run, others were delayed. Work, 
therefore, was unpredictable and some employers, such as "Containerco', hired contingent 
labour because: '"''sometimes we're busy, sometimes we're quiet and we [...] wouldn't be 
profitable if we had a static workforce..." f Containerco' Human Resources Manager, 
interview notes, 15/6/01). That the incidence of hiring contingent labour to cover for staff 
adjustments was so low (9) indicated that some employers covered the gap between leaving 
and starting through overtime or through work intensification of the remaining workforce. 
Interview data indicated that other reasons for hiring contingent labourers included the lack 
of restrictions on the type of work they could perform and, because transport was not
covered by the WTD (see Chapter Two), on the hours they worked.
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A minority of direct employers contracted for men on a semi-permanent basis. Tate and 
Lyle contracted for men on a semi-permanent basis from 'Labourco', for example, and 
Tortco' had arranged with an agency to supply labour to handle weekly car ferries:
"we will go to one of those [labour suppliers] and say, "we 've got a particular 
contract' [...\we want you to supply labour for a vessel for a year...'" (Tortco' 
Marketing Manager, interview notes, 12/10/00)4
Supply Side
The labour-supply agencies were specialists in port work. Many had been set up by people 
with a profound knowledge of the industry, and many - 'Agencyco' or Southampton Cargo 
Handling, for instance - had been set up by men made redundant on abolition or during the 
1990s.
As mentioned above, the men working for these agencies were predominantly ex-RDWs 
who had the necessary port skills. As the Managing Director of "Labourco' remarked: "we 
have a nucleus of fully trained, experienced men and that's what we are expected to supply" 
(interview notes, 23/5/01). Many agencies had long-standing relationships with the primary 
employers. This enabled them to have a good idea of where and when work was likely to 
be available.
"We know where the jobs are and they're... The jobs are fairly regular so therefore 
we give the men advanced warning...so [the secretary] or I ring up and say, 
"there's a ship coming in at [terminal]. We need so many men for the day shift and 
so many men for the night shift... fLabourco' Managing Director, interview notes, 
23/5/01).
Contingent labourers' earnings varied considerably. The "Labourco' Director estimated that 
his top earners in 2000 had earned above the national average, at £23-25,000 before 
stoppages (the lowest earnings were £13-14,000: interview notes, 23/5/01). The
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'Agencyco', shareholders (who worked for and owned the company - see Appendix 3:4), 
on the other hand, were reported to have averaged £18-19,000 before deductions in 2000: no 
figures were available for 'Agencyco' temporary workers. Men working for "Agencyco' 
were paid by one of two rates: tonnage rates, whereby the men were paid for the job, no 
matter how long it took, or hourly. Calling this the men's ' incentive to work', the 
"Agencyco' Director explained that the men were paid for 40 hours work, for example, 
its up to you how long you take' (interview notes, 18/10/01).
Although only two contingent labourers were prepared to discuss their total earnings, their 
data contradicted the employers' estimates. All the men, regardless of the agency, reported 
that they had earned £7.00 an hour before deductions in 2001. 'Roy', working for 
"Labourco', estimated that, by working steadily throughout the year, his earnings in 2000 
had been £17,500.00 (or £350.00 a week for a 50 hour week). On the other hand, 'Cliff, an 
'Agencyco' shareholder, had worked long hours for the seven months of the fruit season 
and had been ^scratching around, looking for work' the other five months of the year, and 
had earned £10,500.00 (interview notes, 26/11/01).
Contingent labourers' earnings were dependent on long hours of work. This was something 
that the agencies recognised. The 'Labourco' Managing Director, for example, said that: 
"there's a lot of work attached to [their earnings]. They tend to work twelve hour shift 
patterns [...] eight hour shifts, really, for the majority of men, doesn't earn them enough 
money (interview notes, 23/5/01). Hours varied across the year and, again, the employers 
recognised that for some men, earning a living could be "a balancing act...though you may
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go down on one side, you always find enough, just about, to bring it up again" (" Agency co' 
Director, interview notes, 18/10/01). Only one agency - Castlekeep, based at Tilbury - was 
known to pay a retainer. However, the "Riggingco' manager mentioned that this was "just a 
bit more than they'd get on the dole" (telephone interview notes, 15/11/01). A contingent 
labourer who had worked for Castlekeep later confirmed this (see Chapter Five).
Both the primary and the agency employers asserted that the men working in the contingent 
labour force preferred that type of working to full-time, permanent employment. Both the 
'Agencyco' Director and the 'Labourco' Managing Director stated that the men put their 
home lives before work. If there was something else the men wanted to do, they would 
either refuse work or would phone to say that they were unavailable the following day 
(interview notes, 23/5/01 and 18/10/01). Chapter Five discusses this from the men's point of 
view.
This, however, may have been a way of shifting the blame for under-employment from the 
agencies to the men. The number of men placed daily fluctuated considerably - "Agencyco' 
placements for non-shareholders could vary between 20 and 100 men a day (interview 
notes, 18/10/01). When only a minimal number of men were needed, where those not 
placed included among those who only worked 'when they wanted to'? Many redundant 
ex-RDWs had found it difficult to find work outside the industry (see Chapter Five). The 
agencies, therefore, knew they had access to men who were unlikely to seek work elsewhere 
but who, because of the lack of 'mutuality of obligation', they had no responsibility towards 
during periods when work was not available.
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Deregulation had provided employers with an excuse to introduce new working practices 
(see especially Brown et al, 1998). The following section examines this in the Port of 
London.
4:2 - Changes in Work Organisation
There was ^a sea change' in manning, employment structures and in working practices in 
the ports industry following abolition (Evans et al, 1993: 2). The winding up of the NAPE 
on abolition (see Chapter One) had seen the abandonment of national minimum terms and 
conditions. As early as 1991, 22 of the 24 employers Evans et al surveyed reported that the 
duties of cargo handlers had ^changed significantly'. In order to improve efficiency and 
productivity, ^nearly alV port employers had removed those working practices that had 
restricted their operational flexibility (1993: 2). The overwhelming reason for this was 
because job demarcation had been abolished and cargo handlers also performed additional, 
unskilled tasks, and non-cargo employees were also utilised to supplement cargo handlers 
(1993: 28). The following looks at work organisational changes in the Port of London.
Work organisation changes were introduced in order to save costs and to increase 
productivity. This was achieved by the introduction of, and/or the intensification of, shift 
work, overtime and contractual functional flexibility (see Chapter Two). These were 
facilitated by, and had an impact on, training, recruitment, and health and safety in the Port 
(see the Appendix to this Chapter for the changes introduced by individual case study 
firms).
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Shift Work and Overtime
In order to remain competitive, ports and port facilities have to be available when their 
customers need them, 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Workers, therefore, have to be 
available at all times. In order to eliminate the need for overtime, and therefore, overtime 
payments, many firms within the Port introduced shift work for their full-time employees. 
"Containerco', for example, introduced five rostered shifts over any seven days (T&G Ports 
Survey 1989 - Tilbury) and, in common with other firms, hired contingent labourers to 
cover weekend and bank holiday working (see also Chapter Five), and multiple shift 
patterns were introduced at Terryco'. These included a six hours on - six hours off rotating 
shift (interview notes, various). This allowed the company to have men available when 
ships arrived and, because they only worked six hours at a time, the men were not entitled to 
breaks (see Labour Research, October 1998: 15). Changes in shift work continued 
throughout the 1990s. The ETGRE survey (Q31) found that five firms (four direct 
employers and one agency) had introduced shift work between 1995 and 2000.
However, overtime was usually the employer's first choice for covering extra working for 
most terminals. As Casey, Metcalf and Millward (1997: 87) had found, this was because it 
is easily adjusted and, as no extra staff are needed, it can be cheaper than employing extra 
labourers. How it was worked - and who could work it - varied across the Port. 
Immediately following abolition, "Generalco' appeared to have abolished overtime as such, 
replacing it with longer hours (see Appendix 5: ii): Matt, a "Generalco' permanent 
employee, remembered that: "we were earning less and working longer. We didn 't get paid 
overtime and they acted as if we should be grateful" (interview notes, 23/11/01). By the late
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1990s, however, overtime at "Generalco', was open to both permanent employees and 
contingent labourers; however, because of the long hours employees worked, contingent 
labourers were more likely to work any weekend overtime.
Overtime at Tortco' appeared to be ubiquitous, and was usually worked at the end of an 
afternoon shift (Branch field notes, various). Although nominally voluntary, overtime was, 
in reality, compulsory for cargo handlers: if extra men were needed, other Tortco' 
employees, such as maintenance and clerical personnel, would be invited to volunteer. 
Overtime was paid at various rates and was often worked at short notice. Unless they had a 
good reason not to do so, cargo handlers were expected to work: those who did not faced 
disciplinary action (1/10 Branch minute books). This meant that men could work up to 12 
hours at a time (see also Chapter Five).
Weekend overtime at Tortco', however, was completely voluntary. The men worked a 
maximum of 12 hours on either a Saturday or a Sunday. The men had to apply for this but 
were not told until the Friday afternoon if they were required and when they would be 
working. Because they were paid a special premium (see Chapter Five), the employer 
found that the men were 'hungry' for this overtime and would 'volunteer for anything' 
(Tortco' Marketing Director, interview notes, 12/10/00).
The following sections look at functional flexibility and skills, training and recruitment and 
health and safety within the Port of London. Although discussed separately, it must, 
however, be emphasised that there was a considerable overlap between these areas.
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Functional Flexibility and Skills
Many employers specified flexibility in their post-abolition contracts of employment (see, 
for example, T&G Ports Survey, 1989). The introduction of contractual flexibility enabled 
the employer to alter where cargo handlers worked and what tasks they would perform.
Because labour demand fluctuated not only day to day but shift to shift, and within shifts, 
there had been a practice during the Scheme years known as 'job and finish', in other words, 
the men would go home when they had completed the job they had been assigned. This, 
however, ended with abolition. The Tortco' Marketing Manager, for example, remarked 
that the men had come to accept that ".. .ifthey finish a job, something can be found for 
them until the end of the shift" (interview notes, 12/10/00).
Casey, Keep and Mayhew (1999:77) wrote that although employers embraced the 
phraseology, and some of the tools, of HRM, they did not embrace its underlying 
philosophy. The working arrangement known as "team working', introduced in port 
transport following abolition (see Turnbull and Weston, 1993: 22), was little more than a 
cosmetic change of name for a traditional collective working practice; this did, however, 
signal a break from pre-abolition working structures. The docks work gang had been a 
'team' of men who regularly worked together. Each had their own defined tasks which, 
combined, ensured the safe and efficient loading and discharging of cargoes. However, 
under the new flexible working arrangements, employers could change both the size and the 
composition of the work 'team' in order to suit work requirements. The main motivation for 
this appeared to be to impede worker resistance, as it ensured that the same men rarely
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worked together for more than a few days at a time. However, by splitting up the gangs so
that men were unfamiliar with how each other worked, it also broke down the men's
cohesiveness, thus having an adverse effect on the effectiveness of the "team'.
Recruitment and Training
The employers had had minimal involvement in these areas pre-abolition (see Chapter One).
Abolition, however, had transferred both these functions solely to employers, enabling them
to choose a workforce to suit their needs and to train it to their standards and requirements.
/: Recruitment
As the following Table shows, the ETGRE survey found that direct employers in the Port
utilised a variety of recruitment methods.
Table 5:3 - Main Methods of Recruitment: Direct Employers
Advertisements in the Local Press
By Word of Mouth
Through the Job Centre
Through a Contractor/ Agency
11
10
8
7
Source: ETGRE Survey, Question 24: some firms gave more than one response. 
The individual recruitment methods were evenly divided. This reflected the situation in 
industries such as road haulage (see Carroll and Marchington, 1999: 16). However, local 
press advertisements or the Job Centre (21) were more likely to attract candidates from 
outside the ports industry. This could be seen as a long-term strategy by the company, as 
these men needed to be trained (see below), thus represented an investment in the future. 
Few employers took their post-abolition workforce from redundant ex-RDWs (Terryco' 
was an exception) but preferred to look outside the industry at related trades, especially 
construction and driving, for replacement labourers: this also enabled them to supplement 
the skills their workforces lacked with others, thus widening their labour pools. A motive
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for this may have been to enhance employer control by diminishing the significance of the 
ex-RDWs. As Brown et al (1998: 56) wrote, any new recruits would carry "none of the 
baggage of memories of old expectations and old working practices..." therefore, their 
"expectations were tailored to the new circumstances'".
However, at times when manpower needed to be optimised quickly (the acquisition of a 
new client, for example) short-term recruitment strategies, such as recruitment through word 
of mouth (10) or through a contractor (7) were also utilised. In common with both the 
construction and haulage industries, many employers in the Port relied heavily on 
recruitment through word of mouth. This not only made recruitment cheaper and quicker, 
but, because this type of recruitment was based on some kind of previous knowledge of the 
worker, also reduced the uncertainty in hiring (see Carroll and Marchington, 1999: 8 and 
18). Torestco', a Tilbury tenant, for example, had relied heavily on personal 
recommendations. It had ^needed to know that the man can do the job' and believed word 
of mouth was the best method for ensuring that (ETGRE Survey notes). If recruitment 
from outside had enhanced employer control, recruitment by these methods only served to 
undermine it as many of the men taken on by these methods were related to retired or 
dismissed RDWs: as the 'Portco' Marketing Manager put it: "its not so much a case of *son 
of but more like ^my uncle' or * my grandfather" (Interview notes, 12/10/00 and see Chapter 
One). In confirmation of this, 'Richie', working at "Generalco', freely admitted that the fact 
he worked there and had been able to 'put a good word in' for his son, 'Matt', had helped 
him get his job there (interview notes, 23/11/01). Similarly, when asked why he had 
decided to work in the industry, a new entrant to 'Generalco' in 2002 replied that: "my
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father was a docker, so was my grandfather and my great-grandfather - it was in the blood" 
OJohn', field notes, 27/9/02).
These recruitment methods did, however, have advantages for the employers. The men 
recruited were more likely to have experience of the ports industry, or be known to the 
employer, thus saving them both training and problem-solving costs. The men were more 
likely to have friends or family inside the industry, who could apply discipline in the form 
of social pressure or, because of their own experience, act as problem-solvers, thus enabling 
them to utilise the knowledge and experience of men no longer working for them
As it is as expensive for agencies to recruit and train as it is for direct employers, agencies 
also have informal recruiting practices (see Fevre, 1989: 27-8). This is especially true if 
extra workers are only needed for a short period, and is a reason why agencies also rely on 
word of mouth recruitment. Because of their experience, both 'Labourco' and 'Riggingco' 
tended to take on ex-RDWs or those made redundant in the 1990s who had been 
recommended by men already on their books (interview notes). "Agencyco' took on what it 
termed 'supplementary workers' for the fruit season, some of whom returned every year, 
others were taken on by word of mouth. 'Agencyco' found no need to advertise vacancies 
because it found that its shareholders recommended their relations:
" With word of mouth, it's someone that's come along with a bit of knowledge of 
something, if you like, a bit of background..." ('Agencyco' Director, interview 
notes, 18/10/01). 
Training
Employers wanted reliable, competent, men who had "o good head on their shoulders" and 
who had some experience of the ports industry (BPIT Chief Executive, interview notes,
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2/4/01). However, and similar to road haulage employers, port employers did not want the 
expense of training them. This led to a deterioration in training standards in both industries 
(see Carroll and Marchington, 1999: 15 and 22 and Chapter Five). What training there was 
within the Port appeared to be facility-specific, tying the employee to that facility. Driving 
qualifications gained at Tilbury, for example, were not recognised outside the confines of 
the Port (1/10 Branch minute books, 19/7/93).
The ports industry did not have a national training standard; neither was there a national 
NVQ in cargo operations after 1998. Formal qualifications to work in the modern ports 
industry were minimal: BPIT listed literacy, numeracy and the ability to work as part of a 
team as the main qualifications (BPIT, 2000: 4). This, however, gave no indication of the 
skills or experience needed to undertake port work: 'Portco', for example, required new 
recruits to have an HGV licence, be able to drive a forklift truck, be medically fit and to be 
versatile ('Portco' Marketing Manager, interview notes, 12/10/00). Although the employers 
preferred to recruit men with experience, as mentioned above, they also took on and trained 
men from outside the industry, thus enabling them to train the men in their methods and to 
their standards; this, again, tended to tie the employee to the firm.
Training varied across the Port, from "on-the-job' training by working to dedicated training 
departments. The majority of respondents to the ETGRE survey (25 out of 31) reported that 
the cargo handlers working for them received formal training. Of those specifying, 13 gave 
induction training; however, it was unknown if this was training for the tasks or merely 
basic information about the firm. Other training included skills update training (9
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respondents), indicating that some employers trained for multi-skilling, and new procedures 
and legislation training (8 and 7 respondents respectively). Although 14 companies had 
training officers, a further five direct employers relied on the original employer, usually a 
labour-supply agency, to train the men (ETGRE survey notes), thus saving training costs.
As mentioned above, the primary employers expected to hire trained contingent labourers. 
However, prior to the introduction of the "passport' system (see below), there had been no 
guarantee that this was so and many employers mentioned that, in the past, they had been 
sent untrained, unskilled, or unfit men (interview notes, various). However, as most 
contingent labourers working for labour-supply agencies, including those participating in 
this research, were ex-RDWs, they required little training. In addition, some agencies had 
positively encouraged skills formation. When barge work in the Port began to decline after 
1992, "Labourco' retrained its men so that:
" with a little bit of formal training, they were happy to become multi-skilled so 
that if we have barge work for them two days a week, we might have ship 
discharging or ship loading work for them the other two days''' ("Labourco' 
Managing Director, interview notes, 23/5/02).
'Agencyco' relied on its shareholders to train the 120 to 140 extra men it engaged for the
fruit season. They were given induction training and were then allocated to experienced
dockers, who gave them one-on-one training ("Agencyco' Director, interview notes,
14/5/02).
Health and Safety
The HSC Marine Policy Advisor opined that the reason for the high accident rate in the
docks (see Chapter Two) was that all the high risk activities - dangerous plant, dangerous
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working conditions, and inexperienced contingent labourers - were present on the same site 
(interview notes, 14/5/02).
The 1995-8 Liverpool dock strike highlighted the dangers of working in the ports industry 
as a contingent labourer. "Eddie' was employed on a day-to-day basis, was given no 
training, nor had he been issued with safety clothing (see Pilger, 1998: 339 and 
http//www.labournet.net/docks). It was these sorts of practices that led to the death of 
Simon Jones in 1998. This became a symbol of the worst aspects of the 'new' casual 
system, not only in the docks but elsewhere.
Simon had taken a job as a casual labourer at Shoreham docks, was given no training and 
was nearly decapitated within two hours of starting work (see SCHnews, 30th November 
2001 on http//www.labournet.net/docks and http//www.simonjones.org uk). Following this, 
the ports industry came under pressure to address health and safety issues. As a result, the 
Port Safety Organisation (PSO) - an international body which advised the ports industry on 
health and safety matters (PSO Health and safety advisor, interview notes 14/6/01) - issued 
the Code of Practice for the Engagement of Non-permanent Employees on Cargo Handling 
operations.
Introduced in 2000, the 'passport', as the Code was commonly referred to, was a small card 
that was issued to contingent labourers supplied by labour-only supply agencies only - no 
other types of temporary workers were covered by the Code or issued with the "passport'. 
In order to qualify for the 'passport', these contingent labourers had to complete an
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induction training course, pass a medical and have a licence to drive various plant5 . It was 
difficult to judge the scheme's effectiveness. Some of the contingent labourers 
participating in this investigation had no knowledge of the scheme and, even when it had 
been explained to them, looked blank when asked for their opinions of it (interview notes, 
23/11/01). However, as the HSC Advisor pointed out, this was not long after the "passport' 
had been introduced and, as discussed in Chapter Five, some men did know of it, and used it 
to their advantage.
The HSC found that induction training was often minimal and appeared to be no more than 
'this is dangerous, don't do it' (HSC Marine Policy Advisor, interview notes, 14/5/02). 
Other industry insiders also reported that induction training was inadequate and did not 
prepare a contingent labourer for work in the docks. Health and safety will be explored in 
more detail in Chapters Five and Six. 
Conclusion
This Chapter has looked at the implementation of change in the Port of London during the 
1990s. Arguably, the employers were able to restructure the employment relationship and 
alter working conditions because they could. Conservative anti-union legislation and union 
derecognition had meant that, in most places, rather than abiding by collectively bargained 
agreements, or re-negotiating working conditions practically on a daily basis, they could 
impose conditions that suited their business and enhanced their productivity. However, this 
was undermined by the recruitment methods as recruitment through word of mouth 
especially was predominantly aimed at men with knowledge of the industry.
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The main reason for change had been to save costs. Wages were cut, shift work was 
introduced, and 'extra' payments were abolished. In addition, the employers imposed work 
intensification and horizontal job enlargement on their workforce, so that any man could 
perform many tasks. However, instead of multi-skilling before downsizing, the ports 
industry in London first shed what it perceived as an inappropriate workforce, and then 
trained the remaining workforce.
The reduced multi-skilled workforce formed the 'core' of the port labour force. This was 
supplemented by a 'periphery' of contingent labourers. As this Chapter has shown, 
however, and within the context of the ports industry, a better term for the 'core' workforce 
would be 'primary worker'. This was because the contingent labourers hired to work in the 
Port were as skilled as the permanent employees and, at some firms, formed part of the 
'core' labour force.
The use of agency and other temporary labourers allowed employers in the Port to transfer 
market risks to the agencies and, eventually, the workers themselves. Employers were also 
able to shift some of the (cost) burden of responsibility, especially for training and benefits 
onto the agency, and even the men.
The changes made by the employers affected the men who earned their livelihoods in the 
Port. They, however, resisted those changes. The following Chapter looks at the post- 
abolition employment relationship in the Port of London through the eyes of the men 
working there, and examines the nature of their resistance.
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The Tortco' Marketing Director remembered that: "...we were basically told, 'here's a 
blank sheet of paper; what do you want, it's a new agreement' (interview notes, 12/10/00).
2 For example, at Christmas 1993 John McNab, the Tilbury Chief Executive, announced that 
as well as a reduction in the number of full-time employees at Tilbury, wages there would 
also be reduced by between 10 and 20 percent (T&G Record, February 1994:2).
3 Generalco' had six permanent employees at the time of the interview. There were 
approximately 12 contingent labourers on site that day and I was told that, unless it was 
very busy/quiet, this was the usual arrangement (interview and field notes, 23/11/01. See 
also Chapter Six).
4 Tortco' also hired five contingent labourers on a permanent basis. Although the work was 
continuous, Tortco' did not want to offer them employment as this could not be guaranteed 
in the long term. It was estimated that agency fees cost Tortco' £500 a year more than 
paying the men wages would have done (1/10 Branch minute books, 21 st March 2003).
5 The 'passport' itself was the size of a credit card and had the contingent labourer's details 
- name, address, agency - on one side and a list of the tasks he was qualified to perform on 
the other (courtesy of "Agencyco').
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Appendix Four: Case Study Employers' Implementation of Change
Taken from a variety of data sources, the following outlines how three direct employers in 
the Port of London - "Containerco', 'Generalco' and 'Portco' - implemented changes 
following abolition. 
/: 'Containerco'
Before 1989, 'Containerco' had met its labour requirements by 'borrowing' labour from 
Tilbury. Co-incidentally with abolition, the contract between P&O Ports, one of the original 
consortium (see Chapter Two) and the Port of Tilbury ended and, as a result, 'Containerco' 
was able to employ directly. It offered the men working there at the time the choice of 
becoming 'Containerco' employees or returning to Tilbury. This was effectively blackmail 
because, as there were no jobs available at Tilbury (there had been mass redundancies on 
abolition), any man not accepting the 'offer' would have been made redundant. This new 
workforce was to be supplemented by a "pool' of contract labour, made up of the ex-RDWs. 
Twenty six men signed the new contracts, becoming 'terminal operators'; after having 
trained their replacements (see below), the remainder were dismissed and rehired for the 
pool.
The new contracts the men signed included 'complete flexibility' clauses, thus removing 
demarcation between tasks. 'Containerco' wanted a multi-skilled workforce and was 
willing to train men as straddle carrier drivers, the most difficult of the plant to master. The 
rationale for this was that, although skilled at driving any plant, the men could also be 
utilised to perform low-skilled, manual tasks, such as unlocking the containers. This 
represented up-skilling (specialist plant driving) and multi-skilling as the men could
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perform more than one task. In order to broaden its skills pool, and in order to recruit 
workers from outside the industry, 'Containerco' also advertised in the local Job Centre for 
heavy goods vehicle drivers. These men were trained by the men they were to replace, 
thereby enabling the company to not only utilise the skills and experience of the men they 
were about to dismiss, but also saving them considerably on training costs.
In order to enforce employer authority, and to attract new customers to the terminal and to 
remain competitive, work at 'Containerco' was extended. In place of the two-shift system 
under the Scheme, "Containerco' introduced a new, rotating three-shift working pattern 
(6am to 2pm, 2pm to 10pm and 10pm to 6am) in 1990, thus enabling the terminal to remain 
open 24 hours a day, 364 days a year (only closing on Christmas Day). Someone was on 
hand "all the time, to answer the phone or off-load the containers''' ('Containerco' Human 
Resources (HR) Manger, interview notes, 15/6/01). By introducing 24-hour coverage, 
'Containerco' was able to eliminate overtime and, therefore, overtime premiums.
The three main job areas that the men performed were deck hand, crane driver and straddle 
carrier driver. These were rotated, depending on the workload. By the end of 1991, 
'Containerco' was able to report that, because of the handling efficiencies achieved as a 
result of this new regime, the terminal had handled 137,000 TEUs in 1990, a 5000 TEU 
increase over 1989 (Port of London, September 1991: 2).
This increased output, however, was partly because there were fewer men to handle the 
same quantity of cargo. Total tonnage in the Port of London did rise immediately after
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abolition; from 54.0 million tonnes in 1989 to 58.1 million tonnes in 1990. Thereafter, 
however, tonnage handled in the Port fell, to a low of 48.9 million tonnes before rising 
again. In response, by the end of 1992, 'Containerco' had introduced other work extension 
measures, including an increase in hours - from 35 to 37.5 hours a week. The fall in traffic 
prompted 'Containerco' to cut wages: average permanent cargo handlers' wages fell from 
about £25,000.00 a year to £19,000.00 between 1989 and 1995. In addition, bonus and 
other payments that had been paid under the Scheme were eliminated. Work was also 
intensified. In 1996, for example, 'Containerco' introduced compulsory overtime and was 
calling for volunteers for redundancy. This was ongoing, and there were at least 80 
redundancies at 'Containerco' during the 1990s.
'Containerco' had a very low staff turnover. What men the company did recruit were taken 
on through a contractor, which the firm appeared to use as a 'pool'. Men from the 
contractor had worked exclusively at 'Containerco', and had been trained by it to its 
standards. 'Containerco' had possibly the best training arrangements of any of the case 
study firms. As well as giving induction and skills update training, it also ran a diploma in 
terminal management, open to all its employees. 
//: 'Generalco'
When it reopened in late 1989, and in order to reinforce employer authority, 'Generalco' 
imposed new contracts of employment, including complete flexibility and work 
intensification clauses, on its reduced workforce. The new working hours were 55 hours 
and 63 hours over any seven days, depending on the level of business. There was an 
implied understanding that, if the men did not work the minimum contracted hours, the time
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'owed' would be worked, in any combination, to suit the employer's convenience. This 
contract was in force until 1992, when it was replaced by two annual contracts. These 
included clauses that the men should be available for work any 12 hours in 24 hours. The 
men were, however, guaranteed a 12-hour break between working. The employer's attitude 
was 'take it or leave it'. As at 'Containerco', and in the context of the early 1990s 
recession, this amounted to blackmail.
In response to declining total tonnage in the Port (se above), 'Generalco' reduced 
employees' wages by a total of approximately £4000.00 a year. Work was both extended - 
by the introduction of longer hours - and intensified. In common with many other facility 
employers in the Port of London, 'Generalco' expected complete flexibility from its 
workforce, and rotated the men round a number of tasks. These included forklift driving, 
crane driving, downholding (or preparing the cargo for discharge), and tallying. In order to 
cut costs and reduce risks, 'Generalco' started, and continued, to rely heavily on casual 
labour, both from its own 'pool' of casuals, and agency labour.
In 1996, and after a change in management, the company introduced enhanced working 
conditions after permanent employees threatened an overtime ban over the further 
deterioration in their working conditions. There was to be a small permanent workforce - 
10 in 1996 - who were to work 12-hour shifts, either 6am to 6pm or 7am to 7pm, over six 
days. Overtime remained compulsory but 'Generalco' paid overtime rates (no details) to 
men working more than 55 hours a week; it also gave the men a guaranteed rest day a week, 
and either a Saturday or a Sunday off every month
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'Generalco' did not recruit after 1990: as mentioned above, it came to rely heavily on 
contingent labour, many of whom worked practically exclusively at 'Generalco' (see 
Chapter Six). It also relied on the ex-RDWs among its workforce, both permanent and 
contingent, to train and otherwise over-see any contingent labourers who had not previously 
worked at the terminal. 
iii: 'Portco'
'Portco', the largest asset of the Port of Tilbury, followed a different path in order to enforce 
employer control. The name of the traditional working arrangement was changed from a 
'gang' to 'team work': this usage, however, appeared to last only between abolition and the 
sale of Tilbury to Forth Ports in 1996, when the term 'gang' reappeared. The PLA also 
introduced individual contracts of employment. These increased the working day by one 
hour and ended the traditional 'job and finish'. In order to ensure maximum productivity, 
from 1989, when one job finished, the men went straight onto the next. Individual 
contracts, which precluded collective arrangements, were also introduced, and could be 
seen as a means by which the PLA countered any residual union resistance (see Chapters 
Two and Seven). Overtime and weekend working were introduced as obligatory, and any 
cargo handler refusing to work these was disciplined. Discipline at 'Portco' was in three 
stages: a verbal warning, followed by a written warning and, finally, dismissal. This, 
however, was flexible and, if the offence warranted it, the employer could go straight to 
Stages Two or Three.
In order to end demarcation and immobility, the new contracts of employment were non- 
job-specific and included flexibility clauses, including both cargo handling and general
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duties (T&G Ports Survey - Tilbury). These both allowed the employer to maximise 
efficiency and to ensure continuous working, thus reducing any down time (see Chapter 
Two). Office workers and engineering staff were also trained in basic cargo handling 
techniques. Possibly more than any other change introduced at 'Portco' following abolition, 
this complete interchangeability demonstrated the employer's complete control over the 
workforce and over the labour process.
'Portco' continued to introduce work intensification measures. For instance, double shift 
working and a night shift were introduced during the early 1990s. However, because noise 
travels across water, people living in Gravesend (opposite Tilbury) complained about the 
continuous night-time noise and the night shift as such was abandoned. However, a small 
number of ships continued to be worked over night, but, rather than as shift work, were 
done so either as compulsory overtime or, to finish a job, as special night work (Tortco' 
Marketing Director, interview notes, 12/10/00).
As at other case study firms, 'Portco' also reduced wages and abolished overtime and shift 
work premiums that had been paid under the Scheme; timekeeping was also rigidly 
enforced. 'Portco' also continued to reduce its workforce, making approximately 500 
redundancies between 1990 and 1996. What recruitment there was to replace these men - 
both ex-RDWs and younger men employed since abolition - was from outside the industry 
and was mainly through work of mouth or advertising in the local Job Centre. Tilbury had a 
training officer who gave induction training to all new recruits to the Port, relying on men 
with long service to teach recruits the job; other training was task-specific.
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Chapter Five: Workers' Experience of Change
Based on interviews and conversations with permanent employees and contingent 
labourers working at various terminals within the Port, this Chapter looks at their 
experience of, and attitudes to, the changes discussed in Chapter Four. It also examines 
whether the changes discussed by Turnbull (see Chapter Two) in the period immediately 
following abolition had been constant, or if cargo handlers had been able to regain some 
control over the labour process. If that was so, it examines how that was achieved.
This Chapter is in two sections. Starting with the immediate impact of abolition on their 
work and employment, Section One looks at the experience of permanent employees, 
and Section Two considers those of contingent labourers. 
6:1 - The Experience of Permanent Employees 
Abolition and Contractual Changes
The changes the employers imposed were, for the men, immediate and profound. These 
included changes in contractual obligations and working conditions, and the introduction 
of a segmented labour force (see Chapter Four and 5:2 below). Although the men's 
designation was also changed (see Chapter One), all the cargo handlers taking part in 
this research, no matter when they started working in the industry, referred to 
themselves, and each other, as 'dockers'. This could have been out of habit (or 
tradition); equally, at a time when cargo handlers were 'yesterday's news' (see Chapter 
Six), this could also be seen as a way of hanging on to an identity associated with their 
former status.
Men used to negotiating any changes - or taking industrial action if an employer had 
tried to impose them - found themselves having to accept whatever changes their
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employers introduced. Because the union had been derecognised, there was little that 
the men could do about this. As Nichols and Beynon (1977: 28) in their research at 
'Chemco' in the early 1970s had found, workers 'have to' or were 'stuck with' the way 
things were. Management made the rules and did not recognise an employee's 'right' to 
take part in decision making. As Edwards (1988: 194) observed, although individual 
employees might have * considerable influence' over the way the work is actually 
performed, they do so in a space and at a price determined by the employer. The T&G 
National Docks Officer at the time of abolition remembered that his members had 
reported that if they refused to change shifts at short notice, for example, they were told: 
"there's the terms: if we want you to work a certain shift, you do - or we fire you " 
(interview notes, 18/6/00). Similarly, 'Generalco' employees recalled that when they 
experienced problems sleeping because of the new working arrangements introduced 
there (see Chapter Four), they had been told: "...ifyou can't sleep, do some gardening or 
some DIT' (Matt, interview notes, 23/11/01. (See the Appendix to this Chapter for a list 
of the pseudonyms of participants cited in the thesis, together with details of their age 
and docks experience).
The powerlessness engendered by this attitude, and because Conservative anti-union 
legislation had made it more difficult (but not impossible) to take industrial action, 
conflict became individualised. Employees found new forms of resistance; these 
included, for example, absenteeism or quitting (see Blyton and Turnbull, 1998: 266). 
This was also true of cargo handlers in London. Some left, others complained, and some 
even indulged in petty acts of rebellion (Roy, a "Containerco' employee until just after 
abolition, talked about placing containers in the wrong place, for example - interview 
notes, 26/11/01). By and large, however, and in the context of both union derecognition
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and the high unemployment of the early 1990s, most men got on with the job (field and 
interview notes, various).
Contractual functional flexibility (see Chapter Four) became ubiquitous at many of the 
case study firms. Full-time employees at both 'Containerco' and 'Portco' related that, 
although their contracts identified them as forklift drivers, for example, or crane drivers, 
they were expected to perform any task, driving or manual work, that their employer 
assigned them. Paul, a 'Portco' employee, mentioned that tasks, such as tallying, tidying 
up, or cleaning, had become: "...legitimate parts of our employment" (interview notes, 
22/2/01). Similarly, employees at 'Generalco' could find themselves forklift driving, 
checking, downholding or, during a very quiet period, weeding the grounds (Matt, field 
notes, 23/11/01: see also Elger, 1991: 51-2).
Some men found the variety of tasks they were asked to perform made their jobs more 
interesting; many others, however, saw this as work intensification (interview and field 
notes, various). Taking various aspects of work and employment organisation in turn, 
the following section looks at this in more detail. 
Hours, Shift Work and Overtime 
i: Hours and Shift Work
Hours of work increased following abolition. The national average weekly hours for 
RDWs had been 45.5 hours in 1988 (National Dock Labour Board, Annual Report, 
1988). In order to keep customers, facilities had to be available to suit them, even if it 
meant the men working long or unsociable hours (see Chapter Four). As a result, by 
2000/1, working hours for the men participating in this research had risen, to a basic 48- 
hour week before overtime, and to a maximum of 63 hours a week for 'Generalco'
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employees. As Miscellaneous Appendix 3 shows, in general, cargo handlers' weekly 
hours, including overtime had, between 1990 and 2000 and with the exceptions of 1992 
and 1994, been longer than other service sector workers.
Employees at both 'Containerco' and 'Portco' worked a basic 48 basic hour week in 
2000/1 (Branch field notes, various). However, because of the vagaries of trade, 
working hours at other terminals could not be predetermined and employers had 
introduced a variety of contracts to suit their business. Terryco', for example, had 
introduced a plethora of contracts (see Chapter Four). Employees at 'Generalco' were 
contracted to work from a minimum of 55 hours, to a maximum of 63 hours a week 
(paid at an unspecified overtime rate) over seven days, including Saturdays and Sundays, 
with a weekend off every six weeks. Richie, a "Generalco' employees, reported that, 
although the usual week was 60 hours, (12-hour days from 7am to 7pm over any five 
days), "the condition was there" for the men to be told to work until midnight if 
necessary (interview notes, 23/11/01). As many permanent employees in the Port also 
worked overtime (see below), the total hours worked could exceed 70 hours a week 
(Tortco' and 'Generalco' permanent employees, interview notes, various).
At most terminals, the men worked these hours as shift work (see Chapter Four). 
Although introduced by some employers in the 1970s (see Chapter Two), many cargo 
handlers' first experience of working shifts was post-abolition. This could have an 
adverse effect on the men's family life. For example, the men working the multiple 
shifts at Terryco' (see Chapter Four) were always on call, day or night, so could not 
plan ahead. Similarly, Angela, married to Alan, a Tortco' employee, related that:
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"...we're rarely together as a family" because of Alan's shift work (interview notes, 
23/7/01). 
11: Overtime
Wages had fallen, especially for ex-RDWs, during the 1990s and some men were known 
to have two jobs in order to earn extra money, (see Chapter Four). Ralph, a 'Generalco' 
permanent employee, for example, worked as a contingent labourer during his weekends 
off (field notes, 27/9/02). However, overtime was the most prevalent form of extra 
earnings among Port employees.
The men were reluctant to talk about overtime premiums. Of those that would, 
'Generalco' employees reported earning overtime rates for working more than 55 hours 
a week, and Tortco' employees reported overtime payments at variable rates, depending 
on when they worked.
The rare overtime worked on the end of the morning shift was paid at approximately 
time and a third (or about £11.44 an hour), whereas the almost daily overtime on the 
afternoon shift attracted rates of time and five-eighths (or about £14.00 an hour). 
Weekend overtime was paid at a special rate of about £200.00 before deductions for a 
12-hour shift (Alan, interview notes, 29/2/01). This, therefore, made weekend working 
attractive, and the younger men with mortgages and other debts applied for as much 
weekend overtime as possible (Paul, interview notes, 22/2/01).
Alan was a good example of this. He was on Grade One (see Chapter Four) and, 
therefore, was among the highest paid Tortco' employees. However, as he had a young 
family and was unable to manage on his basic wages, he applied for weekend overtime
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nearly every week. Because the combination of shift work and the amount of overtime 
he worked impacted adversely on family life, Alan saw working overtime as: "# 
constant juggle between time and money ", saying that:
"I'm getting the money in now so that, in a few years down the line, I can enjoy 
the time - but it's like wishing your life away" (Alan, interview notes, 29/2/01).
Angela (Alan's wife) mentioned that the amount of compulsory overtime Alan had to 
work left him extremely tired; this, in turn, affected the quality of the time he was able to 
spend with his family (interview notes, 23/7/01).
The above are examples of how work was extended, rather than intensified. The 
introduction of functional flexibility and multi-skilling, which enhanced productivity 
through more continuous working, however, were experienced as work intensification. 
Work Intensification
Work intensification took many forms, such as performing what had been a separate task 
(see Chapter Two), and continuous working. Nothing stopped work at 'Portco'. With 
the exception of handling paper (which has to remain dry), work continued in all but the 
severest of weathers. Paul commented:
"/ mean, we don't stop when it rains. I've worked ninety feet up above the deck 
of a ship with nothing to stop you falling off, in blizzards and you can't feel your 
feet. You can't feel your fingers or your hands and I've got to climb up... a 
Samson post to get to the place where we drive the winches... (Paul, interview 
notes, 22/2/01).
Technical innovation had resulted in a greater division of labour and had broken the 
cohesiveness of the autonomous dockers' "gang'. There had been a great deal of 
camaraderie associated with traditional port work and, although this remained 1 , the new 
methods of working reduced the degree of interaction between the men. At both 
Tortco' and 'Containerco' a 'team' of different men perform individual, and what 
appears to the outsider to be isolating, tasks, work on the same job until it is finished,
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and then might not work 'together' again for months (see Chapter Two). As Larry, a 
retired RDW, remembered:
"We used to be able to talk to each other, 'ave a joke. Now the blokes on the 
[quayside gantry cranes]. ..thosepoor sods are stuck a hundred and eighty - two 
hundred feet in the air - where's the joy in that? (interview notes, 13/6/01).
Control, Consent and Resistance
If the wage-effort bargain is the 'frontier of control', then accommodation and 
adaptation to that bargain are the centre of workers' daily lives. They are part of 
workers' "active effort to make sense of, and to a degree achieve control over, their 
work destinies and experiences" (Salaman, 1986: 21, quoted Edwards, 1988: 187). 
Goffman (1961: 172, cited 1988: 189) coined 'secondary adjustment' to describe how 
employees use unauthorised means to assert their individuality and subvert 
management's assumptions of who they are.
As the exercise of skills and worker co-operation with management are central to the 
labour process (Sturdy, Knights and Willmott, 1992:1), any definition of power must 
include resistance (Sakalsky, 1992: 238). Management needs the co-operation of the 
workforce if the work is to be carried out efficiently; worker knowledge of the job and 
how it is performed, however, gives them a certain amount of power. Strauss et al 
(1971: cited Hyman, 1980: 315) wrote about the 'negotiation of order', or the continuous 
trade off between management, under pressure to get the work done, and workers 
conscious of their ability to hold it up. In what this thesis has termed 'spontaneous 
collectivism', or informal organisation outside union organisation, men at various 
terminals have been able to use their knowledge of the job, and management's need to 
get the job done, in order to improve their terms and conditions.
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The effects of the changes in work organisation discussed above and in Chapter Four 
were, and continued to be, profound. However, worker reaction to both their working 
environment and to management's unilateral control had, from the mid-1990s, allowed 
men working at some terminals to regain some control of the labour process. This had 
implications for management's "right to manage'.
Although Ralph, who worked as a contingent labourer (see above), reported that the 
employer was still firmly in control at some facilities, 'things have gone back to the old 
ways' at others (field notes, 27/9/02). However, and because of the limited number of 
cargo handlers participating in this investigation (see Chapter Three), it was impossible 
to determine how widespread this had become. This area would benefit from further 
investigation, not only in the Port of London but elsewhere. It was, however, known 
that some employees at Tortco' were able to decide how the work would be performed 
and, because ships needed to be worked to tight schedules (see Chapter Two), it 
appeared that their supervisors had become complicit in this.
Alan recounted how some work gangs at Tortco' decided among themselves whether 
the job would be 'fast' or 'slow'; that is, whether the men would work hard and get it 
finished, or hang it out and finish it as overtime for extra payments. Many of the 
supervisors in Alan's department had been cargo handlers and had participated in the 
system; however, now part of management, they were under pressure to get the work 
done as quickly and efficiently as possible. Rather like 'Agencyco's ' incentive to work' 
(see Chapter Four), if it appeared the men's actions might delay a ship, the supervisors 
would tell the gang at the start of the job that they would be paid two hours overtime, 
regardless of when the job finished. It is possible that senior management were unaware
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of these arrangements. However, Alan mentioned that supervisors employed from 
outside Tilbury who did not operate the system soon found themselves 'promoted out of 
the way' (interview notes, 18/8/02), so this seems unlikely, especially as overtime 
payments had to be authorised. If the payments were questioned, however, and as Alan 
remarked of other informal practices (see below), "we'll be good boys for a while, then 
we 'II go back to the way we were" (interview notes, 18/2/01).
Although Alan and other members of the "team' were active Branch members, it must be 
emphasised that this practice was outside union organisation. The control exercised by 
Alan and the work "team' was isolated and, as with Lupton's workers, concentrated on 
the immediate wage-effort bargain. Although the practice had the potential to spread - 
the men could have asked for similar payments for jobs in other areas - it did not. The 
men were not concerned with seeing the practice extended throughout Tortco' or in 
influencing the wider effort bargain (see Edwards, 1988: 196). This, then, could be seen 
as the revival of a localised custom and practice (see Brown, 1972: 44) but outside union 
control.
As this and the further examples cited below indicated, in order to remain competitive 
and, therefore, profitable, getting the job done had become more important than who was 
in control at dockside level: rather than running the risk of losing a customer, 
management acceded to what was, in effect, blackmail.
One experienced Tortco' labour manager, however, practised what Gouldner (1954) had 
termed "indulgency patterns' in order to get the work completed quickly and efficiently. 
As long as there was no outstanding work, he would "turn a blind eye' to minor
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infringements of the rules (see below). Men working on his department reported that he 
treated them fairly and, if they had genuine problems would allow them to go early in an 
emergency, for example. Because of this, the men responded by working harder and 
making up any time (by working on at the end of a shift for no extra pay, for example) 
when the department was busy (Branch field notes, various).
Collectivism outside union organisation had also been utilised in order to wrest 
concessions from their employer. Some actions, such as the "blue flu' discussed by 
Blyton and Turnbull (1998: 311) or the following example from Tortco' and 
"Generalco', were what Hyman (1975: 187) termed 'mass absenteeism' and were "very 
effective substitute^] for strike action" (see Blyton and Turnbull, 1998: 311). As their 
aim was to alter the wage-effort bargain, this type of absenteeism could be seen as a 
means of asserting worker control.
Because of communications between the Tilbury T&G Branch and its Scottish 
counterparts, men working at Tortco' were aware that their overtime rates were inferior 
to those paid by Forth Ports in Scotland. As the T&G was not at that stage recognised 
(see Chapter Six), the men were unable to take official action over this. In what could 
also be seen as 'spontaneous collectivism', they all made spurious excuses not to work 
the compulsory overtime for one evening. Because ships were held up, Forth Ports not 
only gave all Tilbury employees overtime parity with the Scottish ports, but also offered 
backdated overtime pay at the new rates (Alan, interview notes, 29/2/01). Richie had led 
opposition to the imposition of contractual changes at 'Generalco'. Although the men 
had offered to go to arbitration, their employer refused, so the men organised an 
overtime ban. Again, ships were delayed and this 'did the trick' and the men won
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improved conditions, including the overtime rate mentioned above (Richie, interview 
notes, 23/11/01).
Because they were limited and had very little impact on over-all control, management 
usually turned a blind eye to, usually individual, acts of defiance (see also Marchington, 
1992: 156) and minor infringement of the rules that made the working day more 
tolerable. As a form of competition between the employee and management, they gave 
the employee an interest in his job, thus reducing the potential for absenteeism and quits, 
and were "fl relatively cheap way of getting workers to keep working" (see Edwards, 
1988: 192). These, however, could also be utilised in order to undermine management 
control. Tortco' employees, for example, exploited their managers' lack of knowledge 
of how the work was performed by going slow. Paul said:
"What usually happens is, you work slow for two hours! For some reason or 
other, because they see a thing working, people seem to think, ^well, it's 
working so it must be going good""" (Paul, interview notes, 22/2/01).
They also started late and finished early. "Portco' employees estimated that, on average, 
they 'lost' an hour on every seven hour shift. They started work five or ten minutes late, 
added five or ten minutes on to their breaks, and left up to twenty minutes early and, 
depending on the job, there were also "numerous stops for cups of tea. " (Alan, interview 
notes, 29/2/01 and Branch field notes, various). Accepting perks, such as gifts in kind for 
acts which are not strictly part of the cargo handler's job, could also be seen as 'getting 
by' strategies. All these informal customs and practices had been developed outside 
union organisation. If these were unchallenged, they could become a precedent that the 
men could use against management (Marchington, 1992: 153).
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The firm provided transport between jobs at Tortco'. However, it had become practice 
that the men drove their own cars to the next job - saving the firm money and the men 
time at the end of a shift. On one occasion, in order to show their displeasure of a new 
supervisor from outside the industry who was causing the men problems, they refused to 
do so. Because he had not laid on transport for them, the men walked to the next job, a 
distance of about three miles, or 45 minutes. The ship was held up, the supervisor was 
blamed and, according to the men, he became more conciliatory after this incident! 
(Branch field notes, various).
The above was an example of a practice which had become both legitimised (through 
constant exercise) and universalised throughout Tilbury. Although the rules stated one 
thing, as it saved the company money and because of the disruption caused, management 
appeared to side with the men, rather than the supervisor (see Brown, 1971: 52). 
Fiddling
Mars (1982: 2) called fiddling (or pilferage) a "covert reward system" or "the hidden 
benefits'" of work. Because it was "contrary to management's control and direction of 
the labour process", fiddling "allows workers to control their jobs rather than being 
controlled by them" (see Blyton and Turnbull, 1998: 315 and Mars, 1982: 206). 
Fiddling can be a form of "job satisfaction' in that employees break management's rules 
and, especially where working terms and conditions are low, it can become both a way 
for the employee to supplement income and a way to relieve frustration (1982: 35 and 
140).
Mars identified four types of workers and their fiddles: hawks, donkeys, wolves, and 
vultures (1982: 2). There was, however, a considerable overlap between them. Cargo
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handlers, for example, could fall into three of those categories. RDWs were a prime 
example of * wolves' in that they worked and fiddled in 'packs', or gangs (1982: 100-7). 
Arguably, however, modern cargo handlers have more in common with both 'donkeys' - 
in that their jobs consist of tasks which are "arduous, monotonous, repetitive and 
isolating" (Blyton and Turnbull, 1998: 316: see also above and Chapter Two) - and 
'vultures'. 'Vultures', such as delivery drivers, work on their own, but need the support 
of the group to fiddle (Mars, 1982: 2). As mentioned above, cargo handlers worked as 
individuals; as with other 'vultures', however, they appeared to fiddle on their own but 
needed the rest of the work 'team' for information (see footnote 2).
Fiddles can be taking money (or the equivalent) or time. As both the employers and the 
men testified, although containerisation had reduced the opportunity for pilferage, it had 
not eradicated it (interview and field notes, various). The retired participants in this 
investigation mentioned that, when RDWs had the right to 'stuff and strip' the 
containers, they were able to take goods, such as spirits, from a pallet that had to be 
broken down (interview notes, various). Although reluctant to discuss it, working cargo 
handlers admitted that theft might still occur. Allegedly they stole 'what isn't there'. 
Some exporters, whilst claiming to dispatch a (cheaper) empty lorry, fill it with small 
items, such as cameras, which the men allegedly took (interview and field notes, 
various). This would appear to be what Mars (1982: 106) termed 'acceptable' pilferage 
as the goods were being exported illegally; there were no recriminations for the same 
reasons.
The employers mentioned that, instead of "a couple of steaks from the cold store, or the 
odd bottle of Scotch" ('Portco' Marketing Director, interview notes, 12/10/00), they now
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tended to lose whole containers of, for example, televisions, or trucks full of timber. 
Modern theft had become organised and, although the PACE stock control system might 
indicate that the container or lorry was still in the yard, they were not2 . 
Employee Concerns
When asked about their main concerns at work, wages and hours came low on the men's 
lists. Invariably, their primary concerns were training, health and safety, and 'casual 
labour', which many saw as inextricably linked (cargo handler interview and field notes 
and Branch field notes). 
i: ^Casual Labour'
The men's concerns could be summed up as follows: dock work was dangerous; more 
and more casuals were being hired to do the work; they were not trained; this made a 
dangerous situation even more dangerous. To be clear, it was not the ex-RDWs (many 
their ex-colleagues) who were the majority of contingent labourers (see Chapter Four), 
but the minority of temporary workers - the out-and-out casuals, and those that were 
hired via general employment agencies - that caused concern (interview and field notes).
The main reason for this was that these men might not work in the Port very often so 
were not trained in dock work and, for the same reasons, had little chance of gaining 
experience of the tasks involved in the work. Experienced men working at various 
terminals told how casuals assigned to work with them had not known how to do the 
task assigned. As the men pointed out, this meant that they not only had to concentrate 
on their own work, but also make sure that the casual worker was not putting himself 
(and them) in danger (Branch field notes). Paul, for example, mentioned that he had 
often seen 'casuals' using the wrong equipment or not wearing safety clothing; this, 
again, could be dangerous to all concerned (interview notes, 22/2/01).
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Permanent employees also saw all categories of contingent labourers as a visible threat 
to their job security. Branch minutes throughout the 1990s record which terminals (and 
berths within Tilbury) contingent labourers were working on, and which jobs had been 
permanently assigned to them3 . This represented a real threat as work performed by 
permanent cargo handlers made redundant throughout the 1990s was likely to be given 
to contingent labourers (because they were cheaper) than to replacement permanent 
employees. In June 1992, a Branch minute had recorded that: CASUAL LABOUR IS 
ON THE INCREASE (original emphasis). As later Branch minutes recorded, this was 
still a concern in 2002 (see, for example, 1/10 Branch minute books 21 st June 1992 and 
18th August 2002). 
w: Training and Health and Safety
Despite employer assurances to the contrary, cargo handlers perceived that both training 
and health and safety had deteriorated following abolition, and poor training left cargo 
handlers unable to adequately respond in what had become the most dangerous land- 
based industry in Britain (see Chapter Two).
Alan's experience of training demonstrates this. His initial training at 'Portco' in 1989 
had been classroom based, followed by practical experience under supervision for six 
months. Although allowed to make his own decisions, Alan was not left completely 
unsupervised for about seven years and, 12 years later, he said that these men still 
checked up on him (interview notes, 29/2/01). However, as a health and safety 
representative, Alan was in a position to observe that this kind of thorough hands-on 
training was no longer given and that training had become classroom-based. Induction 
training lasted approximately one week, and on-site basic training lasted approximately 
three months (see Chapter Four). If, however, 'Portco' was under pressure, a new
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entrant might be put straight to work and receive no formal training of any kind 
(interview notes, 29/2/01). Similarly, Richie remarked that 'there's no training' at 
'Generalco' and opined that the only reason the terminal had a comparatively low 
accident rate was because, as at 'Portco', the experienced men "kept an eye' on the new 
recruits (23/11/01).
Because they had become less important, the "knacks' that cargo handlers needed for 
conventional cargoes no longer formed part of any training programme. At many 
facilities, the employer expected, and relied on, longer-serving men, especially ex- 
RDWs, to train new recruits in these traditional skills. To highlight this, Richie asked 
Keith, a post-1990 'Generalco' recruit, if he knew what certain tasks were. Replying in 
the negative, Keith explained that the ex-RDWs were the only repository of this 
knowledge and that:
". ..if there's a problem and I don't know what to do, I ash one of them and they 
show we. The firm doesn 't show us and when these guys are gone, we won't 
have anyone to show us what to do " (Keith, interview notes, 23/11/01).
Accidents have been associated with increased overtime and general workload (see 
Blyton and Turnbull, 1998: 311 and Powell, 1971: 18). This leads to stress, which the 
HSE has identified as the primary cause of accidents (HSE, 1994). Another key factor 
in stress is fatigue, both mental and physical, and the need to concentrate for long 
periods (HSE, 1994). Quayside gantry crane drivers, such as Alan and Paul, were 
especially vulnerable to this type of stress. Although this type of driving requires high 
levels of concentration, in common with the lathe operators observed by Powell (1971: 
11), crane drivers go through basically the same set of motions for every operation; this 
rendered the task both monotonous and stressful.
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There were health and safety guidelines - the Docks Regulations, last issued in 1988, had 
been incorporated into the 1974 Health and Safety at Work Act. However, these were 
mainly concerned with manual handling and were extremely out of date (HSC Safety 
Policy Officer, interview notes, 14/5/02). The 1999 Management of Health and Safety 
at Work Regulations required employers to make risk assessments; they also had a duty 
to give health and safety information to agencies when hiring workers. Self-employed 
workers, however, were responsible for their own risk assessments. As mentioned in 
Chapter Four, the precise category that contingent labourers fell under was unclear. If 
the labour-supply agencies considered them to be self-employed, they were absolved of 
any responsibility for their health and safety.
Nichols (1988: 290) found that accidents were less likely to occur where trade union 
organisation was strong. He also noted, however, that even well-organised workforces 
could be "persuaded' to work unsafely by, for example, the offer of extra payment. 
Before abolition, unsafe working was compensated for by 'danger money' on top of 
wages (see Chapter Four). Following abolition, however, this ceased and men who 
refused to handle such cargoes could face disciplinary action (Branch field notes, 
various). The pressure to get the work done resulted in unsafe working practices, such 
as unsecured loads on forklifts, being introduced by management and becoming an 
established part of the organisation of production (see Edwards, 1988: 193 and Powell, 
1971:5).
Technical innovation and the nature of port work have also contributed towards making 
it intrinsically dangerous. The main health problem among modern port workers is 
spondylitis, a disease of the fourth vertebra, caused by the posture in which crane and
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straddle carrier drivers sit (see Chapter Two). Alan, who had been working in the ports 
industry for 12 years at the time the interview, mentioned that he sometimes found it 
difficult to straighten his back in the morning, adding:
"...I'm starting to get pains in my neck and the top of my back. I keep thinking, 
'this is s'pos to happen when I'm sixty five, not thirty five'" (Alan, interview 
notes, 29/2/01).
Angela also mentioned this, and that he was getting hard of hearing, which she blamed 
on the noise in the crane cabs (interview notes, 23/7/01).
Technical innovation, deregulation and a lack of training adversely affected accident 
levels within the Port of London. As Andrew, a dismissed union activist, commented:
"... it's easy to get hurt in the docks. The crane pulling out - if something goes, if 
a hook swings across the ship... You've got to know where to be otherwise... If 
you stand there and you carry on working, if you don't know... every now and 
again it 'II swing across, and if a big heavy metal hook swings across, you see 
stars at least. You could get killed, easily... I mean, lots of people get killed as 
well (interview notes, 23/1/01).
The men alleged that individual employers kept just within health and safety legislation - 
a member told a Branch meeting that 'no-one cares about your health and safety - you 
just go in there and do the job' (Branch 1/10 minutes, August 2002). Accidents were a 
common occurrence at Tilbury - Angela mentioned that Alan told her about a serious 
accident there nearly every week (interview notes, 23/7/01) - and crushed hands and feet 
appeared to be regarded by the men as an occupational hazard (interview and field 
notes). The men also reported that longer hours and work intensification had left them 
more tired, and that they remained tired for longer: this also contributing to accidents.
As discussed in Chapter Two, because of their status as "employees', permanent cargo 
handlers working in the Port had a form of security. This, however, was not true for the
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contingent labourers working in the Port. The following section looks at how the change 
from secure to insecure employment affected these men. 
6:2 - The Contingent Port Labour Force
Contingent labourers in the Port of London saw their employment relationship 
transformed . As discussed in Chapter Four, agency workers had a legal status that was 
difficult to define. Although the legal concept of "worker' is wider than that of 
employee' (see Chapter Two) legislation that covers employees only is not applicable to 
other, non-standard, workers. They had, for example, no guaranteed hours of work and, 
therefore, no guaranteed income; they also had no access to employment protection or to 
company pensions or sickness or holiday pay, except after 13 weeks continuous 
employment, at the time of the fieldwork. They, did, however, have certain legal rights. 
These included health and safety and the right to equal treatment regarding race or 
gender, for example, holiday pay as outlined above, and the right to be paid the national 
minimum wage (see Druker and Stanworth, 2001: 76).
Despite employer promises that there would be no return to casual labour following 
abolition, a T&G official commented that it had become 'as pernicious an evil today as 
it was at the beginning of the twentieth century' (T&G FTO, telephone conversation 
notes, 15/6/01). As Fevre (1986: 22-3) found with redundant steelworkers, working for a 
contractor had become "less secure, less remunerative, and more dangerous". Given 
this, and their lack of legal rights, one is forced to ask: why did men do this work?
Talking to men who regularly worked as contingent labourers in the Port of London 
revealed that, overwhelmingly, they had had no choice. Factors such as the dockers' 
reputation for militancy and age discrimination had worked against them. Martin, made
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redundant from 'Containerco' shortly after abolition, recalled that when he looked for 
work the attitude was "'Docker? - You're trouble"' and continued that: "We had to go 
back in, it was the only work we could get'5 (field notes, 26/11/01). Harry, who had also 
worked at 'Containerco', was injured shortly before abolition and was made redundant 
in 1990. Although he received the full redundancy payment, he needed work after his 
injuries healed. He recalled:
"...£35,000 doesn't go far, even in them days... but there was nothing for me at 
the Labour, being a docker was all I knew and, anyway, I was over forty. Even 
though we're suppose to have no discrimination any more, nobody want's to 
know if you're over forty, so when I heard about this job, I grabbed if (Harry, 
interview notes, 23/11/01).
Both Martin and Harry worked for 'Labourco'.
Only one contingent labourer participating in the research positively chose the work. 
After being made redundant from Sheerness in 1993, Cliff had initially found work in a 
factory. However, he found the shift work difficult to cope with, so ''jumped at the 
chance'' of becoming an 'Agencyco' shareholder, where he predominantly worked days 
(field notes, 23/11/01). 
Hiring
The men were, generally contacted by the agency (by telephone) when work was 
available, and would be told were the job was, what time to report, and how long the job 
would last. The general consensus among the men was that, if it were not for the 
telephone, they would again be attending 'call on' (see Chapter One). Some of the men 
mentioned that they had their mobile telephones permanently with them so that, if one 
job finished, they were available for the next (field notes, 23/9/01 and 26/9/01). 
However, there appeared to be a special arrangement between 'Labourco' and 
'Generalco', one of its main clients.
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Although the work differed for different types of cargo, within that, port work was 
basically the same operation; each terminal, however, has its own way of doing things 
(interview and field notes, various). Although they did work elsewhere, many 
'Labourco' contingent labourers were hired almost exclusively by 'Generalco' and had 
become familiar with the 'system' there. Because of this, the men viewed themselves 
more as "Generalco' employees and, as discussed below, "Generalco' appeared to treat 
them as such.
Rather than being repeatedly placed by "Labourco', the men took further orders for work 
from "Generalco' directly. "Generalco' would then inform the agency which of its men 
were working on a daily basis, and the hours they had worked. It appeared that the 
relationship was such that, as long as the work was done, "Generalco' did not mind 
which of the men did it. If not all the men were needed, they decided among themselves 
(based on work record and individual needs) who would do it, and those not working at 
"Generalco' reported to "Labourco'. "Labourco' appeared to accept this and would find 
them alternative jobs until they were again needed at 'Generalco' (field notes, 26/11/01). 
Hours and Earnings
The employers' argument was that contingent labourers only worked when it suited 
them. However none of the men were personally aware of any contingent labourers who 
did this. Terry, who worked for 'Labourco', was an exception. He had seven children so 
knew that, should he need time off for any reason, there was an income (in child benefit) 
going into the household (field notes, 26/11/01).
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As the hourly rates were low, the contingent labourers participating in this investigation 
reported that they rarely refused work, except in exceptional circumstances, as saying 
'no' could have affected their future employment prospects. Len admitted that:
"... if I feel ill or something, that's different, but I do all the work I'm assigned 
You can say 'no' but if you do, the firm says, 'don't send him again"''.
Roy agreed and added:
"We do refuse work but remember, we 've probably just done ten hours a day for 
five or six days and we 're tired and we want a rest" (interview notes, 23/11/01).
This was a factor in health and safety. Brian mentioned that he had only had a five hour 
break between his last job and the job he was on, and added: "I'm tired- and tiredness 
causes accidents" (field notes, 23/11/01).
The reason these men were able to work long hours was that, although the WTD covered 
temporary workers, it did not cover transport (see Chapter Two). The men reported that 
they often worked seven days a week, with as little as nine hours rest between finishing 
one job and starting the next (interview and field notes, various).
As mentioned in Chapter Four, few men would talk about their earnings, or how they 
were made up (basic rate plus overtime and/or special payments, for example). 
'Labourco' men working Saturdays at "Generalco' were paid overtime (at time and a 
half, or approximately £10.50 an hour) for a stated number of hours, regardless of how 
long the job actually took (Roy, field notes, 27/9/02). This, however, appeared to be an 
exception as men working for 'Agencyco' (and 'Labourco' men working elsewhere) 
reported that they were paid only for the hours they had worked (interview and field 
notes, various). However, this appeared to earn them sufficient to tide them over any 
short periods of unemployment. As mentioned in Chapter Four, Castlekeep was the only 
agency known to pay a retainer. Terry, who had worked for Castlekeep, mentioned that,
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in order to qualify, the men had to stay by their telephones until noon, after which they 
knew there would be no work for them that day (field notes, 26/11/01). Arguably, for 
the others, the freedom not to work was the freedom to claim unemployment benefit. 
However, benefit was withdrawn if the claimant earned more than £50.00 in any seven 
days, and there was a 10-day waiting period. In an industry where 'we can work two 
days one week and then get a job that lasts for two or three weeks'1 (Brian, 'Agencyco' 
shareholder, interview notes, 23/11/01), the men had discovered that it was not worth 
their while to do so. However, the fact that they are unemployed in the only industry 
they knew may be a reason why they do not sign on. The Jobseekers Allowance was 
only paid to those that sought any suitable work. Because of their age, they might be 
considered too old for work outside the industry: however, they knew they could get 
work in the Port. Whatever their motives, their actions ensured that a 'pool' of 
contingent labourers was constantly available (see Chapter Four). 
Control and Resistance
As with the permanent employees, contingent labourers appeared to have regained some 
control over the labour process. Arguably, this was because of their years of experience 
in dock work, and of each other. Because they have worked with the same men (for up 
to 30 years in some cases), they knew their strengths and weaknesses better than the 
supervisors did. As mentioned above, because of their experience, and because they 
worked there so often, 'Generalco' regarded these men as employees. Roy stated: 'they 
think they run the place, but we do realty (interview notes, 26/9/01). As "Generalco' 
left it to these men to organise some of the work, there appears to be some justification 
in that. Contingent labourers working there reported that it was they who worked out 
how a job they were on was to be performed, and Roy also mentioned that he, rather 
than a supervisor, would be organising that weekend's overtime (26/9/02).
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Contingent labourers in the Port also used 'spontaneous collectivism' (see above) in 
order to wrest concessions from their employers. Roy was familiar with the "passport' 
(see Chapter Four) and had used it in order to gain concessions from "Labourco'. He 
tried to persuade the men not to pay for the medical certificates and plant driving 
licences needed to comply with 'passport' regulations. He reminded them that, without 
this certification, the agency was unlikely to be hired. As it was in their employer's 
interest to ensure that they had the necessary documentation, he should, therefore, pay a 
proportion of the costs. As the result of the threat of some kind of industrial action ('we 
threatened a, you know... '), the employer agreed to not only pay for the initial 
certification but also offered to pay for any re-certification (interview notes, 23/11/01 
and 27/9/02). 
Conclusion
This Chapter has looked at the changing experiences of work for both permanent 
employees and contingent labourers working in the Port of London. Conditions of 
employment within the Port had deteriorated since abolition and the introduction of 
various types of flexibility had led not only to the re-introduction of "casual' labour but 
also accelerated worker mobility, shift work and overtime.
Ex-RDWs working as contingent labourers in the Port had seen their working conditions 
deteriorate, from secure to insecure. As contingent labourers, their security lasted as 
long as the job and, employed intermittently, their wages depended on how long they 
worked; this, in turn, was dependent on work being available.
Both training and health and safety in the industry were perceived to have deteriorated 
since abolition. The men worked in all conditions, and with dangerous machinery.
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Despite their employers' assurances, the men reported that training, if given, was 
rudimentary or on-the-job, often given by other employees.
The Chapter looked at some of the coping strategies, such as starting late and finishing 
early, driving their cars between jobs and fiddling, that the men had devised in order to 
make their work more interesting. It also considered what it termed 'spontaneous 
collectivism', or men acting together to use management's need to get the work done in 
order to gain enhanced terms and conditions. This informal resistance to employer 
control was utilised by both full-time employees and contingent labourers in the Port but 
was outside union organisation. The following Chapter looks at union organisation in 
the Port of London and examines how, despite derecognition, the organising spirit was 
kept alive.
1 The men talked of 'dockology', or a community of dockers that looked after each 
other, helping their older and not so nimble/talented work mates (Branch field notes, 
17/8/03).
2 This would appear to be a typical "vulture' theft in that it was carried out by lorry 
drivers who, however innocently, must have got the information about where the 
container or lorry was from a port worker. It must be emphasised, however, that at no 
time did the employers cast aspersions on the honesty of their employees.
3 For example, Branch minute books record how, step by step, permanent employees 
working at the Grain terminal were made redundant and replaced by contingent 
labourers. Work there was eventually performed by contingent labour only (T&G 1/10 
Branch minute books, 19th September 1993 to 21 st January 1995).
4 Lavallette and Kennedy (1996: 16) make the point that the cargo handlers who are 
about to retire were the last men to experience 'casual labour'. Of the men interviewed 
who had joined the dock labour force before 1967 and where still in the industry, one 
man - Donald - had seen his employment go from "casual' to permanent and back to 
'casual' again.
5 This, however, was not true of the dismissed activists. In common with Davies' 
(2000: 612) findings that employers were less likely to hire from agencies that had 
militant ex-RDWs on their books, those dismissed in London found it impossible to 
return to the industry. Asked if he had approached, or been approached by, an agency, 
George, a dismissed activist, replied: "they wouldn 't approach me - they would have lost
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(interview notes, 25/7/01).
Appendix 5 158
Appendix 5: Cargo Handlers Participating in this Research, with details of age 
and length of service at time of interview, if known.
Name and Age 
if known
Alan, 36 years
Angela, Alan's 
wife
Andrew, early 
60s
Brian, early 
40s
Charles +
Cliff, late 40s
Colin, mid 50s
Derek
Donald, 65 
years
George, early 
60s
Harry, 64 years
Jack
John, early 20s
Keith
Larry, 78 years
Len
Martin
Matt, early 40s
Paul, over 60
Ralph
Richie, over 50
Roy, 63 years
Ted
Terry
Total: 24
Place of Work
Tortco'
N/A
Tilbury
"Agencyco'
N/A
"Agencyco'
Tilbury
"Labourco'
"Generalco'
Tilbury
Xabourco'
Various Docks 
and wharves
'Generalco'
"Generalco'
Tilbury
'Labourco'
Xabourco'
'Generalco'
Tortco'
"Generalco'
"Generalco'
"Labourco'
Wharves
"Labourco'
Employment 
Status
Permanent
N/A
Dismissed
Contingent
Tugman
Contingent
Dismissed
Contingent
Tool' casual
Dismissed
Contingent
Took 
Severance
'Permanent'
Permanent
Retired
Contingent
Contingent
Permanent
Permanent
Permanent
Permanent
Contingent
Took 
Severance
Contingent
Length of 
Service - in 
years
12 years (1989)
N/A
29(1960)A
1970s*
1960s*
1970s*
24(1965)A
15(1986)
40 (1960)
26 (1963)A
40(1960)
30(1946-76)
Started 2002
1990s*
45 (1937)#
1970s*
31 (1970)
1990s*
37(1964)
Unknown
35 (1966)
35 (1966)
21 (1954-75)
Unknown
Active Union 
Member:
Yes/No
Yes
N/A
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Unknown
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Source: Interview and field notes data.
+: Charles had been a lighterman and had been trained as a docker during the 1970s.
#: Larry started work in 1937: was in the navy during World war Two.
*: Exact date of starting work unknown. 
A : Length of service on dismissal/retirement.
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Chapter Six: Trade Unions, Industrial Relations and the T&G Tilbury Branch
1989-2002
Chapters Four and Five discussed the impact of abolition on work and employment in 
the Port of London. This Chapter examines a further aspect of abolition: its impact on 
industrial relations at Branch level in what had once been a bastion of trade unionism.
Many writers have contributed to the debate on union marginalisation since 1979. 
Blyton and Turnbull (1998) and Brown, (1998), for example, discussed 
marginalisation in the context of social changes at work, and Edwards (1992) have 
looked at it from a political perspective. Although known as socio-legal authors, Smith 
and Morton also wrote extensively on the impact of technology on print union 
marginalisation. Their argument that technical innovation had reduced the need for 
labour and had enhanced employer power over work organisation, leading to union 
marginalisation was discussed in terms of port transport in Chapter Two (see Smith and 
Morton, 1991: 325-331). Of significance to this Chapter is their argument that 
Conservative legislation had weakened unions and made them incapable of compelling 
employers to negotiate change (see, for example, Smith and Morton, 1990: 119 and 
below).
Employees in a trade union setting have traditionally been able to employ sanctions, 
such as a reluctance to work overtime or restricting output, in order to wrest concessions 
from their employer. This was 
(see McCarthy, 1967: 19-22 and 25). However, as Chapter 
Five demonstrated, employees outside union organisation can also employ sanctions. 
The growth of 'spontaneous collectivism', or a form of custom and practice 
union control, was initiated by employees at Tilbury and elsewhere during the period of
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derecognition, and was not co-ordinated by (non-existent) shop stewards, the traditional 
'keepers' of custom and practice.
Taking the T&G port workers branch in the Port of London as a case study, this Chapter 
tries to add to the above debate by examining how effective the union was in the Port of 
London from 1989 and during the 1990s. It looks at what happened inside a 
derecognised trade union at Branch level, discusses the continuing effects derecognition 
had on Branch organisation and looks at how the Branch coped in the hostile 
environment of the 1990s. Finally, the Chapter discusses the impact of ERA at Branch 
level and looks at how cargo handlers in London reacted to re-recognition, and at its 
early consequences. An account of the T&G 1/10 Branch and its members as they were 
observed between 2000 and 2002 is given in Appendix 6:1.
This Chapter is concerned exclusively with the 1/10 Branch, based at Tilbury, and the 
interviews and conversations discussed below were with its members and with the local 
FTO. Branch membership was very fragmented, both by location and employment 
relationship (see Appendix 6:1). However, the majority of Branch members worked at 
terminals located between Purfleet and Tilbury/Gravesend (see frontispiece map). 
Although their views reflected union activity in that area, they cannot be taken to 
represent the Port as a whole. 
6:1 -Trade Unionism in the Port, 1989-1997 
Cargo Handlers and the T&G
Abolition and derecognition adversely affected the T&G's attitudes to cargo handlers 
during the early 1990s. Because national collective bargaining had ceased, the T&G at 
the highest levels no longer had a reason to be involved with dockers or with the Branch:
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as Wilman (1989, quoted in Turnbull and Blyton, 1998: 273) found, unions have no 
incentive to try to organise employees were there is little prospect of (re)gaining 
bargaining rights. The Docks Group was rarely mentioned in the after 
about 1991 and, referring to the Group, a senior T&G official commented that the union 
could not and that it had " (private conversation, 23/6/00). 
Despite the ballot discussed below, the T&G did not mount recognition campaigns in the 
Port during the early 1990s and, although "Link Up' emphasised the recruitment of 
temporary workers (see below) there was no such campaign among contingent cargo 
handlers (Jack Jones, interview notes, 16/6/00).
This attitude appeared to be a direct result of the T&G's defeat during the 1989 strike. 
Turnbull, Woolfson and Kelly (1992: 221-3) wrote that, although the Executive 
supported a strike, T&G leadership strategy was to stay within the law, even if that 
meant delay and not asking for solidarity action from other port workers (this strategy 
remained unchanged and was a major reason for the defeat of the 1995-8 Liverpool dock 
strike - see, for example, Davies: 1996 and Taplin, 1998 for details of the strike). Other 
factors in the 1989 defeat were internal T&G politics and the declining power resources 
of the dockers. By 1989 dockers had dwindled in importance, both to the T&G - they 
were "a of T&G membership - and, because of changes in work, as an 
economic power. They further suggested that, having witnessed the defeat of both the 
miners (1984) and the print unions (1986), the T&G was not prepared to risk a similar 
fate over a minority of its members.
Branch members saw this as a failing on the part of the T&G. Donald, an ex-RDW 
working as a contingent labourer, believed that: 
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[the government] (field notes, 26/11/01). It appeared 
that only pressure from Branch members persuaded the T&G to act. Richie, at 
'Generalco', talking about the events which led to their successful industrial tribunal 
decision (see Chapter Four), mentioned that the men had approached the T&G but 
and before they received union backing 
(interview notes, 23/11/01).
Dockers' concerns, then, appeared to have ceased to play a role in T&G deliberations: 
certainly, following T&G re-organisation in 1999, there was no longer a dedicated T&G 
Docks Group officer. Senior T&G officers were variously described as not interested in 
the Branch and its problems (1/10 Branch Minute Books (hereafter 1/10), 2002-3, 
various). Only Roy, working at non-union "Labourco' appeared to be satisfied with the 
help he received during this period; that, however, was qualified. He remembered that 
he would try to solve the problem by "spontaneous collectivism':
Only if that was unsuccessful would he turn to the then Regional Officer: "... 
] (Roy, interview notes, 11/01).
The current FTO, however, pointed out that legislative constraints and employer 
hostility in London had limited the help the T&G could offer members during the early
1990s:
(FTO, interview notes, 5/12/00).
This feeling of isolation was further exacerbated by the employers' actions.
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Employers and the Trade Union
Mass redundancies on abolition had divided the workforce. In a bid to weaken collective 
resolve at Tilbury, all union activists were also dismissed and management dispatched 
new contracts of employment to the remaining dockers during the third week of the 
abolition strike. If not signed by a deadline, the men would have been deemed to have 
dismissed themselves: 493 men signed the contracts and, as a result, the strike in London 
crumbled (see Turnbull, Woolfson and Kelly, 1992: 164).
A recognition ballot was held outside Tilbury gates in July 1989. Of the 530 voting (750 
were eligible to vote), 99 percent had voted in favour (see 1992: 193). Tilbury 
management, however, refused to re-recognise the union, which remained derecognised 
until 2000 (see 6:3 below). However, an relationship did continue 
between individuals in the 'Portco' personnel department and the T&G at district level 
('Portco' Marketing Director, interview notes, 12/10/00 and see below).
Most Port employers' attitudes to trade unionism could be summed up by Torestco', a 
Tilbury tenant that had derecognised the T&G on abolition: 
(ETGRE survey notes). 
Although some "traditional' docks firms continued to recognise a union (including 
Terryco' until it was sold in June 1990), at least six others were known to have 
derecognised the unions on abolition (ETGRE survey: Q 35 and cargo handlers 
interview data).
In 2000/1, of the 31 firms responding to the ETGRE survey, only 11 (including re- 
recognition at Tilbury under ERA - see 6:3 below) had recognised a union. Of these,
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six had recognised the T&G, and five the AEEU 1 . Only three had been 'traditional' 
docks employers; the others had been non-Scheme employers (see Chapter One). Eight 
terminals, mostly aggregate wharves owned by large companies such as Blue Circle, had 
continued to recognise a union during the 1990s (ETGRE survey: Q 32). This 
confirmed Blyton and Turnbull's (1998: 254) observation that larger companies were 
more likely to recognise a union and to have formal discipline and dismissal procedures. 
Of those stipulating, two ETGRE respondents mentioned that recognition was for 
discipline and grievance procedures only; and Granite Wharf (owned by Tarmac) had 
continued to follow union guidelines on pay (ETGRE survey, Q31). Liverpool (which 
was said to have maintained a good relationship with the T&G until the 1995-8 strike - 
see Pilger, 1998: 342) and non-Scheme Felixstowe had also continued to recognise the 
T&G. Collective bargaining at Felixstowe was maintained and management positively 
encouraged new entrants to join the union. Union membership at Felixstowe in 2002 was 
estimated at between 95 and 97 percent (Port of Felixstowe Labour Manager/Port 
Convenor, joint interview notes, 19/3/02).
Three employers had disingenuously stated at interview that they would not stop their 
employees joining a union (interview notes, various). However, all three firms (the 
barge division of 'Labourco', 'Paperco' and Tortco') had derecognised the unions on 
abolition, thus denying the men representation. Although some port employers 
positively encouraged trade union membership following abolition, others did not (see 
Southwood, 1992: 36 and 43-46). Southwood (1992: ix) estimated that, nationally, at 
least 1032 dockers were denied the right to collective bargaining. Tilbury management, 
for example, had seen derecognition as (PLA Minute Book, 
28th September 1989), and had notified the T&G by letter that it would be derecognised
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from January 1990, and individual contracts of employment, which precluded collective 
bargaining, were introduced. However, the T&G was permitted to continue to represent 
its members at disciplinary and grievance hearings until 1993; the MEBO, however, 
completely derecognised the union (ex-National Docks Officer, interview notes, 
18/6/00).
The relationship between 'Containerco' and the AEEU was unclear. The firm had 
concluded a single-table deal with limited recognition of the AEEU in 1993 (1/10, 
21/2/1993 and 21/3/1993). However, although the survey respondent reported that 
'Containerco' recognised the AEEU, the HR Manager, at interview, stated: 
[the AEEU]". Referring to it as a 'partnership', 
she later said of the relationship: 
and later, that it had been 
(interview notes, 15/6/01). What partnership there may have been appeared to have 
been with 'Containerco' employees via the works council rather than with the union. 
The 'Containerco' HR Manager was unsympathetic to the T&G and the firm delayed 
recognition under ERA.
HRM and Individualisation
The 1989 Dock Act had ended port employers' commitment to both dockers and the 
union and enabled them to dismantle the union culture and replace it with one that 
would increase efficiency and cut costs (see, for example, Brown, 1998: i). 
Conservative legislation and abolition had facilitated a change from multi-employer 
collective bargaining to company-specific industrial relations systems. Blyton and 
Turnbull (1998: 267-8) wrote that, during the 1990s, employers' tactics included union
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suppression (or anti-union) and substitution (non-union). Substitution included the 
introduction of US popular management concepts, especially HRM strategies such as 
consultative committees, team working and group and/or incentive pay rises. However, 
HRM appeared to be little more than the re-packaging of old practices that had been in 
use since the 1950s and beyond. Although many employers in the Port of London had 
introduced HRM strategies, including personal contracts2 or those parts of HRM they 
believed would achieve high performance outcomes (Roche, 2002: 266), it was the 
phraseology, rather than the reality that was introduced by many others.
Employers needed to transfer their employees' loyalty from the Scheme/union to the 
firm. They wanted them to identify any benefits as emanating from the employer and 
not as part of collectively bargained settlements (see Turnbull and Weston, 1993: 116 
and Evans and Hudson, 1994: 307). One way Port employers chose was to offer what 
they believed was a better deal than any achievable through collective bargaining 
(interview notes, various). Another was to individualise the employment relationship. 
The principle advantage was that this allowed flexibility in pay structures rather than the 
rigidity of collectively bargained awards (see Brown 1998: 40 and 44). For the 
employee, however, individualisation did not necessarily result in individual bargaining, 
as contracts tended to become increasingly standardised within firms (see 1998: i); at 
'Portco', for example, although individual contracts had resulted in variations in terms, 
conditions within a department were standardised (Branch field notes, 15/2/03).
Unions, then, were no longer the only channel for promoting employee interests. Others 
included works councils, consultative committees and newsletters: Forth Ports, for 
example, kept its employees informed by meetings, newsletters and notices (Forth Ports,
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1998: 4). In many firms these committees were increasingly established by, and 
dominated by, employers who saw them as giving legitimacy to unilateral changes (see 
Hyman 1997: 314). However, it could be difficult to get volunteers for such committees 
if they were not backed by an active trade union, and trade union members tended to be 
predominant on them (see Brown 1998: ii and 75). The Tortco' consultative 
committee demonstrated both these facets. Initially established by management for all 
the workforce members, only Branch members volunteered for the committee. They 
found that 
However, during a time when union organisation was fragile, 
Branch members did not want to be associated with those changes, so refused to attend. 
As no other volunteers came forward, the committee folded shortly afterwards (Branch 
Secretary, interview notes, 18/8/02). It was unclear whether this was because of a rare 
example of action co-ordinated by the Branch, or a pragmatic management decision.
HRM, personal contracts and employee representation on non-union consultative 
committees were hurdles that the Branch had to overcome during the 1990s. The 
following section looks at the Tilbury Branch during that period and discusses its 
response to derecognition and marginalisation. 
6:2- The Tilbury Branch 1989 to 1997
Although Tilbury Branch members worked at locations throughout the Port, the majority 
were employed by Forth Ports at the Port of Tilbury (see Appendix 6:1). The following, 
therefore, concentrates on the effects of Branch level derecognition as experienced by 
Branch members working at Tilbury. As it was impossible to find substantiating 
evidence, the following is based on Branch minute books, and the recorded memory of 
those who had remained Branch members.
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Abolition and derecognition had a demoralising effect on both the men and the Branch 
and had reduced the Branch members' collective strength. The mass redundancies had 
resulted in membership loss. As Andrew, a dismissed activist, recalled: "[a] 
(interview notes, 23/1/01). Estimating union 
density during the 1990s, however, was made difficult by a lack of hard data. There 
were no minuted membership figures between 1989-1998 as the Branch did not record 
joiners and leavers before 1999 (see 6:3 below). However, interview data indicated that 
the level of Branch membership outside Tilbury remained high; although not actively 
participating, many ex-RDWs working outside Tilbury and as contingent labourers did 
retain Branch membership. Even if, as Heery and Abbott (2000: 155) have observed, 
their employment insecurity fostered a need for trade union protection, part-time and 
temporary workers are, historically, less likely to be trade union members. However, 
unlike many other 'casual' industries, port transport has historically had good trade 
union organisation, dating back to 1889 and, for stevedores, beyond. Whether out of 
conviction, inertia or because of the services it provided, contingent labourers in London 
had remained Branch members. It was also difficult to ascertain the effects of the 
employers' Tire and hire' policy on membership at Tilbury and elsewhere during the 
1990s. Direct employment at Tilbury did fall from the PLA's 730 cargo handlers in 
August 1989 to Forth Ports' 450 port workers in 20003 , possibly resulting in a 
concomitant loss of membership (see below).
To add to the confusion, a Branch activist (a Tortco' shop steward after 2000) asserted 
that union density at Tilbury throughout the 1990s remained at approximately 70 percent 
(shop steward, interview notes, 22/2/01). If accurate (see below), this agrees with the
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finding of Brown (1998: 75) that, in general, "# of union 
members in derecognised and non-union workplaces retain union membership. 
However, as the shop steward's estimate was for Tilbury only, it gave no indication of 
union density at other workplaces in the Port.
There were, however, occasional references to events, such as alterations to 'check-off, 
that adversely affected Branch membership, which allowed estimations to be made. 
After the Donovan Committee (see Chapter Two) had urged that it be established, 
"check-off, or subscription deductions at source, had been widely adopted in the 1960s. 
The Conservative's anti-union stance had given many employers the impetus to 
withdraw from "check-off by the late 1980s, and the 1993 Trade Union Reform and 
Employment Rights Act had exacerbated that trend. Whilst not abolishing it, the 1993 
Act had made "check-off harder to administrate. It became the employer's 
responsibility to seek written permission from every employee every three years to 
continue automatic deductions; it was, however, the union that had to ensure that, where 
"check off was withdrawn, other forms of subscription payment were introduced (see 
November 1993). Since, by 1993, the T&G had been barred from 
Tilbury, it was unable to effectively do this. As a result of a decline in "check off 
authorisations after 1992 about 588 members were lost to the Branch: Approximately 
300 PLA-employed members were lost as a result of individual failure to reconfirm 
'check off and other payroll deductions (see 1/10, 21 st June 1992 and 19th October 
1992). A further loss occurred as a direct result of the 1993 Act.
An April 1994 minute recorded that, at 'Portco': ".. 
17th April 1994). This suggests that there may have
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been as many as 222 working Branch members at Tortco' alone at that time: extreme 
caution must be taken, however, as these figures may be unrelated. The Branch also lost 
140 members working at 'Containerco' because of the cessation of automatic 'check off 
(1/10, 15th May 1994). Together, these figures suggest that there were at least 362 
working Branch members at Tilbury alone after that time, thus supporting the 70 percent 
density figure reported above.
Because of continued job loss and "check off abolition, it appears that only the most 
committed unionists among working cargo handlers and the dismissed men remained 
Branch members. The important thing for these men was keeping the organising spirit 
alive - as Larry, a retired 
docker (interview notes, 13/6/01), put it. This, as discussed below, was the prime reason 
why many of these men continued to attend Branch meetings. 
Keeping the Organising Spirit Alive
In his doctoral research on modernisation and change in the Port of London, Mankelow 
(1994: 212) wrote that, following abolition and derecognition, 
This was supported by the industrial tribunal into the dismissal of 
the activists, which found that it had been planned 
(quoted in September 
1991: 2). The ex-National Docks Secretary (NDS) remembered that Port employers 
were extremely anti-union and that he had been threatened with prosecution if he entered 
Tilbury. This further isolation had left men at Tilbury especially afraid to be seen to be 
associated with the union in case it put their livelihood in jeopardy (ex-NDS, interview 
notes, 18/6/00). The Branch secretary also mentioned that, before 1997, Branch
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membership within Tilbury had been and added that 
in case it affected their livelihood (Branch field 
notes, 15/6/03). Given the above factors in Branch membership decline, it was possible 
that the Tilbury Branch would not survive.
However, against these odds, the Branch did survive. Danford (2002: 310) wrote of 
British Aerospace that, 
by, among other means, 
Ex-RDWs still working in the Port propagandised for the 
Branch to the new entrants they worked alongside, thus helping to keep the organising 
spirit alive at Tilbury (Branch, field notes, 20/5/01). As a result of the events 
surrounding abolition, men who had been Branch members because of the closed shop 
but had taken no part in its affairs started to attend Branch meetings and take part in 
them (George, interview notes, 25/7/01). It was, however, primarily because of the 
dismissed activists that the Branch kept going. George, a dismissed shop steward who 
remained Branch secretary until 1999, remembered that:
" [going to] 
(George, interview notes, 25/7/01)).
By keeping the Branch going, the dismissed activists provided a focal point for T&G 
members still employed in the Port and for dissatisfied new entrants. These men, who 
have knowledge of the industry and contacts within the wider trade union movement, 
allowed the T&G to not only retain a presence in the working Port but enabled the 
Branch to become a focus for future organisation within it.
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In spite of his assertion regarding union defeat, Mankelow found that many of the older 
men remained in the union (1994: 212). He also found that 
some new entrants joined the Branch in the early 1990s and that, as a result of dismissals 
at Tilbury (which continued throughout the 1990s - see Chapter Four), many new 
entrants wanted to be represented by the union (1994: 212-3). The figure of 362 Branch 
members at Tilbury supports this (see above).
Exactly how the Branch was able to recruit and keep new members during the 1990s 
however, remained a complex process for analysis. Interview data suggested that men 
might have joined the Branch because, as discussed in Chapter Four, they were related to 
ex-RDWs. As the FTO explained:
[their fathers] 
(interview notes, 12/00).
The Branch also appeared to have utilised a combination of "servicing' and "organising'. 
* Servicing' and ^Organising'
Mason and Bain (1993: 334-5) outlined two possible reasons why people might join a 
union - structural (or economic) and interventionist (union leadership and policies). 
However, as Mars (1982: 198) pointed out, trade union leadership had become distanced 
from, and less representative of, the rank-and-file membership by the late 1970s, and had 
become as much an "outsider' as management, whilst shop stewards had grown in 
importance. The motives for the individual decision to join a union, however, appeared 
to have remained constant. The structural reasons of being attracted to a union because 
they have a problem that needs solving gives way to interventionist reasons, especially if 
the local union is well-organised and can solve the problem can use it to recruit 
more members (see 1993: 341 and Charlwood, 2002: 469-470). This traditional
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approach was very similar to what Kelly (see, for example, 1998) was later to term 
'mobilisation theory' (see also McCarthy, 1967: 17).
Charlwood (2002: 487) found that four out of ten non-union employee respondents to 
the 1998 British Social Attitudes Survey would have been willing to join a union had 
one been available at their workplace. Trade unions, therefore, needed to tap into this 
latent membership. This was no easy task in areas, such as the Port of London, where 
the union had been derecognised.
'Servicing' and 'organising' are not mutually exclusive approaches and, depending on 
how it is used, any issue can be both (Carter, 2000: 131). Partly to counter HRM, the 
'servicing' approach could be described as passive as it champions individual workplace 
rights and is one-on-one, self-interest representation of trade union members by an 
outside union official (see Waddington and Whitston, 1997: 516 and Bacon and Storey, 
1996: 70). The 'serviced' union members' attitude becomes 'what can the union do for 
me?' (see Carter, 2000: 26 and Blyton and Turnbull, 1998: 137). Examples of 
'servicing' at the Branch included settlements for work-related illnesses and 
representation at industrial tribunals (see, for example, 1/10, 15th March 1993, and 15th 
May 1994).
Fox (1985:6) wrote of what he termed instrumental collectivism, or cohesion for as long 
as an individual's interests are served by being part of the collective. This type of 
individual self-interest possibly attracted some members to the Branch. For example, it 
is known that men were persuaded to join the union so they could be accompanied by a 
union 'friend' at the few grievance and disciplinary hearings there were at Tilbury in the
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early 1990s (Branch secretary, interview notes, 18/2/01). Similarly, conversations with 
current Branch members showed that redundancy or the threat of redundancy, dismissals 
and accidents were the catalysts for their decision to join the Branch (field and interview 
notes, various: see also Waddington and Whitston, 1997: 521-2).
Access to union benefits and services was another recruitment and retention tool. Most 
unions provide free services, such as legal aid and discounted insurance, to their 
members and, although some were committed union activists, this appeared to have been 
a reason why other ex-RDW Branch members, especially the contingent labourers, had 
retained Branch membership. As Branch members, should they have an accident at 
work, for example, the union would provide free legal advice (group meeting, field 
notes, 26/11/01).
Many unions (such as the MSF: see Carter 2000: 120) had initially adopted a 'servicing' 
model. However, they appeared to change tactics in response to evidence that 
traditional, collective interest reasons dominated peoples' decision to join a union (see 
Waddington and Whitson, 1997: 518). For example, although the T&G had listed 
as a recruitment tactic until 1998, this had become 
after 1999 (see TUC, 98/3 and 
99/4).
Although the dividing line is small, 'organising' represented a shift from the passive, 
"servicing' model to a more active, participatory model. "Organising' emphasises 
recruiting and mobilising members in a collective response to workplace problems and, 
rather than relying on an outside official, the Branch becomes the centre of campaigning
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(Blyton and Turnbull, 1998: 137, Carter, 2000: 121, and Fairbrother, 2002: 75). 
"Organising' also emphasises the recruitment of the previously unorganised - the low- 
paid, part-time and temporary workers, for example, and the T&G's "Link Up' 
recruitment campaign, inaugurated in 1987, was aimed at those groups. This was 
replaced by " Organising for Strength' after 1995.
Heery (2000, cited by Charlwood, 2002, 487) suggested that many unions endorsed 
"organising' but did not necessarily practice it. The T&G, however, did and its Region 
One (which included Tilbury) had the 'organising' strategy in the 
union (Blyton and Turnbull, 1998: 108). A Branch based, rank-and-file strategy, 
"organising' starts from the Branch level identification of an issue to campaign around 
(see June 2000: 7). This, however, could be seen as the 
traditional recruitment method. Colin, a dismissed shop steward who remained active in 
the Branch, remembered that the Branch had taken this approach to recruitment in the 
early 1990s. He remembered discussions at Branch:
"... 
(Colin, 
interview notes, 10/2/01).
Although, in line with T&G policy, the Branch appears to have utilised 'servicing' and 
benefit provision in order to attract members (see above), it also continued to utilise 
traditional recruitment methods. During a period when the T&G official was excluded 
(see above), Branch members mobilised fellow workers in order to solve problems, with 
the Branch as the centre of campaigning, especially for members working at Tilbury.
Branch activists working at Tilbury, many of whom were elected shop stewards or other 
union representatives after recognition in 2000 (see below) believed that 'organising'
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created membership and saw the utilisation of common workplace issues to organise 
around as In their experience, membership recruited by that type of 
campaign tended to remain (Branch field notes, 15/6/03). The Branch tried to encourage 
the "silent' members to become involved in it and had organised committees and 
petitions on such issues as imposed wages and conditions and the reintroduction of 
casual labour (see, for example, 1/10, 21 st June 1992, 21 st October 1996, and 21 st June 
1998). Although unsuccessful in that they did not lead to changes, these had raised the 
Branch's profile and encouraged membership (shop steward, field notes, 18/8/02). 
Industrial Relations under Forth Ports 1995-7
The MEBO sold Tilbury to Forth Ports in 1995. This had represented a positive step in 
industrial relations at Tilbury, and the NDS was again allowed into the Port to represent 
members at disciplinary and grievance hearings (ex-NDS, interview notes, 18/6/00). 
Union health and safety representatives had been dismissed at Tilbury in 1989 and the 
MEBO had refused to allow the union to elect others January 1990: 1). Co- 
incidental with the sale to Forth Ports, the 1996 Health and Safety (Consultation with 
Employees) Regulations were enacted. These allowed for the appointment of 
representatives of employee safety in non-union settings and, although they obliged 
employers to consult with the workforce on health and safety issues, they were not as 
comprehensive as the 1977 Safety Representatives and Safety Committee Regulations 
had been. Workplace representatives were not allowed to carry out inspections, for 
example, or to request the establishment of a safety committee (see James and Walters, 
2002: 141-156). Forth Ports may have had a stricter health and safety policy and it is 
unclear whether it was this, or the 1996 Regulations, which resulted in a more robust 
health and safety regime being introduced at Tilbury. There were, for example, minute
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book references to the then Regional Officer representing men for not wearing a safety 
helmets, (1/10, 20th June 1996 and 15th December 1996).
The sale to Forth Ports stipulated that all working terms and conditions remained the 
same and the company appeared to believe this included union recognition. Although 
Forth Ports recognised the T&G in Scotland and there was collective bargaining there4, 
it refused to recognise the union at Tilbury. Although the then NDS remembered sending 
numerous letters to Forth Ports regarding re-recognition, every approach was rebuffed: 
(ex-NDS, interview notes, 6/00). There 
was no campaign for recognition at Tilbury and Forth Ports statement that its failure to 
grant recognition was because it had no indication that there was support for collective 
bargaining at Tilbury could be justified on those grounds (1/10, 20th June 1996). Given 
the density figures discussed above, however, the company was possibly delaying a 
decision. Certainly the Tortco' Marketing Director mentioned that Forth Ports had 
from granting recognition, 
(interview notes, 12/10/00: also see below).
The persistence of serious issues, such as health and safety, for the Branch to campaign 
around and the continued presence of individual activists throughout the Port helped the 
Branch to retain a high profile. Possibly because of this, or because of the earlier 
recognition requests, Forth Ports must have been conscious that the T&G would make a 
request for recognition as soon as ERA became law. Possibly in order to have control 
over any agreement (see below), both Forth Ports and Terryco' made (separate) 
approaches to the T&G for voluntary recognition agreements. The following section
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looks at the implications of ERA for the Branch and discusses its early consequences in
the Port of London.
6:3 - Industrial Relations after 1997
Trade Union Recognition
As many authors have observed, recognition is the main stimulus to union growth. 
Writing of the 1970s, a period when trade unions were encouraged by government, 
Mason and Bain (1993: 343) pointed out that maintaining membership without 
recognition was During the anti-union 1990s, both Blyton and 
Turnbull (1998: 273) and Finlay and McKinlay (2003: 52) were still able to write that 
union effectiveness was difficult without recognition. Management have historically 
seen recognition and the operation of formal procedures as a concession (see McCarthy, 
1967: 24). Bain (1970: 123 and 127) writing on the growth of white-collar unionism in 
the 1960s, pointed out that employers tended to recognise a union because it was useful 
(and representative), and not for ideological reasons. Bain (1970: 98 and 123) had 
pointed out that recognition depended on the employer's attitude and, as an 
unrecognised union was not involved in work organisation, it was unable to prove its 
worth to potential members.
Two other factors hampered union growth. Unions in derecognised workplaces were 
only allowed individual representation (and, as mentioned above, even that was 
impossible at Tilbury between 1993 and 1995) and, if terms and conditions were 
satisfactory, an employee had no incentive to join a union (see Blyton and Turnbull, 
1998: 273 and 252).
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Although Finlay and McKinlay (2003: 53) saw organisation as to 
recognition, union growth and recognition appear to be a vicious circle: membership 
growth prompts recognition, this, because it indicates management's tacit approval of 
the union, prompts others to join. This is especially true of white-collar workers and 
others that tend to identify with management (see Bain, 1970: 122). However, as Bain 
pointed out in 1970, union strength alone was insufficient to persuade employers to 
concede recognition: that needed government help. However, as Oxenbridge 
(2003: 316) pointed out, union dependence on the government had become 
of trade unionism at the end of the 20th century.
Although the changes in union and employment legislation introduced by the Labour 
government after 1997 were piecemeal, there was considerable legislative change. 
Reforms included, for example, the minimum wage (introduced in 1998), "family 
friendly' policies, a reduction in the qualification period for unfair dismissal, and trade 
union recognition rights (see Department of Trade and Industry 1997). Encapsulated in 
many of these changes were introduced under the 1999 Employment 
Relations Act.
Oxenbury (2003: 331) wrote that ERA was the culmination of a process of 
"managing' union recognition (and derecognition) that had began in the 1990s. 
Although it tended to restrict the unions' influence, ERA did represent a shift in the 
employers' attitudes towards greater union approval. However, as Gospel and Wood 
(2003:13) pointed out, post-ERA recognition agreements were signed "m 
and were initiated by the unions and not the employers. That both Forth Ports 
and Terryco' initiated voluntary recognition (see below) was, therefore, distinct.
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Smith and Morton (2001: 3) argued that ERA increased workers rights; 
rights, however, remained minimal. By retaining legislation on the closed 
shop, picketing, secondary action and balloting, ERA provided the employers with a 
formal code that favoured the existing 'balance of bargaining' (2001: 1 and 2). 
Recognition Under ERA
Trade union recognition, under Schedule 1, was the central provision of ERA. 
Recognition, at the time of writing, was only applicable to workplaces with 20 or more 
workers (2001: 5). ERA, therefore, excluded employees of small companies and agency 
workers. This, in the Port of London, meant that nearly half of the employers 
responding to the ETGRE survey fell outside ERA provisions (ETGRE survey, Q6).
ERA provided two ways to gain recognition: statutory and voluntary. Weaker unions 
may have needed the backing of statutory recognition, which could be awarded despite 
employer opposition (see 2001: 5). However, as Druker, Edmunds and White (2002: 3) 
wrote: "[the] 
prior to ERA. This appeared to have been Forth Ports', and possibly, 
Terryco's motivation.
Many participants in this research spoke of "the baggage of the past', that is, industrial 
relations during the Scheme years. ETGRE survey data showed that, of those 
responding, only 4 non-union firms of all sizes in the Port of London envisaged 
recognition requests (a further 8 firms - 4 employing more than 20 workers - did not - 
ETGRE survey, Q 35). When asked to elaborate on these responses, some employers 
stated that they were concerned that recognition under ERA would see a return to
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Scheme conditions. They, therefore, needed to contain the union and reacted very much 
to recognition under ERA as both Bain (1970: 131-2) and Mars (1980: 317) had found 
for earlier periods. Some employers introducing enhanced conditions. 'Labourco', for 
example, had mostly ex-RDW contingent labourers who had retained Branch 
membership on its books. The Managing Director stated that 
/Y" and that 
for a recognition 
request (interview notes, 23/5/01). Arguably, other employers contained the union by 
offering a voluntary agreement.
Seeking voluntary recognition allowed the employer to set the bargaining agenda and to 
have some control over the contents of the final agreements. These were likely to be 
more favourable than any later imposed by the Central Arbitration Committee, which 
awarded collective bargaining over pay, hours and holidays only (see Incomes Data 
Services 2001: 12 and 2000: 1-2). This may have been a 
consideration when both Forth Ports and Terryco' volunteered recognition.
There had only been two post-ERA recognition agreements signed in the Port of London 
by the end of 2002. These covered 440 employees in four departments within the Port 
of Tilbury (discussed in detail below) and 190 workers at Terryco' (TUC, 1/01: 8 and 
1/02: 14 and see footnote 10). Based on the reported 450 employees at Tilbury in 2000, 
recognition at Tilbury covered approximately 90 percent of Forth Ports' employees 
there; the level at Terryco', however, was unknown (ETGRE survey and TUC, 1/02: 
14). The FTO negotiated other voluntary agreements5 , and also expressed a willingness 
to apply for statutory recognition if necessary (Branch field notes, 21/7/02).
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ERA (Schedule 10) gave workers a statutory right to be accompanied by a union 
representative of their choice at discipline and grievance hearings at workplaces where 
the union had not been recognised. Although not the right to representation, this right 
could not be waived (Smith and Morton, 2001: 9). This allowed the FTO access to 
workplaces, such as Tontainerco' (where approximately one third of the workforce - 40 
- were Branch members - 1/10, 18th July 1999), or any of the other unrecognised 
terminals in the Port where Branch members were employed in order to represent them. 
Recognition in the Port of London 
The Port of Tilbury6
The publication of in 1998 had a positive impact on the Branch. 
Recognition itself was one of the main catalysts for Branch growth (see below). The 
Branch officials stated that the fact that ERA would legitimise union membership 
prompted many that had not been members to join the union (Branch field notes, 
15/6/03). These included many post-1989 entrants. Although they had supported the 
idea of recognition and welcomed the improved conditions it would bring, they did not 
want to join the union. They were, however, persuaded to join the Branch after it was 
pointed out that recognition was a prerequisite to the negotiations that could lead to 
change (Branch secretary, interview notes, 29/2/01).
Unlike the 1975 Employment Protection Act, which had also laid down recognition 
procedures, ERA did not promote recognition but, rather, supported it if a union could 
prove it had workplace support (see Wood, Moore and Ewing, 2003: 120 and 122). 
Unions expected to recruit first and then apply for recognition from a position of 
strength (2003: 137). Subsequently, many unions, including the T&G, initiated
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recruitment campaigns especially in areas, such as the port transport industry, where 
they had retained high membership levels.
ERA offered automatic recognition if a union could prove by ballot that it had over a 
fifty percent membership in any workplace. T&G Head Office had not been able to 
supply the Branch with membership figures until December 1998 (see 1/10, 20th 
December 1998). Moreover, these were aggregate figures for the Branch as a whole, 
and were not broken down by terminal or occupation, nor did they indicate the 
percentages of working/retired/dismissed members (see Appendix 7:1). The Branch, 
then, needed to ascertain whether it had the required membership at Tilbury (Branch 
field notes, various).
Forth Ports employees at Tilbury, therefore, started [recognition] 
(see August- 
September 1997 and 1/10, 19th October 1997). The campaign started in areas, such as 
Tortco', where union membership was already high. The T&G targeted specific areas 
for recognition, including the docks, and helped to distribute leaflets and had a 
recruitment bus outside the gates at both Tilbury and 'Ferryco' (see 1/10, 19th July 1998 
and 18th January 1998). As part of its "organising' strategy, the T&G held "organising' 
courses, which Tilbury Branch activists (including those later elected as Branch 
Secretary and 'Portco' shop stewards) attended. These had a positive effect on Branch 
membership and resulted in at least 120 new members and, possibly because of their 
success, the July 1998 minutes were able to record that 
(1/10, 17th July 1998).
Chapter Six 184
Forth Ports, however, appeared to believe it had been "forced' to accept recognition; 
certainly the 'Portco' Marketing Director had stated that Forth Ports had recognised the 
T&G (interview notes, 12th October 2000). Having 
started the negotiations voluntarily, therefore, it dragged them out for as long as 
possible. It appeared that Forth Ports only granted (voluntary) recognition because ERA 
was imminent - voluntary agreements had to be entered into by 6th June 2000: (see 
Oxenbridge, (2003: 316) - and before the Branch sought statutory recognition 
under ERA. There was, however, no imperative for an employer to concede recognition 
before that date. It was, therefore, a further eighteen months before Tilbury management 
accepted recognition in principle (July 1999), and the agreement was signed in March 
2000, becoming effective from the end of April 2000 (see 1/10, 18th July 1999 and 19th 
March 2000).
The recognition agreement was conditional on there being no negotiations on pay and 
conditions until 2001, when a three-year imposed settlement was due to expire. The 
recognition agreement also included procedures that the Branch had to follow. 
Arguably, this, too, can be seen as containment. Further, conversation with Branch 
members involved in the negotiations suggested that the agreement was the best that the 
T&G could achieve at the time. However, the Branch intended to address anomalies 
during subsequent negotiations.
Unlike past recognition agreements, recognition under ERA did not cover all that 
union's members at a workplace but was based on bargaining units (BU) as defined by 
the employer. Under Schedule 19:3 of ERA, a bargaining unit must have 
so can be based on a department 
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July 2000: 11-12). In what could also be seen as a bid to limit union 
influence, Forth Ports, insisted on four BUs, based on each recognised department7 , 
insisting that, rather than port-wide negotiations at Tilbury, each bargaining unit would 
negotiate separately (1/10, 17th March 2002). 
The recognition agreements were between the Port of Tilbury, whose management 
conducted day-to-day industrial relations, and the T&G at BU level; pay and conditions 
negotiations, however, were conducted at company level by Forth Ports. Slightly 
different in order to reflect the subtle difference in working conditions in each 
department, each agreement covered collective bargaining for wages bargaining, 
contracts of employment, hours of work, staff rules, and discipline and grievance 
procedures. There was also a separate health and safety statement (Branch secretary, 
interview notes, 18/2/02). Shop stewards were also elected for each BU/department8 , 
and became responsible for industrial relations within them.
A Port of Tilbury shop stewards committee was constituted and met to discuss port-wide 
issues. The committee, in 2002, had met only once - to discuss the 2001 wage 
negotiation. However, continuous informal contact between the stewards, and between 
stewards and management, had been established and maintained and there were 
bimonthly committee/Tilbury management meetings, which discussed work related and 
union issues (16/2/03). These, together with other shop steward activities, were reported 
to Branch meetings (Branch field notes, various).
Smith and Morton (2001: 13) wrote that recognition could see union membership 
increase, but that As the
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following shows, although Branch membership nearly doubled between the end of 1998 
and May 2001, it remained fragmented. After all, not all Branch members had been 
covered by recognition agreements. Branch members working at Tilbury, both in the 
recognised BUs and in other departments, and those working at Tontainerco', 
"Generalco', and for labour-supply agencies remained unrecognised.
If recognition by BU had been aimed at fragmenting union cohesiveness across Tilbury, 
it was not completely successful. Common problems, such as health and safety and 
terms and conditions (see below), were addressed collectively and collective 
consultative industrial action ballots, especially over health and safety issues, were held 
(1/10 Branch minute books, various).
However, conversations with Branch lay officials suggested that the collective response 
was limited as individual problems continued to be solved individually. Just as in the 
past (see McCarthy, 1967: 30), Branch members encountering a workplace problem 
would approach their shop steward, who reported it to the manager they believed would 
be able to solve it. The stewards were aware of management internal politics - how the 
various managers interacted and their individual spheres of influence - and were also 
aware which manager was "on side' for any given problem (Branch secretary, field 
notes, 16/2/03). If any problem proved insoluble at local level, the matter was referred 
to Forth Ports head office, and the FTO was also informed. The FTO's role, except 
during wages negotiations, was more advisory as, although he offered assistance, the 
stewards found that, in most circumstances, they were able to solve the problem without 
calling him in (Branch secretary, field notes, 16/2/03).
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Procedures on, for example, discipline and grievances had also been agreed between the 
Branch and Tilbury management. These had established channels for getting things 
done and if they were not done, or not done properly, the stewards were able to apply 
pressure, such as non-co-operation with management. As a result, the Branch Secretary 
was able to report that Tilbury management acted more responsibly towards its 
workforce; this in turn lead to growing employee confidence at Tilbury (field notes, 
18/8/02). The Branch secretary, who has been a Branch member since the mid-1990s, 
worked at various locations within Tilbury. He was, therefore, well placed to observe 
changes in attitudes among Branch members there. He reported that men no longer 
asked him if they could refuse to work in certain condition, but him they would not 
do so until the problem had been solved (Branch secretary, field notes, 16/2/03).
Co-incidentally with recognition under ERA, the Branch campaigned for union 
recognition for health and safety representatives and a Forth Ports health and safety 
committee was finally established at Tilbury in 1999 (1/10, 21 st September 1997 and. 
19th April 1999). As a result of continuing pressure from the Branch, a new sick leave 
package was introduced at Tilbury towards the end of 2001 (1/10, 18th November 2001). 
In July 2001 the loss of a workplace nurse prompted the Branch to threaten to take 
industrial action. The health and safety representatives resigned and, as a 
compromise, it was agreed that the remaining nurse would take on extra duties if 
necessary (1/10, 15th July 2001 and 21 st October 2001). The Branch has also sent 
resolutions to the National Docks Group committee, requesting that it take the necessary 
steps in order to have spondylitis recognised as an industrial disease.
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However, health and safety remained a live issue for Branch members. The Branch was
told, for example, that, although the men had been trained for safety, they were under
pressure to 'cut corners', and that supervisors were praised for encouraging the
continuation of unsafe working practices that got the work done more quickly (1/10,
various dates).
Trade Unionism Elsewhere in the Port
Terryco' had been the only other employer in the Port to sign a recognition agreement
by mid 2002, signing a single union deal with the T&G in 2000 (1/10, 15 th October
2000). In common with the experience of recognition at Tilbury described below,
however, Branch members at Terryco' found the employer obdurate, frustrating
negotiation attempts (Branch field notes, 7/02).
Although these recognition agreements covered the largest Port employers, a sizeable 
minority remained outside any agreements. Workers in other facilities experienced 
hostility with regard to recognition. Employers in the Port utilised many of the 
strategies discussed by Gall and McKay (2001) in order to resist union recognition 
requests. "Containerco', for example, insisted on a membership audit and a Branch 
member working at "Generalco' reported that the company had split its workforce into 
units below the ERA recognition threshold, and included employees unlikely to join a 
union in them (2001: 99 and Roy, interview notes, 12/02).
Although it seemed clear that, for the foreseeable future at least, many employers within 
the Port would continue to retain alternative forms of employee relations, there had been 
a growth in militancy among men working in other areas of the Port. Clegg (1979, 
quoted in Edwards, 1988: 205) had written that, for dockers, striking had become
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' In London, however, that "habit' appeared to have faded after 
1970 (there were only 16 recorded strikes there between 1970 and 1988, compared with 
Liverpool's 37 strikes between 1972 and 1988: see Turnbull and Sapsford, 1991: 246). 
However, the " habit' appeared to resurface in London after 1997. Men were prepared to 
take industrial action in support of their various disputes, as witnessed by the rise in the 
incidence of industrial action ballot requests9 . Most of these, such as the ballot by 55 
"Containerco' members over the imposition of a reduction in wages, were successful 10 . 
However, the results of other ballots were more ambiguous. The ballot sought by seven 
"Generalco' Branch members in 1998 over management's derecognition of the union 
and the imposition of less favourable terms was only minuted as 'resolved', for example 
(see DWR National Committee Minutes, October 1998: 2 and January 1999: 2).
Although any action by any contingent labourers in the Branch in support of fellow 
Branch members would have constituted secondary action, some were known to have 
taken "holidays' if asked to work at a firm in dispute. Some labour-supply agencies, 
who were sympathetic to the union, were known to refuse to act as strike breakers and, if 
informed of a dispute, would find that their men were 'busy' elsewhere (Branch field 
notes, February 18/2/02). 
2001-2 Pay Negotiations at Tilbury
The Branch Secretary had been able to report that recognition had had a positive 
outcome on industrial relations and that, because of the procedures mentioned above, 
day-to-day problems within Tilbury had improved. However, the same cannot be said 
for company-level terms and conditions negotiations. Based on Branch minutes and 
Branch meeting observation during 2002, the following gives an account of the 2001-2 
pay negotiations. These suggested that the recognition agreement had not at that time
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translated into effective bargaining at company level (see Wood and Goddard, 1999: 
203).
The negotiation illustrated the observation that, within certain constraints, 
(Brown, 1998: iii). The 2001/2 pay negotiations are also a good illustration of 
Forth Ports attempts to marginalise the Branch by ignoring it and its lay officials, and 
then insisting that it abided by agreed procedures.
An imposed three year pay and conditions award had expired at the end of 2001. There 
had been no collective negotiations at Tilbury since derecognition in 1989 and, although 
the Branch knew they could not all be solved immediately, there were many problems, 
especially regarding health and safety, to be discussed. Instead of entering into 
negotiations with the shop stewards, in December 2001 Forth Ports sent a letter to every 
Tilbury employee detailing an imposed pay and conditions award of 3.5 percent over 
three years, due to be implemented from 1 st January 2002.
The company did not 'bargain in good faith' (Gall and McKay, 2001: 106) or, to be 
more accurate, bargain at all. A ballot held in January 2002 overwhelmingly rejected the 
'offer' - of those balloted, only one member voted to accept. This was followed by a 
'work to rule' and a weekend overtime 'ban' (in that nobody volunteered for it). 
Although these were effective, Forth Ports refused to negotiate in accordance with the 
recognition agreement. Forth Ports management appeared to believe it could settle the 
dispute by talking to senior T&G officers and, consequently, would only enter 'informal 
discussions' with them; they, however, refused to meet with them without the FTO and
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the shop stewards being present. A meeting between the FTO and Forth Ports, which 
only one Branch lay official was allowed to attend, was finally arranged for May 2002. 
As management had made it clear it was either this or no meeting, the Branch reluctantly 
accepted.
There was growing workplace frustration at Forth Ports' intransigence and at the slow 
progress of the "negotiations'. There were also repeated calls for industrial action 
ballots, which were supported by Region (but could not take place because, according to 
the agreement, industrial action was the final stage in a procedure that had not then 
started). The FTO told the March 2002 Branch meeting that he saw the 'offer' as a 
proposal only, that he was dissatisfied with Forth Ports attitude and the way it was 
conducting the "negotiations'. He added that management would be 
to the negotiation table, by industrial action if necessary.
The FTO's attitude was difficult to decipher. He wanted to get the best deal he could for 
his members and, given that recognition at Tilbury had been so recent, he saw this as an 
opportunity for the Branch to 'prove' itself by standing up to management on behalf of 
its members and winning. On the other hand, in the face of the mounting frustration 
expressed by Branch members, he urged Forth Ports' members not to stage unofficial 
action, on the grounds that this could be construed as a breach of contract, but to follow 
the legal procedures. The FTO was conscious that, because of the BUs and because 
wages for post-1995 entrants at Tilbury had risen (see Chapter Five), that the Branch 
was fragmented within Tilbury, and he appeared to have been persuaded that the 
members in dispute would not, at that stage, have unequivocal support. He continually 
advised against industrial action ballots, pointing out that, although it had not been
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awarded an improved pay offer, the Branch was making progress, especially in matters 
of principle.
Forth Ports asserted that, as negotiations had not yet began, they could not be said to 
have irretrievably broken down. Possibly in order to destabilise the Branch and coerce 
its members into accepting the offer, attempts were made to intimidate union activists - 
one shop steward was warned that his future employment prospects were in doubt, for 
example, and another was charged with spurious disciplinary offences. Forth Ports were 
told at the May 2002 meeting that its attitude was not in accordance with the recognition 
agreement and that, as negotiations had now begun, the officials had been mandated to 
hold an industrial action ballot, and would do so. Possibly as a result of this, Forth Ports 
agreed to enter into meaningful negotiations for a single-table deal on a departmental 
basis.
Departmental claims were to be submitted by the end of May 2002. Although varying 
in detail, certain elements of the claims, such as the wages demand, had been agreed 
collectively. However, because of scheduling difficulties on the part of both the FTO 
(who had other Trade Groups to oversee) and Forth Ports' management negotiations did 
not take place until August 2002.
Despite its insistence that there would be no port-wide negotiations, as the departmental 
claims were basically the same, the company did, in fact, negotiate them together, and it 
will be interesting to observe if the Branch is able to use this as a precedent in future 
negotiations. The company's final offer was balloted and, because changes in start and 
finish times peculiar to that department were agreed, it was accepted by Intermodal (see
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footnote 9). Because of its forthcoming sale, the Tilbury Freight Station was not 
balloted; the FTO had negotiated a separate pay increase for the members working there: 
this was to form the basis of TUPE arrangements on final take over. However, the two 
departments with the largest Branch membership - Tortco' and the Finnish Terminal - 
rejected the offer.
The FTO was still reluctant to implement an industrial action ballot, especially as some 
Branch members had voted to accept, thus weakening support for those still in dispute. 
However, he was also aware that action in support of the claim had to be taken, 
otherwise the Branch - and the T&G - would be seen to have failed; recognition would 
be in name only and the employer could ignore the union. A ballot for industrial action 
at 'Portco' and the Finnish Terminal was finally held just before Christmas 2002. This 
had overwhelming support and industrial action by those members was due to 
commence on 3rd January 2003. However, Forth Ports asked for a meeting with the 
shop stewards and the FTO just after Christmas and, after very hard bargaining, offered 
8.5 percent over three years. This was over double the original imposed amount and was 
accepted at mass meetings. The industrial action was called off on 31 st December 2002.
The Branch, then, by its persistence (and the threat of industrial action at the busiest time 
in the Port year) was able to establish the principle that it could enter claims and 
negotiate them on behalf of its members. One positive outcome of the protracted 
negotiations was the high profile given to the Branch and the number of Branch 
membership applications rose as a result. Approximately 30 new members joined the 
Branch during 2002 (1/10 minutes: Correspondence, 2002). Although it was difficult to 
determine individual reasons for joining the Branch, the negotiations did appear to be the
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main catalyst. Not wanting to accept a low pay award, employees had asked to be 
allowed to vote to reject it. As with post-1989 entrants (see above), these men were also 
told that, if they were not Branch members, they were not entitled to vote and would 
have to accept the 'offer'.
Another positive outcome was the formation of a Forth Ports-wide consultation forum. 
However, although announced as a concession, this was in line with forthcoming Works 
Council legislation (see Chapter Two). 
Conclusion
This Chapter has tried to add to the debate on union marginalisation by examining what 
happened inside the Tilbury Branch during the 1990s. It looked at how, although called 
by new names, employers used old tactics in order to marginalise the Branch and at 
Branch renewal which was achieved by utilising traditional methods to rebuild both 
Branch confidence and membership. This may have been a factor behind two employers 
offering voluntary recognition under ERA.
Branch members felt abandoned by the T&G after abolition and, because national 
collective bargaining had ceased, negotiated terms had been replaced by imposed terms 
and conditions at individual workplaces, further exacerbating members' feelings of 
isolation. Port employers introduced new management techniques, such as 
individualisation, which challenged the unions' legitimacy as the only 'voice' of 
communications between management and employees; this further exacerbated union 
marginalisation.
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In London, derecognition of the T&G on abolition, redundancies and job loss at Tilbury 
and elsewhere throughout the 1990s, together with management hostility, saw further 
T&G marginalisation within the Port. However, the committed unionists among the 
dismissed men and many of those continuing to work in the Port did retain Branch 
membership. It was these men, especially the dismissed activists, who, because of their 
strong trade union consciousness, were prepared to keep the idea of unionism alive in 
the Port, and so keep the Tilbury Branch going. They ran it throughout the 1990s, thus 
allowing the Branch to provide a focal point for T&G members in the Port, and a 'safe' 
place for new entrants to talk about their problems.
Branch organisation was fragile before 1995 and, as discussed in Chapter Five, any 
sanctions that the men applied were as individuals and were not co-ordinated by the 
Branch: the exception may have been the failure of the Tilbury Consultative Committee. 
Although it was known that Branch membership remained high among dismissed 
activists and retired members, it was unknown what proportion were working members 
during the 1990s, and how many were dismissed or retired. A further problem, 
especially germane for further Branch organisation, was the redistribution of the 
workforce, as men continued to join, leave, and re-join the ports industry in London. 
This was a reason why it was impossible to be certain what attracted membership to the 
Branch before 1998. However, Branch membership, especially as Tilbury, did grow and 
interview data suggested that the Branch, especially within Tilbury, utilised a form of 
'servicing'/'organising' hybrid. On the one hand, the Branch represented individuals at 
disciplinary and grievance proceedings and, on the other, followed the traditional 
approach of mobilising around issues of importance to port workers. Although health 
and safety issues, which remained an intractable problem for the Branch, continued to
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attract members after 1998, the main catalyst for Branch growth after 1997 was the 
prospect of recognition, which attracted at least 200 new Branch members.
On the publication of ERA, and possibly conscious that the Branch would seek 
recognition under it, and as a means of containing the union and controlling the 
bargaining agenda, both Forth Ports and Terryco' entered into voluntary recognition 
agreements with the T&G. Recognition, however, was limited in scope. There were 
employer-imposed BUs, which the T&G accepted, and not every department within 
Tilbury was recognised. Although union density at Tilbury was about seventy percent, 
the support of non-union members during industrial action could not be guaranteed. 
Although relationships between local managers and the shop stewards at Tilbury became 
friendlier following recognition, this is not the case with Forth Ports. Bargaining at both 
Tilbury and Terryco' were initially "empty' and the reality of recognition was a 
disappointment to the Branch. The 'negotiations' over the 2001 pay award took nearly a 
year to settle but the intransigence exhibited by both Forth Ports and Terryco' in 
negotiating new agreements only acted as a stimulant to interest in the Branch and new 
members continued to join it.
Recognition outside Tilbury and Terryco', however, was patchy; neither was it clear to 
what extent the Branch membership was "paper', or how many members could be relied 
on to back any policy that the Branch decided on. Both individualisation and the steps 
taken by some Port employers in order to delay or limit recognition under ERA were 
problems that the T&G still had to overcome. However, despite these and other 
employer efforts since 1989, the union in the Port of London had not been defeated and 
has shown that it is prepared to take action to defend its members' rights.
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1 Other unions recognised were the GMPU, recognised by the Northfleet Terminal, 
which handled paper and pulp, and the GMB, recognised by a cement terminal. Some 
terminals, such as Tilbury, recognised more than one union.
Other HRM practices introduced in the Port included group/collective pay incentives 
(by seven employers) and individual performance assessments (by two employers only; 
however, other employers reported that they were considering this (ETGRE survey, Q 
26).
3 Employment at Tilbury during the 1990s was uncertain. For example, there were
  730 ex-RDWs working at Tilbury, either for the PLA or tenants, after abolition.
  Approximately 300 PLA/Forth Ports jobs were lost between 1990 and 2000 because 
of redundancies, and
  The ETGRE survey data showed that Forth Ports employed 450 men at Tilbury in
2000. 
This suggests that the union density figure of 70% cited for Tilbury was correct.
Although there was no data to indicate the reason for this, it was possible that, because 
it was a small workforce that was widely dispersed, Forth Ports' employees in Scotland 
had little collective strength. But equally, as Forth Ports head office was in Edinburgh, it 
was possibly easier for the men, who were primarily organised by the T&G, the RMT 
and the AEEU, to apply pressure there, thus indicating a position of strength. Branch 
meeting discussions during 2002 indicated that Forth Ports do enter into negotiations in 
Scotland
5 The FTO was in the process of negotiating voluntary agreements covering further 
departments within Tilbury and anticipated that these would be signed by Spring - 
Summer 2003.
6 Recognition at Tilbury covered Forth Ports, owners of the Port of Tilbury only. It did 
not cover Forth Ports tenants, such as "Containerco', the majority of which did not 
recognise the T&G. Any discussion of recognition at Tilbury, therefore, is only 
applicable to Forth Ports.
7 The departments recognised by Forth Ports in 2000 were: Tortco', Intermodal, the 
Finnish Terminal, and Tilbury Freight Station (TFS), which was sold at the end of 2002. 
Based on the number of industrial action ballot papers distributed in December 2002, 
membership was 139, 29, and 45 respectively (TFS membership in January 2002 had 
been 9: however, because of the sale, it did not take part in the ballot). Both cargo 
handlers and clerical workers are included in the bargaining units, which were based on 
the departments.
This more than anything demonstrates the problems encountered when trying to 
ascertain Branch membership both before and after 1997. The above figures are a lot 
lower than the 440 reported by the TUC (see p. 181 above), which probably included all 
Branch members working within Tilbury, and not just those covered by the agreements. 
There was some employment loss, and therefore Branch attrition, not only at Tilbury but 
at other terminals in the Port after 2000, and, therefore, there can be no direct 
comparisons with the Branch membership figures at different terminals reported since 
1997. The known Branch membership figure of:
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  440 at Tilbury
  190atTerryco'
  40 at 'Containerco'
  at least 7 at "Generalco'
  and an unknown number among the contingent labourers
are more than the 600 working cargo handlers reported by the Branch secretary in 2000
(see Appendix 6:1).
There were six shop stewards at Tilbury in 2002: two per shift at Tortco' and one shop 
steward each at Intermodal and the Finnish Terminal. There were also six shop stewards 
at Terryco'. Shop stewards and Health and Safety representatives have attended T&G 
training courses for that position.
9 Ballot requests were not recorded in DWR National Committee minutes before 1997. 
It was, therefore, unclear if the increase in ballot requests was an indication of increased 
militancy on behalf of Branch members or simply a reflection of the changes in National 
Committee minute keeping. One might surmise, however, and given the publication of 
that this did represent a reaction to the increased levels of frustration 
felt by Branch members throughout the Port.
10 The "Containerco' ballot appeared to have prompted the company to offer a 3.7 
percent pay rise (see 1/10, 21 st April 1997 and 1 st January 1998 and DWR National 
Committee Minutes, October 1997).
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Appendix 6: 1 - The Branch and its Members
There were four T&G Branches within the Port of London area - for pilotage, 
lighterage, the Port of London Authority, and the port workers Branch based at Tilbury. 
This, the T&G 1/10 "Ben Tillett' Branch, was itself an amalgamation of four pre- 
abolition Tilbury Branches. Because of job and membership loss following abolition, 
however, these had become unsustainable and were amalgamated to form the current 
Branch in 1990 (Branch Chairman, telephone conversation, 11/01).
Possibly because of the small Docks Group membership (see Chapter Two), and because 
of the continued closure of T&G local offices, the composition of Branch membership 
was confusing. A Geographical Branch, it included all T&G members in docks-related 
occupations (including clerical staff) working anywhere in the Port of London, 
regardless of where they lived. However, Branch membership also included T&G 
member living or working in the area covered by the Port, regardless of their occupation, 
if they had applied for membership from within it (Branch Secretary, interview notes, 
29/2/01). Despite this, the majority of the Branch's membership worked in the ports 
industry and, overwhelmingly, for Forth Ports at the Port of Tilbury, the largest 
employer in the Port (Branch field notes, 18/11/01).
Branch membership in 2001 had been estimated to be 1400. About half were working 
members - about 100 of whom were described as clerical workers and 600 as dockers. 
These included both post-abolition recruits and ex-RDWs still working in the Port for 
both direct employers and for labour-supply agencies in the area. The Branch also has a 
large number of retired members (about 700), some of whom still took an interest in the 
Branch, and dismissed activist members (Branch Secretary, field notes, 20/5/01). As
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many of these men were under 65 years old, they were too young to transfer to the 
T&G's Retired Members Association.
Branch meetings were held at a Tilbury Dockers Club on the third Sunday of every 
month and, although fluctuating, the average attendance was 15 members. The majority 
of attendees, including the Branch Chairman, were dismissed or retired dockers; the 
remainder were working members employed at various departments within the Port of 
Tilbury. Every three to four months, a representative from "Generalco' and/or a shop 
steward from Terryco' attended meetings, reporting any matters causing concern at their 
workplaces to the Branch. Union subscriptions were taken before the meetings began. 
Although Forth Ports, on re-recognition, had offered to re-introduce 'check off, the 
shop stewards committee had declined. Although the T&G had introduced Direct Debit 
for subscriptions, most members preferred to pay in cash, either at the Branch meeting or 
leaving the money in a safe place or with a person they trusted for the shop stewards to 
collect.
The main items of business at Branch meetings concerned events within Tilbury or 
issues, such as labour and pension legislation or the re-development of Shell Haven as a 
container port, which concerned the Branch.
The Branch was part of T&G Region One - Southeast and East Anglia - and was part of 
the DWF. Once the backbone of the T&G, the DWF had become one of the smallest 
Groups in the union (see Chapter Two). It became part of the T&G's Transport sector 
following T&G reorganisation in 1999. The sector also included Passenger Transport, 
Civil Aviation and Road Transport Commercial, one of the largest T&G sectors.
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The T&G office at Tilbury was closed in 1994 and there is no longer a dedicated docks 
officer below National Organiser level. However, other T&G officers, such as the Trade 
Group National Secretary and the local FTO included the DWF in their remit. Both the 
FTO (a Tilbury Branch member) and the Regional Chairman (a dismissed Tilbury 
docker and a Branch member) also had ports backgrounds.
There was a Branch committee, which was comprised of two working members - a 
Tilbury shop steward and the 'Generalco' representative - and two dismissed activists; 
the Branch Chairman and Secretary were also co-opted committee members. The Branch 
also had members on committees at various levels. These included Regional and 
Regional DWF Committees, and National DWF and National Transport Sector 
Committees, all of which the Branch secretary sat on. This, however, was not significant 
as all Branches within a Region were represented on Regional committees (and all major 
ports were represented on the DWF National Committee). Interaction between these 
levels appeared to be minimal and these committees appeared to be advisory only. For 
example, the Branch would solve a disciplinary problem itself, only apprising the 
Regional Committee of its occurrence; any problem that might have national 
repercussions, such as the Shell Haven redevelopment, were reported to both the 
Regional and National Committees. However, and possibly because of the restrictions 
on secondary action, no instructions were passed down from these committees. Having 
said this, the Branch appeared to be on good relations with the various committees, and 
the Branch had sent a delegate to the T&G Biannual Delegate Conference, which 
decided T&G policy, in July 2003.
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Employment and the Branch
Because of the pre-entry closed shop, union membership figures and employment 
figures in London prior to abolition had been the same. However, ports industry 
employment statistics, collected by the National Dock Labour Board before 1989 (see 
Chapter Two), became the private property of individual employers after abolition. 
Although the ETGRE survey had given a snapshot of employment statistics in the Port 
in 2000/1, it was, extremely difficult to ascertain employment figures, and therefore 
union density, between 1989 and that date. This was compounded by changes in 
ownership in the Port - the Port of Tilbury changed ownership three times between 1989 
and 1996, for example (see Chapter Two). There was also the emergence of labour-only 
suppliers and other agencies supplying contingent labourers to various terminals within 
the Port.
There was also a plethora of places were Branch members could have worked, some of 
which recognised a union, others that did not. There were at least 31 firms - 24 direct 
employers and 7 labour-supply agencies - in the lower Port alone in 2000, all of which 
might (or might not) have employed or hired Branch members (see ETGRE survey 
results).
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Appendix 6:2 - Tilbury Branch Membership Growth 1989 to 2001, showing 
joiners, leavers estimated totals, and contextual events
Date
August 1989 
October 1992 
April 1994 
January 1998
Joiners Leavers* Estimated 
Totals
*** 999 A
*** 699AA
*** 482
AAAADecember 1998
1999
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
2000
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
2001
January
February
March
***
3
2
1
11
26
4
16
17
16
3
4
35
21
8
5
5
8
6
2
***
4
2
Not Minuted
3
2
Not Minuted
3
Not Minuted
2
2
2
2
Not Minuted
3
2
1
Not Minuted
2
Not Minuted
Not Minuted
Not Minuted
3
2
6
2
2
Nil
790'
789
789
787
796
819
821
835
850
864
864
900
919
924
927
926
932
936
938
Contextual Events
Recognition 
recruitment Campaign
Tilbury Health and 
safety Committee 
formed
Recognition accepted 
in principle
New Tilbury grading 
system introduced 
Further recognition 
discussions at Tilbury
Recognition agreement 
signed at Tilbury
Problems with Risk 
assessments at Tilbury
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Date
April 
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
Joiners
2
10
Leavers
nil
2
Estimated
Totals
940
(1400)
Contextual Events
Tilbury redundancies 
announced 
13 5 1413 Loss of Workplace
Nurse at Tilbury 
6 Nil 1419
Not Minuted 
1 Nil 
Minute Book Closed 
Minute Book Closed 
Minute Book Closed 
* Reasons for leaving the Branch include retirement and changes in occupation 
A RDWs still working after abolition. 
Possible Branch membership after failures to confirm "check off.'
Estimated Tilbury only. 
AAA Agrancj1 membership total from T&G. 
(1400) Branch Secretary's membership records.
AA
AA AT
Source: Branch 1/10 Minute Books 1994 to 2001 and interview notes.
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion: From 'Docker' to "Terminal Operator': 
Working in the Port of London 1989 to 2002
The term 'from docker to terminal operator' has two meanings. The first describes the 
impact technical innovation had on the ports industry, changing the manual Mocker' to a 
* terminal operator', who drives sophisticated plant. The second meaning donates the 
changes in work organisation and employment structure implemented by employers 
following the abolition of the Scheme in 1989.
This investigation set out to answer questions raised by both meanings of the above 
term. Taking the Port of London as a case study, it looked at how technical innovation 
impacted on dock work, and at how employers were able to use abolition (itself partly a 
consequence of technical innovation) to effect change in the relationship with their 
workforce. Combining the two meanings, the investigation examined whether abolition 
had exacerbated the transfer of control over the labour process, started by technical 
innovation, and what form any resistance might have taken. Finally, taking the T&G 
1/10 Branch as a case study, the investigation looked at industrial relations at Branch 
level in a derecognised setting, and at the early impact recognition under ERA had on 
industrial relations in the Port.
Taking the main sections of investigation in turn, this Chapter tries to draw together the
research findings and, based on those findings, to offer some conclusions on the
employment relationship in the Port of London.
7:1 - Workforce Segmentation
Abolition and subsequent trade union derecognition in London were assumed to have
had a profound effect on work organisation and employment. This raised questions
about the changes in the employment relationship and about what changes had been
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introduced to terms and conditions, and concerning the job content and skills levels, 
especially between the various types of labour.
Port employers needed to adapt to demand fluctuation and uncertainty. Backed by 
Conservative legislation, and in the context of high unemployment in the late 1980s- 
early 1990s, they introduced measures that improved both efficiency and productivity. 
However, this investigation discovered that working conditions in the Port of London 
had deteriorated as a result. Wages fell following abolition and, for ex-RDWs working 
for Forth Ports at Tilbury especially, had not returned to their 1989 levels by 2002. 
Work had also become both extended (through the introduction of longer hours and shift 
work at some sites, and/or compulsory overtime at others), and intensified (by 
contractual functional flexibility and the reduction in down time). Although permanent 
employees in the Port had better job security and higher average earnings, they were 
exploited in the form of shift work and overtime. Shift work was introduced in many 
terminals following abolition, and overtime appears to have become ubiquitous, 
especially at Tortco', where overtime was a daily occurrence and was compulsory. 
Because of the low basic wages, overtime has become a necessity for many workers in 
the Port.
The literature on the segmented workforce (see, for example, Pollert, 1988), reinforced 
by Saundry and Turnbull (1996) and Barton and Turnbull's (2002) description of port 
work, had raised expectations that a 'core'/"peripheral' working relationship would be 
found in the Port. The expectation was that containers would be handled by a 'core' of 
permanent employees, leaving the more labour-intensive conventional cargoes to be 
handled by a 'periphery' of low-skilled, contingent labourers. However, research into
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contractual obligations within the Port of London found that, although a segmented 
workforce had emerged following abolition, it did not conform to this model.
Although hired for the same reasons as 'peripheral' workers - to reduce costs and limit 
legal and other obligations - far from supplementing the workforce, contingent labourers 
in the Port of London were essential to the smooth running of some terminals. 
Contingent labourers had gradually replaced full-time employees at 'Containerco', for 
example, and contingent labourers outnumber full-time employees at 'Generalco'.
Although Tortco' utilised temporary workers for low skilled tasks for some jobs; there 
was no difference in skills or job content in the generality. Abolition had released a 
large number of highly trained, highly skilled ex-RDWs onto the temporary labour 
market who, because they had been trained under the Scheme in line with the 
introduction of new technology, were as skilled as the full-time employees they worked 
alongside. However, as these men are approaching retirement age, this will not continue 
far into the future. Training is urgently required for temporary cargo handlers and a 
national minimum training standard should be introduced for all cargo handlers. The 
'passport' as it stands is inadequate and should be extended beyond induction training 
and should cover not only labour-supply agency workers but also other temporary 
labourers who work regularly in the industry.
The transfer of employment risk was one of the major consequences of abolition. As 
Fevre (1986: 18 and 25) had found with subcontracting in the steel industry, work was 
performed by the same people working under different terms and conditions. This is a 
perfect description of the labour-supply temporary labourers participating in this
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research, all of whom had seen their terms and conditions change from full-time, secure 
employment under the Scheme to insecure, temporary work following abolition. 
Although the employers insisted that ' casual labour' had not returned to the ports, that 
men were hired and paid by the hour appeared to contradict this. In many ways, the 
ports industry had returned to pre-1967 conditions, with temporary labour again the 
'norm' for the industry. As in the past, this has economic and social consequences not 
only for the men and their families but for the wider community. As in the Interwar 
period, although the men formed a 'pool' which the employer could hire from at need, it 
was the government, and not the employer, that met the cost of under-employment.
Contingent labourers worked long hours (12 hour shifts for six days at a time were not 
uncommon). However, because of the nature of Mock work', work was not guaranteed. 
The men could work a few hours one week then get a job that could last for two or three 
weeks. This had meant that many had found it not worthwhile to claim unemployment 
benefit: it did appear, however, that most earned sufficient to last them for short periods 
of unemployment. As their age meant that they were unlikely to be offered work 
elsewhere and although the iniquities of 'call-on' have not returned, these men were 
again waiting to be hired in the only industry open to them. Ensuring employ ability had 
also been transferred to the men. The onus for acquiring new skills and for 
recertiflcation was on them; however, as the men working for 'Labourco' demonstrated, 
if a benefit to the business can be demonstrated, this risk can be transferred back to the 
employer.
It was difficult to quantify how many contingent labourers were available to work in the 
Port. ETGRE survey results showed that there were 465 men working for labour-supply
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agencies in 2000/1: this, however, was based on a very low response rate. A major 
finding of this research is the discovery that there was a difference between different 
types of contingent labourers, depending on the source. Four categories were identified. 
These were:
predominantly ex-RDWs made redundant in 1989 
or during the 1990s, who were highly trained and had a profound knowledge of 
Mock work'.
As above. These men, however, worked for one employer only and 
were constantly on call at short notice.
These men were usually hired to drive 
lorries at roll-on, roll-off terminals. They were not trained for port work and had no 
specific port skills.
Men who were hired occasionally and worked in the Port 
infrequently in order to supplement their income. These, too, were not trained and 
had no specific port skills.
This demonstrated that temporary workers cannot be seen as a single mass, and that
skills levels have to taken into consideration. It further demonstrated that, rather than
assuming that the segmented workforce in any industry conforms to a single model, the
background of the industry must be taken into account.
Questions on technical innovation asked what impact it had had on work and
employment organisation, on the port labour process, and on control and resistance.
The impact of containerisation had been felt during the 1970s and 1980s and was not a 
consequence of abolition. However, containerisation had changed the nature of Mock 
work', reducing the job content and the need for dock workers; the number of RDWs in 
London, for example, had fallen by just over 93 percent (from 25,309 to 1759) between 
1965 and 1988.
Chapter Seven 21 °
Technical innovation had already changed the way dockers worked; abolition, however, 
allowed further changes to take place. Changes in work organisation following abolition 
had broken down the cohesiveness of the work system. The men had worked as a self- 
contained work gang that made its own decisions as to how the work would be 
performed. "Team working' was introduced following abolition and, as a result, the 
same men might not work together for some considerable time. This may have 
enhanced employer control by reducing the opportunity to form any type of collectivism, 
but it adversely affected productivity.
Rather than deskilling, containerisation had led to different skills levels. These were 
essentially in line with the introduction of new technology and task 
broadening. Although still needed for some cargoes, the gangs of men performing 
labour-intensive manual work have been replaced by individuals exercising new skills, 
such as driving quayside gantry cranes or straddle carriers. Following abolition, clerks 
and maintenance men were trained to perform port work, and cargo handlers were 
expected to perform other tasks, such as housekeeping, when port work was unavailable.
Contrary to Turnbull's (2001: 373) assertion that technical innovation and abolition had 
passed labour process control to the employer, this research has demonstrated that labour 
process control is not immutable. The men have gradually regained some control and/or 
have found ways and means of circumventing it. Contingent labourers working at 
various locations in the Port had found that 
(interview notes, 27/9/02) and permanent employees at both Tortco' and 'Generalco' 
had regained some control over the labour process. Taul', who worked at Tortco', 
mentioned that or started late, finished early or
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added an extra five minutes onto their breaks (interview notes, 22/2/01). Even though 
working as individuals, cargo handlers at 'Portco' had managed to form a sort of 
collectivism outside union organisation. They decided whether the job would be 'fast' 
or "slow' and, to ensure that the work was completed in time, the supervisors sanctioned 
extra payment before the job started; a similar system was also in operation at 
"Generalco'. This appeared to demonstrate that the employer's 'right to manage' took 
second place to getting the job done on time and thus remaining competitive.
This also raises questions about the nature of custom and practice. If shop stewards are 
the "guardians' of custom and practice, is its growth outside union organisation also 
custom and practice or if not, what is it? This thesis coined the phrase 'spontaneous 
collectivism' to describe what were in essence very localised practices which did not 
spread beyond the immediate workgroup. As mentioned in Chapter Five, this area 
would benefit from further research.
Similarly, contingent labourers with long experience in the industry were also able to 
regain some control of the labour process. This was especially true of those working for 
"Labourco' at "Generalco', who were left to organise their own work.
These demonstrations of what were termed 'spontaneous collectivism', however, were
not part of an organised resistance but were staged by the workforce, some of whom
may have been Branch members.
7:3 
The final area of analysis concerned industrial relations following derecognition, itself a
consequence of abolition. The investigation wanted to discover how union organisation
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had been sustained during the 1990s, how the T&G 1/10 Branch attracted members, and 
how individual members had solved their problems. Finally, as this investigation 
coincided with ERA, it wanted to discover what impact this would have on industrial 
relations within the Port.
It was not so much technical innovation that led to the marginalisation of docks 
unionism, but an Act of Parliament. The 1989 Dock Work Act had abolished the 
Scheme, permitting the abandonment of joint control and thus allowed union 
derecognition. This has led to a fall not only in working conditions but also in the 
standard of training and health and safety - the ports industry had one of the worst 
accident rates in Britain. In order to improve this and to break the Vicious circle' of 
casuals, training and health and safety which were the main concerns of permanent 
employees, registration for all port workers, both full-time employees and contingent 
and "casual' labourers, should be re-introduced. The Labour government, in Opposition, 
promised to ratify International Labour Organisation Convention 137 which, among 
other provisions, calls for the establishment and maintenance of dockers' registers. This, 
however, was still unsigned at the end of 2003. Because of its identification with the 
'baggage of the past', most employers see registration as a return to the Scheme and are 
opposed to it. However, registration is not regulation, and such a register would identify 
the firms that employ and supply labour to the ports and this information could be 
utilised in order to improve training, and therefore health and safety, in the industry.
The cargo handlers Branch for the Port of London, the T&G 1/10 Branch, covered the 
entire Port from Teddington to the Nore Lighthouse. However, the largest percentage of 
Branch members were, or had been, cargo handlers, who worked in an area between
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Purfleet and Tilbury/Gravesend. Although collectivism in the Port has remained alive, it 
was weak and was mainly confined to the above area: this, in turn, has limited its 
effectiveness. This was exacerbated by the composition of Branch membership. 
Although there had been about 1400 Branch members in 2001, only approximately 600 
were described as working cargo handlers, and where both permanent employees and 
contingent labourers; at least 700 Branch members were either dismissed activists or 
retired members. This meant that approximately half of the Branch membership would 
only be able to offer moral support during any industrial action.
However, and despite predictions that docks unionism had been completely undermined, 
this investigation discovered a revival in organisation, especially at Tilbury. Although 
continued job losses and the cancellation of the "check off arrangements in 1993 had 
had an adverse impact on Branch membership, union density at Tilbury, according to the 
shop stewards, never fell below 70 percent. Although membership figures, which this 
research had unique access to, appeared to confirm this, it was impossible to verify as 
neither the Branch nor T&G Head Office appeared to have kept records before 1997.
During the 1990s, when the union was derecognised and the Branch felt abandoned by 
the T&G, Branch members had had to solve their own problems. Individual members, 
such as "Roy', a contingent labourer who mainly worked at "Generalco', would try to 
solve problems by "spontaneous collectivism', only turning to the T&G as a last resort. 
Rather than part of the collective, it was at the various sites that threatened or 
took actual action in order to win improvements in conditions.
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The lack of case studies at Branch level following derecognition made it difficult to 
ascertain whether the Branch's experiences were typical or not. As the Branch minutes 
show, as people tended to join the Branch for traditional reasons, especially problem- 
solving, the Branch took a traditional approach to membership growth but also found 
issues, especially health and safety, to 'organise' around. The Branch Secretary had 
seen 'organising' as a 'common sense' approach to recruiting, and keeping, new 
members; this in turn led to membership growth. Mason and Bain (1993: 343) wrote 
that maintaining membership without recognition was difficult, even in the more union- 
friendly 1970s. The unions needed government backing for recognition, and ERA, 
which supported, rather than promoted, recognition, provided this. The publication of 
which became incorporated into ERA, became the biggest impetus to 
new membership. ERA legitimised union membership and Branch membership 
increased. As a result, two employers - 'Ferryco' and Forth Ports - sought voluntary 
recognition with the T&G before ERA became law.
There had, at the time of writing (late 2003), been no investigation of the impact of ERA 
at micro level. Only further research, therefore, will be able to ascertain whether the 
experience of Branch members working for Forth Ports at Tilbury was an exception, or 
if Forth Ports' actions were common among employers who felt themselves 'forced' to 
grant union recognition under ERA. This research, therefore, can only provide a basis 
against which other experiences can be measured.
Although writing of a different circumstance, the observation of Brown (1998: iii) 
that recognition means what the employer wanted it to mean proved to be apposite for 
the experiences of the Tilbury Branch under ERA. This, in late 2002, had not been as
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effective as Branch members had hoped. Branch membership dispersal coupled with 
organisational complexity, the way work was structured, and the 12 years of union 
marginalisation, had made union revival difficult. Only some Branch members working 
in some departments at Tilbury and at Terryco' were covered by recognition 
agreements. Further, the Tilbury recognition agreement had only been granted on the 
employer's terms, which had tried to contain organisation by splitting Branch 
membership into separate bargaining units.
Because it had instituted procedures that had to be followed, recognition at local level 
had been successful. However, possibly because Forth Ports felt 'forced' into 
recognition, interviews with both Branch members and union officials, together with 
participant observations as Branch minutes secretary during 2002/3 have shown that 
recognition at company level had been 'empty'. The first wages negotiations were 
protracted, lasting one year, and the Branch had to accept the employer's delaying 
tactics. However, the dispute was resolved after a ballot for industrial action, which 
showed the beginnings of cohesiveness among Branch members working at Tilbury.
Other experiences in the Port of London mirror Gall and McKay's (2001: 99-102) 
observations of the obstacles that employers might put in the way of recognition under 
ERA. These obstacles, however, were not new but were identical to those discussed by 
Bain (1970) and Mars (1982) in earlier periods. Terminal employers have, for example, 
divided the workforce into units below the recognition threshold, or have improved 
conditions in an attempt to forestall recognition requests. The strength of feeling among 
the workers in the Port, however, is such that, sooner or later the employers, especially if 
legislation is introduced which lowers the recognition threshold, will find themselves
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having to enter recognition agreements at many of the terminals and labour-supply 
agencies throughout the Port. 
The experience of researching modern port work in the Port of London has been both 
stimulating and rewarding. The case study itself, the first investigation into the Port of 
London since approximately 1993, is itself a contribution to knowledge. It has 
discovered that the employers' tactics - and the workers responses - very much mirror 
those of an earlier period, as do the working conditions of, especially contingent, dock 
labourers. Other major contributions were that, based on the skills levels of contingent 
workers in the Port of London, temporary workers cannot be treated as a homogenous 
unskilled, mass but that the background to the industry in which they work must be 
taken into consideration. Similarly, this research has contributed its discovery that the 
transfer of control of the labour process is not immutable, but that, under certain 
condition, workers within an industry can regain some control. This possibility must be 
taken into account in any discussion of the labour process.
Based on her own observations of Branch meetings, this researcher has seen a 
resurgence of militancy among workers in the Port. This appeared to prompt re- 
recognition under ERA at two terminals. Possibly this research's most important 
contribution was its investigation of industrial relations following recognition under 
ERA. This has given a basis for comparison for the experiences of other unions and 
organised workplaces gaining recognition under ERA.
The above findings have shown a resurgence of worker strength in the Port of London. 
However, it must be recognised that these findings can only be suggestive of a growing
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strength among cargo handlers in the Port. Union cohesion has remained weak and there 
have been no further recognition agreements. Prompted by deteriorating terms and 
conditions, cargo handlers have begun to fight back. At the moment, however, this 
worker strength is often based on workers combining outside an organised setting in 
order to win an improvement in working conditions, rather than on collective solutions.
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53.7 767
* -'000 tonnes
A - 'ooo TEUs: "TEUs are included in the tonnage figures after conversion from TEUs'
(Port of London Authority, 2000: 7).
Source: Port of London Authority, 2000-1, p. 7 
+ Source: Port of London Authority, 2002, p.7.
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Miscellaneous Appendix Two: Health and Safety Statistics: 1996/7 to 1999/2000
1996/7 - final figures
Accidents
Code Title Fatal Major 3dav per 100,000
Employees 
6110 Sea and Coastal Water Transport ... 16 36 257.3
6311 Cargo Handling ... 26 83 2001.8
6312 Storage and Warehousing 2 165 73 966.6 
6322 Other Supporting 6 126 47 2627.1
0141 Agricultural Services 2 51 137 N/A 
1010 Hard Coal Mining 2 36 69 694.11 
4521 General Construction 43 2519 6792 2295.8 
of Buildings
1997/8 - final figures
6110 Sea and Coastal Water Transport 1 26 55 446.5
6311 Cargo Handling ... 41 133 2840.8
6312 Storage and Warehousing 2 193 910 1295.3 
6322 Other Supporting 1 119 566 2976.8
0141 Agricultural Services 2 85 172 N/A
1010 Hard Coal Mining 3 49 93 921.7
4521 General Construction 34 2854 7280 2203.7
1998/9
6110 Sea and Coastal Water Transport 0 18 49 413.6
6311 Cargo Handling 2 21 99 1936.5
6312 Storage and Warehousing 1 123 632 933.3 
6322 Other Supporting 4 133 558 2932.5
0141 Agricultural Services 2 84 192 1616.3
1010 Hard Coal Mining 0 23 81 662.4
4521 General Construction 29 3095 6613 1989.4
1999/2000
6110 Sea and Coastal Water Transport 0 20 65 590.3
6311 Cargo Handling ... 31 131 2571.4
6312 Storage and Warehousing ... 220 1156 1443.9 
6322 Other Supporting 3 118 616 3443.9
0141 Agricultural Services 1 101 257 2409.4
1010 Hard Coal Mining 1 31 58 737.7
4521 General Construction 40 3074 7016 1963.6
... - column left blank 
0 - written in column
Source: Health and Safety Executive, Injuries to Employees as Reported to HSE 
1996/7 to 1999/2000.
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in comparison 
with average male manual wages in the Services sector
(11,273.60) 
(12,292.80) 
(12,906.40) 
(13,218.40) 
(13,520.00) 
(14,040.00) 
(18,288.40) 
(14,419.60) 
(21,808.80) 
(22,672.00) 
(25,474.80) 
(23,514.40) 
(20,378.80) 
(16,749.20)
39.3
39.3
37.5
39.7
39.5
38.6
5.9 
5.6 
5.6 
5.3 
5.7 
5.7 
5.3 
5.7 
5.0 
2.4 
2.3 
2.2 
4.4
47.3
45.2
47.7
44.9
44.9
44.7
45.2
45.4
45.1
41.0
40.9
40.6
44.4
*1980 Standard Industrial Classification code 763: Supporting Services to Sea
Transport.
SIC code 76: Supporting Services to Transport (1994 only) 
1990 Standard Industrial Classification code 632: Other Supporting Transport
Activities.
A 1990 Standard Occupational Classification 930: Stevedores and Dockers. These were 
the only figures available for this Classification. 
Serv - Service Industries average
*(...): weekly figures multiplied by 52
Source: from Office of National Statistics, 
Table A4: Average Gross Weekly Earnings not effected by absences, 
Hourly Earnings, and Weekly Hours: Full-time Manual Males on Adult Rates 
1990 to 1995,
Table A6: Average Gross Weekly Earnings not effected by absences, Hourly
Earnings, and Weekly Hours: Full-time Male Employees 1996-2000, and
Table Cl: Average Gross Weekly Earnings and 
Weekly Hours: Full-time Manual Males on Adult Rates 1999.
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